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Prof. Pina D’Agostino is the Founder and Director of IP Osgoode, the IP Intensive Program, and the IP Innovation Clinic, the Founder and Editor-in-Chief of the IPilogue, the Deputy Editor of the Intellectual Property Journal, and an Associate Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School. This article features contributions from Ryan Wong (IP Osgoode & IP Innovation Clinic Alumnus), Sabrina Macklai (IPilogue Senior Editor), Tianchu Gao (IPilogue Writer), and Ashley Moniz (IPilogue Managing Editor).

2021 was an exciting year for the IPilogue. Our hard-working students and community members published more than twice as many articles than in 2020 and the most articles in a calendar year since 2011. This sharp increase helped us stay up to date with some of the biggest topics shaking up intellectual property: from , to ; and from growing investments in and , to IP registrars around the world grappling with whether to acknowledge Ìęas an inventor or artist. This article summarizes the top developments reported on our blog and in patents, trademarks, and copyright law in 2021. For a review of Privacy legislation in Canada, check out .

Top 10 Most Read IPilogue Articles Published in 2021

1. by Sabrina Macklai & Emily Chow
2. by Prof. David Vaver
3. by Claire Wortsman
4. By Claire Wortsman
5. by Natalie Bravo
6. by Prof. Giuseppina D’Agostino
7. by Bonnie Hassanzadeh
8. By Meena Alnajar
9. by Prof. David Vaver
10. by Bonnie Hassanzadeh

Introducing the College of Patent Agents & Trademark Agents

On , the came into force. The Act established the (‘’), an independent public interest regulator of patent and trademark agents in Canada. The purpose of the College is “to enhance the public’s ability to secure the rights provided under the and the .” The College’s responsibilities include maintaining professional competencies and ethics, issuing licences, collecting fees, and administering certification exams. This development marks a key milestone for the profession and for Canada’s . Though still in its infancy, the College has been criticized for and its , which may impose an additional fee on lawyer agents. It remains to be seen how influential the College is on the profession as it is expected to be fully operational within the next two years.

Patents

Overbreadth as an Independent Ground of Invalidity

On July 28, 2021, the Federal Court of Appeal confirmed overbreadth as a standalone attack on patent validity: . In this case, the appellants argued that there is no statutory basis for overbreadth as a ground for invalidity. The Federal Court of Appeal disagreed and found that overbreadth can be supported by a combination of sections 27(3) and 27(4) of the Patent Act. Case law has often overlapped overbreadth with other grounds of invalidity such as obviousness, anticipation, and inutility.Ìę

First Time Interpreting Patent Agent Privilege

Similar to solicitor-client privilege, patent agent privilege was introduced by section 16.1 of the Patent Act on June 24, 2016. The first case on patent agent privilege was decided this year: In this decision, the Federal Court provided some helpful commentary and analysis on the application and limitations of patent agent privilege.Ìę

Patent Prosecution History Now Admissible as Evidence

In 2018, section 53.1 of the Patent Act was added to make patent prosecution history admissible as evidence in patent proceedings. This was a significant development as the Supreme Court of Canada had expressly rejected the idea and stated that admitting patent prosecution history “would undermine the public notice function of the claims, and increase uncertainty as well as fuelling the already overheated engines of patent litigation” (Free World Trust v Électro SantĂ© Inc., 2000 SCC 66 at para. 66). Three subsequent Federal Court of Appeal decisions developed this provision further: ; ; and .Ìę

Continued Debates over AI as an Inventor

Around the world, patent registrars grappled with patent applications that credit artificial intelligence software as the inventor. Dr. Stephen Thaler’s “DABUS” (Device for Autonomous Bootstrapping of Unified Sentience) applied for patents around the world for its interlocking food containers. DABUS was granted patents in Australia and South Africa, with . In line with the and the , the disagreed, stating that absent express intention from Congress, the term “individual” in their statutory definition of “inventor” . The Supreme Court of Canada last considered the definition of "inventor" in 2002, but has yet to consider whether it would include non-human entities.

Trademark Law

Parody in Trademarks is No Joke

In , the Federal Court reaffirmed that parody is not a defence against trademark violation. Unlike the 2020 decision ), where the Federal Court failed to find the marks confusing, Justice McHaffie held there was a likelihood of confusion and passing off. This was based partly on the similarity of the trademarks and the overlap of the goods (both offering baked goods). However, even if the nature of the parties’ trades differ, trademark owners may still find recourse against spoofed versions of their marks through claiming depreciation of goodwill under section 22 of the . Here, the Court found goodwill in Subway’s trademarks, which was damaged by the nature of Budway’s products, as contrary to Subway’s “healthy and active” lifestyle promotion. With damages amounting to $40,000, it is clear the courts are unamused by parody in trademarks.

The Road Less Travelled Cannot be Trademarked

Like most countries, Canada bars the registration of “clearly descriptive” trademarks to prevent applicants from monopolizing words that merely describe the goods or services at hand. For this reason, marks consisting of are typically unregistrable. In , the Federal Court clarified when such marks might be protected. Hidden Bench and Locust Lane are two wineries operating on the same little road, “Locust Lane”. Although the Federal Court agreed that Hidden Bench met the threshold for a valid common law trademark over “Locust Lane”, they ultimately held that the mark, as clearly describing the goods and services’ place of origin, lacked both inherent and acquired distinctiveness. Therefore, Hidden Bench could not establish the necessary goodwill for a passing off claim. Only descriptive marks that have acquired a “secondary meaning” through use may warrant protection.

CIPO Addresses the Application Backlog

While filing trademarks is important for brand protection, the examination stage can take . In May, the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) new measures to address the application backlog. Trademark owners may now file requests to expedite their examination where the registration of their mark is necessary for special circumstances such as if a Canadian court action involving the mark is expected or underway or if the goods or services are aimed at preventing, diagnosing, treating, or curing COVID-19. If accepted, the examination will take place within two weeks. The examination is also automatically expedited by approximately 6-10 months when the goods and services in the application are listed in CIPO’s . Though it is too early to assess the effect of these changes on mitigating the “”, the backlog of CIPO’s unexamined trademark applications appears to have as of December 13, 2021.

Push to Register Non-French Trademarks for Use in Quebec

Among the controversies associated with Quebec’s proposed Bill 96, , the bill stipulates new requirements for trademark owners operating in Quebec. Currently, under Quebec’s French-language laws, both registered and unregistered (i.e., common law) trademarks recognized under the may appear on public signs, posters, and commercial advertising in Quebec, in languages exclusively other than French. If enacted, Bill 96 would permit only registered non-French trademarks to appear on public signage, provided there is no corresponding registered French version of the mark. The Coalition Avenir Quebec government tabled Bill 96 on May 13, 2021, and Quebec’s National Assembly last examined it on December 10. Some iteration of the bill will likely become law by the end of this year. But even if it fails to pass, businesses relying on common law trademarks would be wise to try to register them, given the many that registration provides.Ìę

Copyright Law

In 2021, the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal heard 57 copyright infringement proceedings, approximately of all IP-related litigations at these levels.

Developments in Fair Dealing

The Copyright Act’s section 29 fair dealing provision, which allows for certain uses of copyright-protected materials, remained a central issue. affirmed that fair dealing for the purpose of news reporting (section 29.2 of the Act) must provide attribution, mentioning both the source and the name of the author. An indirect reference to the author accessible through “minimum research” is insufficient. As such, the Federal Court of Appeal rejected Trend Hunter’s argument that hyperlinking to the source article where Stross was credited was sufficient to meet the second requirement. The Court also declined to find fair dealing under s. 29 more broadly, considering that Trend Hunter’s dealing was commercial in nature, reproduced Stross’ work in its entirety, and that alternatives were available.

Fair dealing was once again at issue in , where the Federal Court held that the Conservative Party’s use of the CBC’s news footage of Liberal Party Leader and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau during their 2019 election campaign did not infringe CBC’s copyright. The court undertook a large and liberal interpretation of fair dealing, finding that the Conservative Party’s use of CBC footage was for the purpose of criticism under s. 29.1.

91ŃÇÉ« achieved a in the copyright tariff dispute with the Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (“Access Copyright”) in In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the interim tariff approved by the Copyright Board is not mandatory. Users can choose whether to accept licences or pursue alternative methods to lawfully copy works. Notably, this marked Justice Rosalie Abella’s final decision before her retirement from the Supreme Court of Canada. Throughout her tenure, and her judgement here provided helpful obiter regarding fair dealing as integral to users’ rights.

Even Fake Facts are Not Copyrightable

involves the alleged copyright infringement of the famous true-crime story The Black Donnellys. The book had always been presented and accepted as “.” The Federal Court ruled that “an author who publishes what is said to be a nonfiction historical account cannot later claim the account is actually fictional to avoid the principle that there is no copyright in facts.” Given today’s popularity of the phrase “based on a true story”, this ruling is a that there is no copyright in facts, even if they are later found to be untrue.

Copyright in Evolving Content Transmission

In , the Federal Court found the defendant liable for copyright infringement in its provision of pre-loaded set-top boxes and internet protocol television (IPTV) services and awarded the plaintiff nearly $30 million in damages. These services made copyrighted works owned by the plaintiff available to the public without the plaintiff’s permission. This decision marks the first time The court dealt with a similar issue in ). As IPTV is growing increasingly popular across the globe, its poses a challenge in Canada.

Availability of Reverse Class Actions for Copyright Infringement Claims

The first of its kind in Canada, the Federal Court of Appeal in affirmed that reverse class actions may be pursued in connection with copyright infringement claims. Though the matter was sent back to the Federal Court for further consideration, this judgement may encourage and enable mass copyright enforcement in the future, especially in our digital age where copyright infringement is more commonplace.

Public Consultations Ahead of 2022’s Copyright Reform

As part of the (CUSMA), which came into force on July 1, 2020, Canada has until the end of 2022 to implement numerous changes to their domestic copyright laws; most notably, extending the general term of copyright protection from . In light of the upcoming legislative amendments, the Government of Canada hosted three public copyright consultations in 2021:

• ;
• ; and

With the consultations now closed, it will be interesting to see how Canadian copyright laws will change in 2022 to accord not only with international obligations but our ever evolving digital world and public attitudes surrounding copyright laws.

The post 2021 IP Year in Review appeared first on IPOsgoode.

Emily Chow is an IPilogue Writer and a 1L JD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School.

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Photocopying classroom materials in a K-12 public school system may have seemed harmless and benign before the 2012 Supreme Court of Canada case, . The decision reframes traditional teaching pedagogies by considering the artist and owner rights under copyright law. In doing so, I saw an opportunity to compile a list of resources for educators to make informed decisions about how they use and distribute learning materials (located at the end of this article).

Countless teachers throughout my K-12 years printed and distributed excerpts from a short story or a news article outside of our textbooks that held the most evocative paragraphs for pre-reading and open discussion. Other times, we looked at diagrams from an older edition of a textbook that were “much better for the purposes of our class.” While working as a tutor, I often collected scans of creative math problems from various textbooks.

Despite its benefits, copying materials can present consequences for the content’s owners, artists, and publishers. As a copyright collective, made royalty agreements during the years of 1991-1997 with all Canadian provinces and territories, except Quebec (which has its own collective, ), permitting use of copyright-protected content in primary and secondary schools on a per-student basis. These agreements were slated for renewal in 2004, during which Access Copyright sought to restructure the royalty system to reflect the quantity and extent of photocopies made in schools. Four different categories of usage arose from an assessment of school photocopying habits. The one in this case, Category 4, comprised of photocopying instances where teachers would assign readings from materials outside the textbook.

Access Copyright argued that Category 4 circumstances were not covered under the fair dealing exceptions and thus subject to tariffs. The Copyright Board agreed, claiming that despite the permissible use of the photocopied materials for educational purposes, the use was not fair and so royalties needed to be paid. A series of appeals regarding the definition of fairness ultimately led the case to the Supreme Court.

What constitutes “fair” dealing? The landmark 2004 SCC case, [CCH] defined the tests for fair dealing. It is the potential copier’s responsibility to ensure that their use passes the tests. As Abella J. summarizes in , fairness is assessed considering the “purpose, character, and amount of dealing; the existence of any alternatives to the dealing; the nature of the work; and the effect of the dealing on the work.” According to the , copies made without a student’s request for access do not fall under the permissible “private study” purpose. Consequently, copies made by teachers for the purposes of in-class instruction, pre-readings, and supplementary materials may be considered infringements of copyright. Likewise, I probably also would need to pay royalties for my small collection of math problems and diagrams.

In a 5/4 split, the SCC ruled in favour of educational institutions. , Abella J. contended that a teacher’s goal of instruction—facilitating the education of their students—was necessarily “symbiotic” with students’ studying. She took issue with how the Copyright Board misapplied other factors of the CCH tests, which arbitrarily placed educator copying habits in competition with the textbook market. She also pointed out the possibility of schools being doubly charged by Access Copyright, first upon purchase of the original work, and again upon copying. Note, was a unanimous SCC decision that reaffirmed Justice Abella’s emphasis on end-user considerations in a post-secondary setting.

Where do these cases leave Canadian educators now? They may continue to teach using copyright-protected materials, and are not required to destroy any copies by shredding them en masse or, theatrically, igniting a large pyre.

Overall, Alberta (Education) v Access Copyright serves as a useful reminder in understanding the legal framework to use original works. Below are several accessible resources that may also inform one’s judgement of fairness and fair dealing, as well as some interesting “further reading”.

In particular, the is a fantastic Canadian resource that can guide educators’ decision-making and reflection processes for the materials in question. It also points out any citation requirements (e.g., author/artist/owner name, title) and/or digital safeguards necessary to limit access to the material.

Further Reading:

Dr. Meera Nair's interesting take on the importance of copyright education for educators in classrooms and the promotion of creative thought:

IPilogue’s Sabrina Macklai writes about the recent 2021 SCC decision regarding post-secondary fair dealing in 91ŃÇÉ« v Access Copyright:

Council of Ministers of Education Canada’s resources for teachers:

Fair Dealing Canada:

Access Copyright’s information and services tab for educators:

Canadian Association of Research Libraries’ Resource Library’s copyright open educational modules for university instructors and staff:

Osgoode Hall’s Professor Giuseppina D’Agostino’s comparative analysis of Canadian, UK, and American fair use/dealing:

The post Revisiting Alberta v Access Copyright: Resources for K-12 Educators in Canada appeared first on IPOsgoode.

Access Copyright is a collective society which administers certain copyrights on behalf of its member writers, visual artists, and publishers. Specifically, authors assign the “reproduction” and “making available” rights to Access Copyright, which then licenses its entire repertoire (made up of the works of all of its members) to organizations such as 91ŃÇÉ«. Organizations , which are negotiated between the collective society and the organizations (ss.68-70.1 of the Act). These tariffs encompass specific time periods, often 2-3 years, and may or may not be certified by the Copyright Board of Canada.

Judicial History of Access Copyright and 91ŃÇÉ«

The case at issue revolves around the Copyright Board’s (at para 1). 91ŃÇÉ« decided to stop paying the tariff mid-way through the term and instead issued fair dealing guidelines to its students, staff, and faculty (collectively, “employees”) under the belief that their activities were acceptable due to the decision in or under the newly amended Copyright Act. Access Copyright applied to the courts to enforce the tariff, and 91ŃÇÉ« counterclaimed that the tariff was not properly certified pursuant to . The court was asked two questions:

1. Whether the interim tariff is enforceable against 91ŃÇÉ«.
2. Whether 91ŃÇɫ’s dealings were fair for the purposes of

At the Federal Court, Justice Phelan decided in favour of Access Copyright, declaring that and that tariffs certified by the Copyright Board were mandatory (at para 356). The panel at Federal Court of Appeals reversed in part the earlier decision, finding that the tariff was not mandatory, while dismissing 91ŃÇɫ’s counterclaim that its Guidelines complied with the fair dealing exception.

Extended Collective Licensing in Canada

Collective societies exist to ease the administration and licensing of copyrighted works. Canada legislates via the Copyright Act how collective societies operate and collect such fees. Outside of Canada, many countries have adopted extended collective licensing (“ECL”) regimes, which further legislate how collective societies operate, both to protect society members and non-members on behalf of whom collective societies collect royalties. Depending on the jurisdiction, ECL offers collective societies additional powers, such as legal standing on infringement claims and the ability to issue compulsory licenses.

If not for collective societies, licensing materials would be piecemeal, with universities having to individually licence every textbook, article, and video which its employees wanted to read and make copies of – a very cumbersome task. With collective societies, universities pay a set rate to collectives, reporting on what has been used, and then the collectives pay the owners for their work. With ECL, collective societies could have increased leverage to act on behalf of authors in enforcing their statutory rights and righting any supposed imbalance brought by aspects of fair dealing.

Access Copyright is likely to argue this case in the SCC this year. Whatever decision results will undoubtedly have a lasting effect on our understanding of fair dealing in respect of education and on how collective societies operate.

Written by Rachael Glassman, Osgoode JD Candidate, enrolled in Professors D’Agostino and Vaver 2020/2021 IP & Technology Law Intensive Program at Osgoode Hall Law School. As part of the course requirements, students were asked to write a blog on a topic of their choice.

The post Access Copyright and the Path to Extended Collective Licensing appeared first on IPOsgoode.

After two exciting and lively debates on the principle of technological neutrality (see Sebastian Beck-Watt’s coverage ) and reproduction rights (see Paul Blizzard’s coverage ), IP Osgoode’s UnpackÌęSODRAC symposium turned to a new panel to ‘unpack’ the paragraphs of [SODRAC] concerning the mandatory (or not) nature of tariffs set by the Copyright Board.

The fresh panel was asked to tackle the issue of whether the majority decision of SODRAC dispelled the notion—coined by Ariel Katz as the “”—that once the Copyright Board approves a tariff, any unauthorized use of a work triggers legal obligations to pay the royalties specified in the tariff and comply with the terms and conditions. The majority judgment’s alleged ‘debunking’ is found in paragraphs [101]-[13]. At paragraph [107] Justice Rothstein (for the majority) wrote: “In the absence of clear authority that this is Parliament’s intent, the burdens of a license should not be imposed on a user who does not consent to be bound by its terms” and, at [112] he concluded “that the statutory licensing scheme does not contemplate that licences fixed by the Board pursuant to [of the Copyright Act (the “Act”)] should have a mandatory binding effect against users [emphasis added].”

This issue was posed to the panel—comprised of Katz ( Intellectual Property Professor), Mario Bouchard (former General Counsel, ), Adriane Porcin ( Copyright Professor), Bobby Glushko (Head of the at University of Toronto), and Howard Knopf (Copyright Lawyer and )—in the form of the following questions: what are the potential implications for collective management organizations (CMOs), copyright users, and the copyright board?; and, more specifically (a major point of contention) does the reasoning of paragraphs [112]-[113] extend to other tariffs approved by the Copyright Board, and if so, does this “debunk” the so-called “mandatory tariff” theory?

Ariel Katz – The spectre is dismissed

Katz promptly asserted that Copyright Board issued tariffs are not mandatory. He focused on the language of of the Act, stating that even though a literal reading of s 68.2(1) appears to grant CMOs a right to collect royalties, it does not grant such a right. The provision reads:

68.2 (1) Without prejudice to any other remedies available to it, a collective society may, for the period specified in its approved tariff, collect the royalties specified in the tariff and, in default of their payment, recover them in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Katz examined the key phrase “default of their payment”, and reasoned that a collective may only collect royalties if the user owes a payment. Logically, Katz argued, if the user does not owe any payment they cannot be in default. As a result, a CMO’s right to collect only extends to a licensee, and not a user who falls outside the definition of the type of users to which the tariff applies.

Katz then argued that the holding was applicable to of the Act, since it is indistinct from s 70.2. He focused on the plain meaning of the word “tariff” and stated that if parliament wanted it to be mandatory, they would have called it a “Levy”.

As a joint intervener in the case with the Centre for Intellectual Property Policy, more of Katz’ argument can be found in his .

Mario Bouchard – Copyright Board-issued tariffs are mandatory

Bouchard followed Katz and began with a criticism of the way the issue was framed for the panel. He was concerned by the classification of s 70.2 licenses as tariffs. Bouchard dispelled this notion by explaining that s 70.2 licenses are not tariffs, they are regulations.

Turning to SODRAC, Bouchard argued in favour of the mandatory tariff theory. He reasoned that the SODRAC decision misapplied, misapprehended, and ignored copyright principles, principles of statutory interpretation, judicial precedents, legislative history, and the way foreign copyright values approach the regulation of collective societies. Concerning copyright principles, Bouchard stated that—well established by the —where permission is required, it is for the user to ask permission from the copyright owners, not the other way around. Asking rhetorically “are we to embrace Google’s approach to copyright: use first, ask forgiveness later”, he conceded that it may be an appealing instrumentalist approach, but Berne still legally controls.

Adriane Porcin – Do users need CMOs in a transactional world?

Porcin followed Bouchard and took a different approach to the issue, seeking not to conclude what the majority decision means. Rather, she examined the context in which the decision was made and inquired into the purpose of the tariff regime, mandatory or not. After detailing the “one size fits all” approach tariffs impose on users, she opined on the purpose of s 70.2 and CMOs in a transactional world where organizations (like CBC) are free to negotiate licensing terms with or without the assistance of the Copyright Board as arbitrator.

She presented four points on this topic: [1] different copyright collectives have different types of relationships with their members, depending on the nature of the work and industry in which the tariff functions, and so the ability to maneuver around s 70.2 depends on the rights granted to each CMO; [2] because some CMOs’ license valuations have disconnected from the utility of those licenses to the users, intervention of the Copyright Board is essential to ensure that users are not subjected to the CMO’s own price setting; [3] the Copyright Board is in a better position than CMOs to assess the fair market price, but the timing of valuations is an issue in fulfilling their role as market surrogate; and [4] CMOs’ evolving governance structures may alleviate the issue. On the last point, Porcin used Access Copyright as an example of a CMO that evolved by shrinking their number of directors and recruiting them based on their industry knowledge and skills. She explained this may be an encouraging step toward reducing the disconnected valuations between CMOs and users).

Bobby Glushko – The lack of clarity about tariffs is not user-friendly

Glushko—Head of Scholarly Communications and Copyright at University of Toronto—brought a unique user’s viewpoint to the panel. Glushko, whose role is to help his institution identify, evaluate and mitigate risk, focused on the uncertainty of this area of copyright law. He explained that in his case, the uncertainty over whether tariffs are mandatory or not—combined with the uncertain potential outcome of valuations involved in those tariff hearings—made his job particularly difficult.

Glushko further explained how the Principle of Technological Neutrality, in light of the SODRAC decision, only exacerbates the uncertainty in his position. It remained unclear what activities constitute copying, whether they are compensable, and what the value of those copies may be.

Howard Knopf – If you don’t like the bridge toll you can swim across

Knopf closed the panel and described why CMOs might see the SODRAC decision as bad for business: it expressed a clear message that, for users, tariffs are not mandatory. Knopf detailed the historical nature of a tariff, proffering an analogy to the old train tariffs from Toronto to Ottawa to regulate train companies, and suggesting that these were only mandatory it you took that particular train—you could ride a bus, plane, bike or hitchhike if they were cheaper, faster or better means to travel. His argument was that the SODRAC decision gives users leeway to choose “alternate means of transportation” by clearing rights for works they want to use through different mechanisms without running afoul of the Act. Bouchard spoke up in disagreement with this analogy, clarifying that users are free to use alternate repertoire (reinforcing the mandatory tariff theory).

Knopf conceded an earlier argument by Bouchard—that tariffs are in fact regulations—but tempered the concession by adding that parliament is capable of adding explicit provisions to make such tariffs mandatory. In the absence of such language, tariffs as regulations still need not be mandatory.

Conclusion

In light of the disagreement between the panelists on whether the mandatory tariff ‘Spectre’ had been debunked, the panel illuminated the difficulty presented by Glushko: ÌęIf we cannot agree on the very nature of tariffs, it makes it difficult for both users and CMOs alike to predict the implications of ł§°ż¶ÙžéŽĄ°ä’s decision. And, with CMOs acting as representation for authors (and owners), and users often being authors themselves, it is hard to find where the SODRAC majority decision falls with regard to the Act’s role as balancer of the public interest and obtaining a just reward for the creator. Does it tilt in favour of the public interest, giving more transactional freedom to users and authors, and accordingly encourage dissemination of new works? Or, does it inject more uncertainty and place greater barriers to the just reward of creators? One thing is certain: the issue made for a fascinating and passionate panel.

The post Tariffbusters: Does the CBC v SODRAC decision debunk the "Mandatory Tariff Theory appeared first on IPOsgoode.

The afternoon event was structured into three panel discussions -- titled "Copyright Scope and Management," "Fair Dealing," and "Technological and Copyright Neutrality" -- in which authors featured in the new book provided short presentations summarizing their findings and analysis on some aspect of theÌęÌę- the series of five copyright decisions released in the summer of 2012 by the Supreme Court of Canada. The panels then proceeded to take questions from the audience.

While all three panels were informative and interesting, withÌę, fair dealing has resurged as a hot topic in Canada. The "Fair Dealing" panel, led by Michael Geist with ÌęandÌę, provided insight into how courts will likely treat fair dealing in future and how educational institutions may react to the decision. Before I discuss the panel’s treatment, a background overview of fair dealing in Canadian copyright law may be useful.

A Short History of Nearly Everything About Canadian Fair Dealing

The law of fair dealing () was clarified by the SCC inÌę. There the Supreme Court described fair dealing as a user right - "more properly understood as an integral part of theÌęCopyright ActÌęthan simply a defence" (2004 SCC 13, para 48). The Court also laid down a non-exhaustive list of six factors that need to be evaluated to determine if a dealing was fair. This evaluation of fairness is part of a two-part test, the first being whether the dealing is for one of the allowable purposes listed in theÌęActÌę(more on this later).

Questions relating to fair dealing appeared twice at the SCC in the 2012 Pentalogy, in ÌęandÌę IPilogue coverage can be foundÌęÌęandÌę.

In Access Copyright, the Court found in favour of the Alberta Education Board, saying that classroom copies made by teachers of excerpts from copyright protected material could be considered fair dealing for the allowable purposes of "research or private study", broadly construed. ÌęThe court also determined that a teacher's purpose for copying could not be separated meaningfully from the purposes of the teacher's students. The teacher and her employer could therefore benefit as facilitating the fair dealing purpose of the students since it is the end user’s purpose that is relevant on the question of fairness.

InÌęBell, the SCC determined that providing 30- to 90-second previews of songs for customers via streaming was not an infringement of copyright and so not subject to a SOCAN royalty tariff. The Court stated that these previews could be considered as "research" on whether or not to purchase the whole song and, being fair in relation to that purpose, passed the second part of theÌęCCH CanadaÌętest.

Both decisions have caused a number of IP lawyers to modify their previous conception of fair dealing in Canadian law.

Fair Use 2.0: The Rebirth of Fair Dealing in Canada: Ariel Katz’s Presentation

Has the shift in fair dealing as a result of the SCC's decisions in the Copyright PentalogyÌębeen a move into uncharted territory, or are we merely back on the course we were always meant to be on? Katz reiterated this point throughout his presentation. WhileÌęÌę- the closely related cousin of fair dealing in Canada - provides an illustrative list of purposes by using the words "such as" before them in the U.S. legislation, section 29 of theÌęCanadian ActÌęlacks this wording. Most lawyers therefore believe that the list of activities in Canada is exhaustive rather than illustrative, on the expressio unius est exclusio alterius principle ("the express mention of one thing excludes all others").

Katz posits that such a reading insufficiently considers the legislative history of fair dealing, once a judge-made principle of equity in UK common law that was later enacted into the Copyright Act 1911 (UK) and carried forward into the Copyright Act 1924 (Can.). Lawyers involved in the drafting process at the time had strangely little to say about whether the enactment was intended to limit the scope of fair dealing in practice as previously understood. ÌęFrom a policy perspective, did or does it make sense to exclude certain areas of use categorically from this user right? Yet with the addition of the categories of parody and satire by the 2012, ÌęCanadian law will likely continue its restrictive approach, at apparent odds with the original intent of the 1911 and 1924 legislation.

Fairness Found: How Canada Quietly Shifted from Fair Dealing to Fair Use - Michael Geist’s Presentation

Michael Geists’s presentation following Katz's was aimed at showing that the restrictive approach to fair dealing would not apply in practice in the future since, after the Pentalogy, Canadians are living in a U.S.-style “fair use” world in all but name.

The Supreme Court’s approach of giving a large and liberal interpretations to the categories enumerated in the fair dealing sections of theÌęCanadian ActÌęmeans that the first part of the fair dealing test - whether the dealing is within the scope of the legislation or not - presents a very low legal hurdle to overcome. Most of the legwork will take place in the second part of theÌęCCH CanadaÌętest through a consideration of the six “fairness” factors. The shift has occurred because: (1) the list of enumerated fair dealing purposes has grown with the 2012 amendments to theÌęCopyright ActÌęin 2012, and most activity should fit into one of the categories, broadly defined; (2) the Court inÌęBellÌęconfirmed CCH’sÌę generous interpretation of the fair dealing purposes, so that most of the "analytical heavy-hitting" should occur when determining whether or not the dealing was fair; and (3) the Court has focused on the end user’s purpose, making it increasingly easier for the Courts to find that third party activities directed to that purpose equally qualified as fair dealings.

On this view, the concept of user rights has clearly expanded and the question arises how creators view this recalibration of the copyright balance.

Fair Dealing Practices in the Post-Secondary Eduction Sector after the Pentalogy - Samuel E. Trosow’s Presentation

Trosow's presentation was direct and to the point: now that the Courts have confirmed fair dealing rights, universities need to stop contracting out of the rights the legal system has granted them. According to Trosow, in 2010 (6 years afterÌęthe decision inÌęCCH), post-secondary schools were still not factoring fair dealing into their copyright licensing strategies. In 2013, after the Pentalogy, there seem to be few reasons for these institutions to hesitate. Trosow argued that licence agreements with Access Copyright should be terminated at the first available opportunity and that institutions should further develop their copyright practice guidelines to take advantage of their fair dealing rights.

Even with the SCC’s recent reinforcement of user rights inÌęAccess CopyrightÌęandÌęBell, post-secondary institutions seem wary of cancelling their licensing agreements with Access Copyright. Trosow stated that the main reasons for this behavior were: (1) institutional risk aversion, (2) overreaching by copyright owners and copyright collectives, and (3) general copyright literacy. Institutions need to make an effort to educate themselves and their staff on how to use materials appropriately to stay within their fair dealing rights . Practices should be developed in an open manner and should act as flexible and useful guidelines rather than rigid workplace rules. For Access Copyright licensing to continue, the collective will need to provide greater value to the institutions beyond what fair dealing provides them.

Reflections

Although perhaps difficult to implement at a book launch, there seemed little discussion on the possible ramifications of the aggressive expansion of fair dealing as a user right. Even in the question periods that followed each panel, only a few individuals raised arguments on the side of collectives and creators.

The Access CopyrightÌęcase undoubtedly represented a massive defeat for copyright collectives - organizations that exist to ensure that creators are paid fairly for the use of their works. If courts continue to interpret fair dealing as broadly as they have in recent years, creators may continue to see their piece of the pie shrink ever further. Whether this is or is not a good result, it is necessary for all angles of the problem to be considered if the proper balance in copyright law as described by the Court inÌę is to be maintained.

Copyright collectives meanwhile have cause to be worried with what these Supreme Court decisions mean for their future and the creators they represent.Ìę The foundations of copyright law were not the only thing shaken after the Pentalogy decisions were released in 2012.

Adam Del Gobbo is the Content/Publication Editor of the IPilogue and a JD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School.

The post The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook Up Fair Dealing appeared first on IPOsgoode.

The what uses of copyrighted works are considered fair dealing, which is in accordance with the policies of several other institutions. Fair dealing is generally accepted to include: up to 10% of a work, a single chapter or article, an entire artistic work from a compilation, an entire newspaper article or page, an entire poem or musical score, or an entire entry from a reference work providing that no more is copied than required. The AUCC developed Ìętailored to various members of the post-secondary community that explain how the policy is to be put into practice by institutions. The guideline offers suggestions to post-secondary institutions about what specific information to include in their own policies in light of , such as a for institutions to post near copying services indicating the institution's copyright policies.

Interestingly, the guidelines dictate that any restrictions imposed by an institution’s licensing agreement will over the fair dealing guidelines. The guideline also implements “” to ensure compliance with fair dealing exceptions. This results in a fairlyÌę guideline, but the AUCC also indicates that activities outside the scope of the restrictions may still be protected by fair dealing exceptions.

There is concern from some that this policy will result in the narrowing of the scope of fair dealing. In , the Court held that one of the factors to consider is the industry standard. While not a conclusive defence, the Court may look to the guidelines set out by a community to determine whether a dealing is fair. If post-secondary institutions broadly accept these guidelines then they will in effect become the industry standard examined by future courts. Post-secondary institutions may opt to remain within the "safeguards" to in an attempt to ensure that they are not the target of infringement claims. If this creates a new outer boundary drawn by the community then courts may follow suit and narrow the concept of fair dealing for education or research. On the other hand, the Court may still hold that dealings falling within industry standards exceed what is fair.Ìę Thus, even if institutions choose to remain well within the boundaries of the guidelines, there is neither a guarantee that claims will be prevented,Ìęnor a guarantee that conduct within the scope of the guidelines will result in a favourable ruling in any proceedings that follow.

On the other hand, there is nothing to prevent the court from determining that a use beyond the scope of an industry practice is nevertheless fair. Courts have made it clear that these policies remain guidelines and nothing more. They will still examine the overall feel of the copying and look to the quality rather than quantity of material copied. InÌęCCHÌęthe Court supported a “large and liberal” interpretation andÌęasserted fair dealing as a user right.

The guidelines are most concerned with the supplemental aspect of the ruling. In that case, the Court stated that it would be unrealistic to expect classrooms to purchase a full book for each student when only a small portion was used to supplement the main text used in the class. Therefore, course packs must remain supplemental to be protected under fair dealing. I suspect that the guidelines are intended to stem the trend of making various excerpts available to students so that the course pack or posted readings become the main reading material provided to students. Even though each individual piece may fall within generally accepted usage and the CCH guidelines, Ìęthe overall effect of such course packs may not pass the Alberta (Education) test for supplemental materials.

Post-secondary institutions do not want to be on the wrong side of a test that balances the rights of students to deal fairly with copyright protected materials and the rights of copyright holders to retain control of the reproduction of their works. The Court continues to affirm tech neutrality and the guideline’s conservative outlook may be attributed to an attempt to remain open to the changes that could be brought about by forthcoming technology. Viewed this way, the guidelines are not restrictive but responsive to the changing ways in which materials are available and the flexible nature of the fair dealing exceptions as viewed by the Canadian court system in recent years.

Allison McLean is an IPilogue Editor and a JD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School.

The post To Use, or Not to Use? That is the Question: AUCC Updates Fair Dealing Guidelines appeared first on IPOsgoode.

I argue that while it is salutary to re-emphasize the existence of users’ rights as per CCH v Law Society of Upper Canada [CCH], and indeed that these rights are here to stay, it cannot be beneficial for the Court to reinterpret the facts, which is the job of courts and tribunals of first instance, or to make policy, which is the job of government; here, unfortunately, the Court indulged in both. In its reasoning, the Supreme Court of Canada showcases rigid reliance on CCH’s six-factor framework and elevates the framework to the level of law.[3] Ironically, in doing so, the Supreme Court of Canada is actually going against the spirit and the benefit that CCH created for copyright law in Canada and, more specifically, for fair dealing.

Fair Dealing and the Copyright Pentalogy

The Supreme Court of Canada released five copyright cases, commonly referred to as the copyright pentalogy, on the same day in July 2012, setting abuzz all circles in the legal community and beyond. Many fundamental copyright issues were raised: delineating the scope of various rights and the overlapping nature of rights in the Copyright Act, technological neutrality, questions of payment and, more broadly, appropriate standards of review, as each of these cases originated from the Federal Court of Appeal’s judicial review of the Copyright Board of Canada decisions. Among the five cases, two dealt squarely with the doctrine of fair dealing: within certain limits, what a user can do with a substantial part of a copyright work without permission of the owner.[4]

In Canada, the doctrine of fair dealing is statutorily entrenched in the Copyright Act. As a result of the recently enacted Copyright Modernization Act, there are now five allowable purposes for fair dealing: (1) research or private study (s. 29); (2) criticism or review (s. 29.1); (3) news reporting (s. 29.2); (4) parody or satire (s. 29); and (5) education (s. 29).[5] Fair dealing is a question of fact and a matter of first impression.[6] The onus is on the defendant to prove that the dealing (1) fits within one of the enumerated allowable purposes; (2) is “fair”; and (3) for “criticism or review” and “news reporting”, sufficient acknowledgement is given. In CCH, a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada ruled that fair dealing, alongside the other exceptions in the Copyright Act, “must not be interpreted restrictively”[7] and that more or less six factors may be used when assessing fairness.[8] In that case, the Law Society of Upper Canada did not infringe copyright, because its Great Library request-based reproduction services fell squarely within the allowances of the fair dealing doctrine. Lawyers carrying on the business of law for profit were held to be conducting noninfringing research. Research should be accorded a “large and liberal interpretation in order to ensure that users’ rights are not unduly constrained.”[9]

In SOCAN v Bell [Bell], Abella J for a unanimous court agreed with the Board that song previews provided by Internet service providers for consumers constituted fair dealing for the purposes of research and thus were not subject to a tariff. Consistent with the spirit of CCH, the term “research” should be given a “large and liberal interpretation”. For the Court, it would be far too restrictive to limit “research” to its ordinary meaning, as it can include “many activities that do not demand the establishment of new facts or conclusions. It can be piecemeal, informal, exploratory, or confirmatory. It can be undertaken for no purpose except personal interest.”[10]

On the other hand, Alberta (Education) was a heavily contentious case, with a 5-4 split decision over the appropriate deference afforded to the Board and the interpretation of fair dealing. At issue was whether copies made at the teacher’s initiative in Kindergarten to Grade 12 classrooms and provided to students with instructions to read the material were made for the allowable purpose of research or private study.[11] While the matter was sent back to the Copyright Board for reconsideration, the Board later ruled that the copying at issue was fair dealing.[12] For Abella J’s majority, the Board misinterpreted the six fair dealing factors. For Rothstein J’s dissent, the six factors are not statutory enactments; fair dealing is a question of fact, and deference should be accorded to the Board. In both cases, the Court seized the opportunity to clarify the interpretive framework set out in CCH.[13]

In Bell, Abella J clarified that a generous, “low-threshold” interpretation should occur for the first part of the test, with respect to determining the allowable purposes, “so that the analytical heavyhitting is done in determining whether the dealing was fair.”[14] While the Court is quite liberal in the first part of the test—some would say too liberal[15]—it is ironically rigid in the fairness analysis.

What follows is a discussion of the Court’s enthusiasm to rehear facts when it does not agree with the outcome, in specific reference to (1) an emerging user perspective test the Court used for determining both the allowable purpose to warrant fair dealing and the first fairness factor (i.e. the purpose of the dealing), and (2) the Court’s general approach to determine fairness: by methodically examining each of the six fairness factors proposed in CCH. I will tackle the latter first, as I find this development the most troubling.

Featured here is the first part of a book chapter written by Giuseppina D’Agostino, Founder and Director of IP Osgoode, the Founder and Director of the IP Intensive Program, and an Associate Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School. The full chapter is available for download . The book is entitled "The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law" edited by Michael Geist, and is available for purchase or download .

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The post The Arithmetic of Fair Dealing at the Supreme Court of Canada appeared first on IPOsgoode.

After spending much (printer) ink on the two-step test for fair dealing that has been outlined in CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, , the SCC ruled, in a very close 5-4 majority, that photocopies of short excerpts from books, made by teachers for students in elementary and secondary schools, should not be subject to an additional tariff.

This is because they come within the ambit of “fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study,” as outlined in of the Copyright Act, . Naturally, the decision has many ramifications for the textbook industry, as well as for authors, educational institutions, teachers and students. Both the majority and the minority were engaged mostly with determining what is “fair”, within the definition of the Act, as well as with respect to the facts of the case. Ultimately, Ìęthe SCC decided in favour of users, firmly entrenching the soon to-be-famous adage that “fair dealing is a user’s right,” (at para. 22), quoting Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of CanadaÌęv.ÌęBell Canada, , covered by IP Osgoode .

On appeal from the Federal Court of Appeal (FCA), the facts of the case were simple enough: Access Copyright, a collective that licenses literary works, filed a tariff proposal with the Copyright Board stating that the photocopies made by teachers in elementary and secondary schools for their students did not constitute fair dealing, and therefore should be subject to royalty payments. The crux of the matter revolved around the second stage of the CCH test: the fairness analysis. The 5 factors from CCH were used to determine the concept of fairness within the context of the case: the purpose, character, amount of the dealing, existence of alternatives to the dealing, and the effect of the dealing on the work (at para. 12).

It is important to note, that the SCC did not make a general ruling as to what “fairness” entails, agreeing unanimously that this criterion was fact-specific. In this case, the facts supported a finding that the photocopying was fair, and the Court remitted the matter to the Copyright Board to whether a royalty really would be the best option in these circumstances. While we wait for the Board to make its decision on the tariff, here is a brief breakdown of the Court’s debate, and some personal thoughts on why the majority’s decision was a fitting one, in this case.

I. Purpose of the Dealing:

Justice Abella, writing for the majority, disagreed with the Board’s view with respect to three aspects: that the purpose of the dealing should centre around the teacher’s (or copier’s) perspective, that the purpose then became instruction (not research or private study), and finally, that the teacher became the facilitator of the dealing, and in doing so, made it unfair, since the teacher’s purpose (instruction) was separate from the allowable purpose of the students (research or private study).Ìę According to Justice Abella, the teacher’s purpose could not be separated from that of the students’, because the teacher would have no ulterior or commercial motive to replicate excerpts unless they were for the students themselves.

The majority also stated that it was incorrect for the Board to have deemed a student request for a photocopy as different from a teacher initiated one, since it was the teacher who had the expertise to know the most suitable material, and this was a part of the process of research and private study, rather than of just pure instruction. As far as the majority was concerned, the purpose is indistinguishable into categories of student versus teacher.

Justice Abella dealt another blow to the Board’s analysis when she determined that “private study,” as contained within the Act, could not have meant “requiring users to view copyrighted works in splendid isolation” (at para. 27). Rather, the term was supposed to have been interpreted conceptually (i.e. relating to one or a select group), than geographically.

Justice Rothstein, on the other hand, disagreed, along with the rest of the minority. Choosing to hierarchize the purposes, the justices deemed the teacher’s purpose to not only be relevant, but also, predominant in the fairness analysis. This was because efficient teaching tools – which include the photocopying of excerpts – are essential to the very nature of the job of teaching itself (at para. 43). The minority then deemed the purpose of the teacher to be crucial in the fairness analysis.

With respect to the interpretation of the words “private study,” Justice Rothstein pointed out that the inclusion of the word private in the act could inferentially mean that it was meant to distinguish private and non-private studies. In agreeing with the majority that studying and learning were "personal endeavours," he also noted that “words used by the legislator should be construed to give them some meaning” (para. 47).

The opposing viewpoints on the matter highlight an interesting component – that of voluntariness, on the part of the students. The Board wanted the SCC to consider the will of the final user – the student, as distinct from that of the copier – the teacher, the latter of who would presumably have a separate agenda from the student. However, I think this seems a trifle far-fetched; while it is true that the process of instruction is essential to teaching, it seems unlikely that the photocopying of excerpts from supplementary textbooks would enable a teacher to obtain any direct commercial gain.

On the question of whether this gain could be indirect, clarification is needed from the courts. For instance, would it matter if the schools in question were private or public institutions? In the former, a good teacher could mean higher salaries, and promotions, while in the latter, a teacher whose skills were enhanced by photocopying excerpts might gain less monetarily, but may gain through an enhanced reputation as a better teacher.

II. Amount and Character of the Dealing:

Once again, Justice Abella focused on the Board’s attempts to distinguish between the student and the teacher’s motives as being a false dichotomy, insisting instead on their unity. The majority viewed the amount as being essential to determine fairness, but entrenched it in the concept of proportionality.

The notion of whether it is fair to copy an excerpt depends on the proportion of the excerpt to the overall work, and not how much was actually copied in terms of the number of pages (quantity). The totality of all copying, according to the majority, is related to the character of the dealing, not the amount. By confusing the two, the Board removed the concept of proportionality from the analysis, which the majority found unacceptable.

Justice Rothstein and the minority, on the other hand, took a broader view of the “amount of the dealing” aspect, because the teachers, in his opinion, would return to the same textbooks to copy different excerpts, thereby increasing the overall proportion of copied work, making the practice unfair.

III. Existence of Alternatives to the Dealing:

In considering whether there were other reasonable alternatives to photocopying the excerpts, the majority found it unreasonable to expect schools to purchase every article that was useful in addition to textbooks. Basing its criteria on the “reasonably necessary aspect,” it differed from the minority by saying that, in the absence of other viable alternatives, photocopying excerpts was the best available course of action.

The minority was adamant to point out that just because there were no other viable alternatives, this did not make the copying fair (at para. 57).Ìę According to them, schools would have had to buy extra copies, and make them available to the public, thus solving the issue of photocopying.

IV. Effect of the Dealing on the Work:

The final criterion, according to the majority, considered whether photocopying would have had a negative impact on the commercial sales of the original materials, and whether this was enough to make a dent in the perceived or potential success of the original books. Both sets of justices were in agreement here— namely that there was a very slight chance, if any at all, that the photocopies would affect the market for the originals, since there was such a large gap between the number of photocopies being made, versus the textbooks sold.

The Court took into account the fact that there was no evidence specifically pointing to photocopying by teachers as a reason for the decline of sales and profits. Therefore, it was not prepared to consider declining sales as a direct or indirect effect of photocopying by teachers.

Implications:

The decision is a reminder to the Canadian public, lawyers and lower courts that fair dealing is here to stay in Canadian law, and must be given a broad interpretation (at para. 48). This has led to questioning whether the SCC has cast the net too broadly. Coupled with the recent changes to the Act through Bill C-11, the decision could potentially mean that a lot more can be included in the category of “education” than would have been previously done, and this might mean a lot more leeway will be given to users, when it comes to using materials. Access Copyright itself has insisted that it will keep pushing for the rights of the creators, and that the decision will .

While reading the decision, some other things come to mind as well. The case concerns the use of supplementary texts and their photocopying, and limits the use of its principles to small, short excerpts. Therefore, it seems that the SCC was quite aware that it would not deal a blow to the entire textbook industry, since in most cases, students will still buy the textbooks they need the most, as has always been the case. Further, in determining fairness, the SCC has not deviated from the CCH case at all, and to speculate, perhaps did so to stress to the lower courts that the application of those factors is crucial in all analysis of fair dealing.

Then, there is the question of whether the Board’s argument would have stood regarding copying of the excerpts by other users. For example, students themselves can now make the copies without the involvement of the teacher – a simple snap with an iPhone can do the trick. In such a case, would there even be the need to consider the facilitator’s purpose as anything other than that it might be to ensure students learn the material, since in this example, there is no facilitator at all? Simply put, the SCC’s eventual determination of a symbiotic purpose seems to be correct, because it gives future courts the option of either lumping in the teacher’s and students’ purposes together, or it eliminates the need for the former altogether. In my opinion, it makes for a less-complicated path in the recognition that fair dealing as, to truly be a user’s right, it must focus on the benefit to the end user.

The Court also draws a sharp line between users and creators in this category, and chooses the former over the latter. While this has no doubt been done to give fair dealing its dues in Canadian law, it also puts creators at a sizeable disadvantage. There is no precise definition of what constitutes a “short” excerpt, and future courts will have to rely on the amount, character and proportionality factors, combined with sizeable judicial discretion to determine whether it falls within the realm of fairness.

The ruling also puts authors in further danger of being inadequately compensated, because with even less dues being paid to the publishers, it leaves the authors with very little, thanks to the profit-making criteria of the publishing world.

The most positive thing, however, seems to be that the SCC has prevented a deviation in the understanding and purpose of the nature of learning, namely that is a constantly evolving, symbiotic process that is both private and public. . At the same time, the Board might have received its wish, albeit in an indirect way. By focusing on the purposes of the user and on the facilitator, the SCC has in fact prioritized the rights of the end user over anybody else’s, even the creator’s. Only time will tell what the overall impact on students’ education, and the educational publishing industry, will be.

Editor's note: The Supreme Court of Canada did not make a definitive ruling on the issue of fair dealing. Rather, the Court held that the Copyright Board's finding of unfairness was based on a misapplication of the fairness factors enunciated inÌęCCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada.ÌęThe Court therefore remitted the case back to the Copyright Board for reconsideration as to whether photocopies made by teachers to distribute to students as part of class instruction at the primary and secondary level are subject to a tariff. Ìę SeeÌęAlberta (Education) v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright),Ìę2012 SCC 37 at paras. 37 - 38.

Mekhala Chaubal is a JD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School.

The post Fairly Dealt: Strong Statement by the SCC in Alberta (Education) v. Access Copyright appeared first on IPOsgoode.