The US Copyright Act weighs in at a hefty 326 pages.⁴�� In contrast the Canadian analogue is a mere 80.⁵�� It may well be justifiable then to lay blame for our copyright problems in Canada at the feet of a comparatively anorexic set of laws.�� The recent case of��Penguin Group, Inc. v. Steinbeck��in the US serves as a lens through which we might consider the logical consequences of such an assertion.⁶��

In the��Steinbeck��case two of John Steinbeck’s sons, heirs to his estate, were denied termination of the copyright licenses attached to their father’s works.⁷�� The court held that Steinbeck’s third wife had already re-negotiated the copyright licenses after his death and as such the purpose of termination under the US copyright act had been met.����

Reversion, known as termination in the US, is designed to allow heirs or creators to escape from earlier improvident bargains.�� Under s.14 of the��CCA��reversion occurs automatically 25 years after the death of the author.⁸�� Under US law reversion occurs after 56 years, upon written notice, within a five year window, and under other special circumstances as delineated on four pages of the act under s.304(c).⁹��

On a plain, though hardly simple, reading it would appear under s.304(c)(2)(A) that Steinbeck’s widow should have obtained only a ½ interest in the copyrights of her late husband due to the existence of his two surviving sons.�� However, it should come as no surprise that a four page subsection can be the source of multiple and conflicting interpretations especially in the face of private contracts and/or testamentary gifts to the contrary.�� This is not the first time that the detail and compliance requirements of the US act have frustrated the attempts of a creator’s heirs to terminate prior agreements.¹⁰��In opposition reversion under the��CCA��has been the source of very little litigation – this suggests, on at least one interpretation, that its application and limitations are simple, clear, and understandable.¹¹��

Canadian copyright laws are in desperate need of reform and a further balancing of user and creators rights is critical as we move towards an increasingly re-sampled media rich environment.�� As we go about this task��Steinbeck��should stand as a reminder to us that intellectual property laws impact the average citizen. Despite the historical tendency to view and develop intellectual property laws for the legal elite the usability, brevity and clarity of our laws are critical to the creative and inventive engines, that is the individuals, in our society.

[2] See

[3] David Vaver, Essentials of Canadian Law- Intellectual Property Law (Concorde: Irwin, 1997) at 115.

[4] Copyright Law of the United States, 17 U.S.C. (2007)

[5] Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 ��

[6] Penguin Group (USA) Inc., et al. v. Steinbeck, et al., USCA Second Circuit, August 13, 2008.

[7] John Steinbeck was the author of such works as The Grapes of Wrath, Of Mice and Men and Tortilla Flat.

[8] Supra note 5 s.14.

[9] Supra note 4 §304(c).

[10] See for a discussion of the battle over A.A. Milne's Winnie the Pooh stories.

[11]In Anne of Green Gables Licencing Authourity Inc. v. Avonlea Traditions Inc. (2000), 4 C.P.R. (4th) 289 (Ont. S.C.J.). the court considered the reversion interests of the plaintiffs and reiterated the simple and default nature of reversionary interests under the CCA.

��

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The impact of tariffs has lead many, including , to opine that downloading in Canada may be legal. A current version of their argument can be summarized as follows.

1. Tariff 22A’s approval of a tariff on communication means that the transmission of the files over the internet, regardless of their copyright status, will be legalized.
2. The Private Copying Levy would then allow individuals to lawfully copy those files to any personal medium.

Viewed in this light blanket tariffs are seen as legalizing the actions they target and they may therefore have unintended consequences. Any proposal for copyright reform must therefore address the question of legality head on.[i]

Tariff 22 would have seen ISP’s which make income via advertising pay copyright holders 3.2% of their gross revenues or 25 cents per subscriber, whichever was greater. Large media corporations (read ISP’s) vehemently opposed the scheme on the underlying basis that the model would destabilize the media playing field. They could no longer be certain of the costs they would need to pass on to users as expenses would be tied to revenue. Market neutrality is therefore another key consideration for any working model.

The SCC’s Tariff 22 also clarified that any version of copyright enforcement on the internet needs to hold those responsible for communication under s.3(1)(f) of the CCA legally responsible. Specifically, the decision held that the ISP’s could not be held responsible as they were merely conduits falling under the exception in s.2.4(1)(b).

More generally we can also say that any solution should be capable of easy implementation. To this end the proposals made in Tariff 22 are again of value. However, instead of targeting ISP’s we need to leverage their relationship with users. There are a small finite number of ISP’s and their networks clearly support illegal file trading. Furthermore, a solution working with ISP’s could target a stable relationship rather than a volatile technology. Over the past 20 years subscriber relationships with ISP’s have not changed appreciably despite substantial technology advances. In opposition Tariff 22A targets individual websites vastly increasing the number and instability of control points and doing little to stem the flow of illegal file trading. In fact the tariffs may only serve to further handicap legitimate operations.

The solution I propose has two principle components. Its first branch recommends that our existing legal solutions (i.e. physical enforcement) for resolving communication infractions should remain in place. This means that when illegal communications reach a level of public pervasiveness which is unacceptable the source of such actions can be conventionally eliminated. This occurs regularly today and has been compared to the war on drugs.[ii] Though far from perfect stemming the flow into popular society may be the best we can achieve.

The second branch addresses the fact that a lack of total elimination results in recognizable losses for artists. To this end the individuals (i.e. the communicators) in the network need to be fined based on the type and magnitude of their copyright transgressions.[iii] With the use of passive file tracking at the ISP level[iv] it would be relatively easy to establishing the actus reus component of the criminal activities taking place while at the same time respecting privacy rights.[v] This provides us with the legal grounding necessary to issue a fine. ISP’s would only be responsible for assessing and collecting fines which is in keeping with their exception right under s.2.4(1)(b) of the CCA. Finally, the fines can be established as set rates thereby eliminating any market imbalances.

The end result is that the arguments made by the ISP’s are quelled but the principle ideas and easy implementation of the original Tariff 22 proposals are retained through co-operative methods while avoiding the presumption of legality created by tariffs.

[i] This was also recognize by CRIA in its Tariff 22A arguments before the Copyright Board in which is suddenly reversed its previous stance on tariff viability.
[ii] Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World (New 91��ɫ: Oxford Press 2006) at 179.
[iii] This is in accordance with s.42 of the Canadian Copyright Act – which creates the criminal penalty for copyright infringement.
[iv] In fact most of these technologies are by ISP’s to shape network traffic.
[v] For further clarification see the under “Collection, Retention and Disposal”

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