IP Osgoode Speaker Series: Advocacy in IP Litigation in the Supreme Court

The post IP Osgoode Speaker Series Video: Advocacy in IP Litigation in the Supreme Court appeared first on IPOsgoode.

This historic event reverberated in a number of domains.

These five judgments mark the final moments before a long anticipated major reform in Canada’s copyright law: on 12 July 2012, when the five judgments were released, the Copyright Modernization Act had been passed by Parliament but had not been declared in force.[6]

In addition to marking the end of one version of the Copyright Act, in the context of intellectual property development in Canada, the “pentalogy” instantly enormously multiplied the total jurisprudence from Canada’s highest court that bears on copyright. Indeed, between the time McLachlin J became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 2000 and the release of the pentalogy, there had only been five copyright judgments from the Court:[7] �ճ�é��������� v Galérie d’Art du Petit Champlain [�ճ�é���������],[8] CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada [CCH],[9] Society of Composers, Authors, and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Association of Internet Providers [SOCAN v CAIP],[10] Robertson v Thomson Corp [Robertson],[11] and Euro-Excellence Inc. v Kraft Canada Inc. [Toblerone].[12] Taken together, these ten cases represent a greater volume of interest from the Supreme Court in copyright than has been evinced at any time since it became Canada’s final appeal court.[13] For example, in Ian Bushnell’s history of the Federal Court, spanning 1875 to 1992, there is mention of only one intellectual property case being appealed to the Supreme Court,[14] a trademark case, Benson & Hedges v St. Regis Tobacco Corporation.[15] Others did reach the Supreme Court but did not merit discussion in Bushnell’s history: for example, in copyright, on appeal from the Exchequer Court (predecessor to the Federal Court), the Supreme Court decided Cuisenaire v South West Imports Ltd in 1969—but consideration of copyright by the Supreme Court under previous Chief Justices has definitely been infrequent.[16] One reason for this relative paucity of copyright cases in the Supreme Court may be the strong contribution to intellectual property jurisprudence between 1964 and 1980, which is universally acknowledged as being made by Jackett CJ of the Federal Court.[17]

But, beyond the context of copyright jurisprudence, the release of these five copyright decisions together was a landmark in the history of Supreme Court jurisprudence in general. This chapter will focus on the historic copyright “pentalogy” but, rather than considering these judgments primarily in light of Canadian copyright jurisprudence— or, indeed, in light of intellectual property jurisprudence more broadly—the discussion will focus on these five judgments in the context of Canada’s Supreme Court jurisprudence generally...

The post The Context of the Supreme Court’s Copyright Cases appeared first on IPOsgoode.

Of the five cases, two do not seem particularly controversial. In the first case, Re:Sound v Motion Picture Theatre Association of Canada,[3] which involved the 1961 Rome Convention,[4] a unanimous Court agreed with the Copyright Board that sound recordings embedded in movie soundtracks were not (or were no longer) to be treated as sound recordings under the Copyright Act,[5] thus rejecting the application in Canada of an Australian precedent based on a similar fact pattern but on very different statutory language. Given the wording of section 2 of the Act, the outcome seems reasonable. While the Rome Convention might have led the Court to take a longer look at the appellants’ arguments that a pre-existing sound recording reproduced in a soundtrack is still a sound recording and/or that a new sound recording is created by ripping the soundtrack—based on the principle that statutes should be interpreted in accordance with treaties ratified or adhered to by Canada[6]—the statute seems rather unambiguous in defining a soundtrack as something other than a phonogram because it is not exclusively “aural”.[7] The idea that an existing sound recording ceases to exist under Canadian copyright law when (while) it is embedded in a soundtrack and re-emerges when ripped would deserve a longer comment, but the point is not one I wish to belabour here.

In the second case, Rogers v SOCAN,[8] the Court decided (unanimously on this point[9]) that a series of point-to-point on-demand transmissions of works constituted a form of communication to the public (covered by an exclusive right) even if each individual transmission was not, at least colloquially, public. The Court referred to the WIPO Copyright Treaty[10] and the making available right in that context. That case was, I believe, rightly decided if the normative basis for the definition of “public” that has applied to signals sent to groups of private homes, hotel rooms, etc. (which, together, constitute a “public”) is to be followed.

Two of the three other cases in the pentalogy were 5-4 splits. Not surprisingly, they are controversial. I return to those two cases below. I will also mention the fifth (and last case) of the pentalogy, namely SOCAN v Bell, later on. It is not particularly controversial but it needs to be contextualized. However, before embarking on our review of the cases, I wish to take the reader for a quick a tour of ancient China and Greece...

Featured here is the first part of a book chapter written by Daniel Gervais, Professor of Law and Director of the Intellectual Property Program at Vanderbilt University. The full chapter is available for download . The book is entitled "The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law" edited by Michael Geist, and is available for purchase or download .

The post The Internet Taxi: Collective Management of Copyright and the Making Available Right, after the Pentalogy appeared first on IPOsgoode.

In what is now dubbed the Supreme Court’s “copyright pentalogy”—five copyright judgments released concurrently by the Court in July 2012[1]—the unprecedented importance accorded by the Court to the principle of technological neutrality is clear; what remains unclear is precisely what “technological neutrality” means, why it matters, and whether or how it can (or should) ever be attained.

This chapter aims to critically assess the significance of the principle and its potential to guide the future development of copyright law and policy in Canada. In Part 2, I set out the various shades of meaning that can be attached to technological neutrality, first as a principle of sound regulation, and then as a principle of statutory interpretation by the courts. I review, in Part 3, the reasons delivered by the Justices in three of the five cases to examine the various and divergent ways in which the principle of technological neutrality was defined and rationalized by members of the Court. I proceed to explore the application of the principle and its role in resolving the legal issues before the Court, drawing connections between conceptualizations of the principle and its interpretive impact, and focusing on its capacity to support the extension and/or circumscription of owners’ and users’ rights.

In Part 4, I consider whether the role accorded to technological neutrality as a guiding principle is justifiable or appropriate in the context of Canadian copyright policy. Arguing that its justification is found in, and flows from, the concept of balance at the heart of the copyright system, I proceed to offer some thoughts on its potential significance in the future of Canadian copyright law and in light of the recent amendments to the Copyright Act.[2] Part 5 concludes that the new emphasis placed by the Court on technological neutrality as a guiding principle is an important and positive development for Canada’s copyright system. The caveat, however, is that the principle cannot perform this role effectively if conceived (or rhetorically invoked) as a limited principle of formal non-discrimination that merely justifies the extension of copyright’s reach. Rather, I argue, it must be conceived in a functional sense, shaping copyright norms to produce a substantively equivalent effect across technologies, with a view to preserving the copyright balance in the digital realm.

Featured here is the first part of a book chapter written by Carys Craig, Associate Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School. The full chapter is available for download . The book is entitled "The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law" edited by Michael Geist, and is available for purchase or download .

The post Technological Neutrality: (Pre)Serving the Purposes of Copyright Law appeared first on IPOsgoode.

I argue that while it is salutary to re-emphasize the existence of users’ rights as per CCH v Law Society of Upper Canada [CCH], and indeed that these rights are here to stay, it cannot be beneficial for the Court to reinterpret the facts, which is the job of courts and tribunals of first instance, or to make policy, which is the job of government; here, unfortunately, the Court indulged in both. In its reasoning, the Supreme Court of Canada showcases rigid reliance on CCH’s six-factor framework and elevates the framework to the level of law.[3] Ironically, in doing so, the Supreme Court of Canada is actually going against the spirit and the benefit that CCH created for copyright law in Canada and, more specifically, for fair dealing.

Fair Dealing and the Copyright Pentalogy

The Supreme Court of Canada released five copyright cases, commonly referred to as the copyright pentalogy, on the same day in July 2012, setting abuzz all circles in the legal community and beyond. Many fundamental copyright issues were raised: delineating the scope of various rights and the overlapping nature of rights in the Copyright Act, technological neutrality, questions of payment and, more broadly, appropriate standards of review, as each of these cases originated from the Federal Court of Appeal’s judicial review of the Copyright Board of Canada decisions. Among the five cases, two dealt squarely with the doctrine of fair dealing: within certain limits, what a user can do with a substantial part of a copyright work without permission of the owner.[4]

In Canada, the doctrine of fair dealing is statutorily entrenched in the Copyright Act. As a result of the recently enacted Copyright Modernization Act, there are now five allowable purposes for fair dealing: (1) research or private study (s. 29); (2) criticism or review (s. 29.1); (3) news reporting (s. 29.2); (4) parody or satire (s. 29); and (5) education (s. 29).[5] Fair dealing is a question of fact and a matter of first impression.[6] The onus is on the defendant to prove that the dealing (1) fits within one of the enumerated allowable purposes; (2) is “fair”; and (3) for “criticism or review” and “news reporting”, sufficient acknowledgement is given. In CCH, a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada ruled that fair dealing, alongside the other exceptions in the Copyright Act, “must not be interpreted restrictively”[7] and that more or less six factors may be used when assessing fairness.[8] In that case, the Law Society of Upper Canada did not infringe copyright, because its Great Library request-based reproduction services fell squarely within the allowances of the fair dealing doctrine. Lawyers carrying on the business of law for profit were held to be conducting noninfringing research. Research should be accorded a “large and liberal interpretation in order to ensure that users’ rights are not unduly constrained.”[9]

In SOCAN v Bell [Bell], Abella J for a unanimous court agreed with the Board that song previews provided by Internet service providers for consumers constituted fair dealing for the purposes of research and thus were not subject to a tariff. Consistent with the spirit of CCH, the term “research” should be given a “large and liberal interpretation”. For the Court, it would be far too restrictive to limit “research” to its ordinary meaning, as it can include “many activities that do not demand the establishment of new facts or conclusions. It can be piecemeal, informal, exploratory, or confirmatory. It can be undertaken for no purpose except personal interest.”[10]

On the other hand, Alberta (Education) was a heavily contentious case, with a 5-4 split decision over the appropriate deference afforded to the Board and the interpretation of fair dealing. At issue was whether copies made at the teacher’s initiative in Kindergarten to Grade 12 classrooms and provided to students with instructions to read the material were made for the allowable purpose of research or private study.[11] While the matter was sent back to the Copyright Board for reconsideration, the Board later ruled that the copying at issue was fair dealing.[12] For Abella J’s majority, the Board misinterpreted the six fair dealing factors. For Rothstein J’s dissent, the six factors are not statutory enactments; fair dealing is a question of fact, and deference should be accorded to the Board. In both cases, the Court seized the opportunity to clarify the interpretive framework set out in CCH.[13]

In Bell, Abella J clarified that a generous, “low-threshold” interpretation should occur for the first part of the test, with respect to determining the allowable purposes, “so that the analytical heavyhitting is done in determining whether the dealing was fair.”[14] While the Court is quite liberal in the first part of the test—some would say too liberal[15]—it is ironically rigid in the fairness analysis.

What follows is a discussion of the Court’s enthusiasm to rehear facts when it does not agree with the outcome, in specific reference to (1) an emerging user perspective test the Court used for determining both the allowable purpose to warrant fair dealing and the first fairness factor (i.e. the purpose of the dealing), and (2) the Court’s general approach to determine fairness: by methodically examining each of the six fairness factors proposed in CCH. I will tackle the latter first, as I find this development the most troubling.

Featured here is the first part of a book chapter written by Giuseppina D’Agostino, Founder and Director of IP Osgoode, the Founder and Director of the IP Intensive Program, and an Associate Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School. The full chapter is available for download . The book is entitled "The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law" edited by Michael Geist, and is available for purchase or download .

Normal
0

false
false
false

EN-CA
X-NONE
X-NONE

/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:"Table Normal";
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-priority:99;
mso-style-qformat:yes;
mso-style-parent:"";
mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin-top:0in;
mso-para-margin-right:0in;
mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt;
mso-para-margin-left:0in;
line-height:115%;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;
mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;
mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast;
mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;
mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;
mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;}

The post The Arithmetic of Fair Dealing at the Supreme Court of Canada appeared first on IPOsgoode.

The Copyright Pentalogy rocked the foundations of Canada’s media industries, and will have wide reaching repercussions for Canadian copyright law. The book, entitled “” is the first comprehensive scholarly analysis of the pentalogy. The text covers a range of topics, including the standard of review in the courts, the implications and evolution of fair dealing, technological neutrality, the scope of copyright and copyright collective management.

The book is edited by Prof. Michael Geist of the University of Ottawa and includes contributions from many of Canada’s leading copyright scholars, including IP Osgoode’s very own Prof. Giuseppina D’Agostino and Prof. Carys Craig. It is sure to be a must have resource for anyone interested in Canadian copyright law in the future.

Print copies are available from the and an open access PDF version is available as a .

The post New Book - The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law appeared first on IPOsgoode.

“Reflections on the Supreme Court of Canada 2012 Copyright Decisions”

“Advocacy Skills and IP: Observations from the Bench”

The post IP Osgoode Speaker Series Videos appeared first on IPOsgoode.

The IPilogue has covered these 5 cases in depth and our analysis of each can be found .

The lecture began with introductory statements by the Founder and��Director of IP Osgoode, . IP Osgoode's followed with a short outline of Justice Rothstein’s legal career and past accomplishments. We learned that before becoming a judge, Justice Rothstein spent a number of years in private practice dealing primarily with administrative and transportation law issues.�� He��later became a member of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal��and held��a host of other offices throughout his career. (More information on Justice Rothstein’s career can be found .) Upon his appointment to the Federal Court in 1992, Justice Rothstein developed an interest in intellectual property law, writing a number of influential decisions. He was eventually elevated to the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in 2006. Professor Vaver made special note that the date of Justice Rothstein’s official swearing-in ceremony – April 10^th, 2006 – was auspicious for sharing the anniversary of the commencement of the and potentially meant important things to come for the field of copyright law as a result.

Justice Rothstein, taking to the podium,��made his sizable audience laugh at his forgetfulness to bring his “red Santa Claus robes” for the lecture and mentioned that his introduction would have been very different had his wife Sheila given it. This set the tone for the rest of the lecture – Justice Rothstein proceeded to give a very frank and honest discussion on the Copyright Pentalogy cases, eager to generate discussion on the cases and to answer questions the audience had on his experiences when deciding these cases.

Justice Rothstein began with a short discussion of 3 of the cases: ; ; and . To an extent, these could be considered the “less-controversial” decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Pentalogy (as evidenced by the unanimous decisions in Re:Sound and SOCAN v Bell and the majority of 8 in Rogers v SOCAN). However, Justice Rothstein had some important points he wanted to share with respect to the latter two cases.

In SOCAN v Bell, the court had to determine if an online preview of a song could be considered “research” for the purpose of avoiding a claim of copyright infringement under a fair dealing exception. The SCC agreed with the decision of the Copyright Board – such a use was reasonable and was protected under fair dealing. Justice Rothstein referred to what he thought were 4 interesting aspects of this case:

1)���������� “Research” as described in the case is a very low hurdle to overcome and provides an expansive approach to the first part of the fair dealing test laid out in .

2)���������� In determining whether the specific dealing at issue was fair or not under��the second part of the fair dealing test,����the reviewing courts should��give deference to first instance courts that make a determination on this issue.

3)���������� Fair dealing is to be assessed from the point of view of the purchaser/user.

4) �� �� ��"Research" need not be associated with traditional intellectual pursuits.

In Rogers v SOCAN, the court determined the meaning of “to communicate the work to��the public” in s. 3(1)(f) of the Copyright Act in the context of streaming musical works. Justice Rothstein wrote the decision for the majority: streaming of a copyright work to a number of individuals is a public communication.�� The determination of this issue could be different depending on whose point of view (the sender or the receiver); in the end the desire for the court to remain technologically neutral led to it's decision.

The discussion of the last two cases in the Copyright Pentalogy ( and ) provided interesting insight into the thoughts and opinions of the Supreme Court Justice (it should be noted that Justice��Rothstein wrote dissenting opinions in each of the cases).

To begin his discussion of ESAC v SOCAN, Justice Rothstein told a story about a case he worked on in 1990 about railway companies and grain rates, representing four provinces in the case. Ian Binnie, who would also later become a Justice of the SCC presented a very compelling statutory interpretation argument to the court. After a sleepless night preparing a response, Justice Rothstein was able to convince the court that the railway company was attempting to get double compensation for its product (“double-dipping”). The purpose of the story was to illustrate that judges��do not like��double-dipping and will go to great��lengths to prevent any such unjust enrichment. The relevance of the anecdote became readily apparent as ESAC v SOCAN concerned copyright holders of musical works wanting to receive royalties for their music used in video games which had been downloaded over the internet. SOCAN attempted to construe the download as a communication (the artists only negotiate a right to reproduce the musical works), thereby entitling artists to a separate communication tariff.�� For Justice Rothstein, applying his caselaw experience as a practitioner, now on the other side, it wasn’t very difficult to see how some of the judges viewed SOCAN's approach as an attempt to “double-dip".

Justice Rothstein repeated the well-known concept that the purpose of the court is to give effect to legislation that has been created by governmental bodies and to interpret those laws in accordance with their purpose. However, Justice Rothstein disagreed with the approach that the majority took in this case – in determining that the list in s. 3(1) of the ��are not individual and distinct rights (as he and the minority believed) but rather enumerated examples of the sole rights to reproduce, perform and publish works that is outlined in the preamble to s. 3(1). He also disagreed with the majority’s decision to push technological neutrality (a desirable objective but not one enshrined in the Copyright Act) ahead of some of the statutory requirements that he felt were overlooked.�� Justice Rothstein then pointed out that SCC judges are not prescient or clairvoyant – the court does not usually know what will happen as a result of their decisions until they take place.

If technological neutrality becomes an overriding issue in copyright cases, Justice Rothstein is not sure if copyright laws will be read more narrowly now or what effect the Copyright Modernization Act will have on future cases that come to the federal courts.�� He��noted that some cases have already come forward as a result and that there will likely be many more.

Justice Rothstein finished his presentation with a discussion of the Access Copyright case – where photocopies made by teachers and distributed to their students as part of class instruction were determined to be fair dealing under s. 29 of the Copyright Act. These types of copies were considered “Category 4” photocopies – the other 3 categories were already considered fair dealing and were either copies made for the teacher’s use or at the request of a student. While the majority determined that these copies could be considered fair dealing (the end user was the student and considerations towards their research should weigh in their favour), the minority believed that since the teacher would be doing the copying, the teacher’s purpose should weigh in their favour.

After the decision by the SCC on the subject, the redetermination by the Copyright Board was, in the words of Justice Rothstein, “terse” (as most 1-sentence decisions tend to be). The SCC’s decision did not allow for much flexibility and went against one of the usual practices of appellate courts – to give deference to the Copyright Board in findings of fact (fairness in claims of fair dealings is one such finding of fact).�� Justice Rothstein noted that while the courts “don’t always practise what they preach”, one of the differences between the relationship between the Copyright Board and the courts as opposed to other tribunals is that the federal and provincial courts��have concurrent jurisdiction with the Copyright Board in interpreting rights. He finished his discussion of the case by stating that he agreed with a deferential review by appellate courts on factual questions but not on legal questions decided by any tribunal.

After a round of applause concluded his presentation, Justice Rothstein took a seat between Professors D’Agostino and Vaver and answered some of the questions that audience members had with respect to the Copyright Pentalogy and his thoughts on copyright issues. One such question was posed by IP Osgoode's concerning the role of the balancing principle as discussed in and its effect on statutory interpretation. Rothstein replied that this balancing is at the very heart of many of the decisions the court makes, not only in copyright cases but other intellectual property cases such as the . He also stated that while some may believe that the “balancing” done by the court is an after-the-fact justification of the court’s decisions, the concept of balance is always in the mind of the adjudicators.

Another thought-provoking question by an audience member was whether there is room for common law equity considerations in copyright law��(being a creature of statute). Justice Rothstein responded that even though the court is bound to the statute in a number of ways, equitable considerations can come into play.�� While he was unsure of the application of the equity��doctrine to Canadian copyright law, he mentioned��one possibility could be new factors being added to the six factor CCH fair dealing test.

After a resounding applause from the audience at the closing of the discussion and a short wait as the Supreme Court Justice answered the personal questions of some inquisitive Osgoode students, I was able to thank Justice Rothstein for speaking at our school and providing us his insights on these important copyright issues. It was an enlightening afternoon and I hope that he returns to speak to us again in the future. Perhaps we can get his wife Sheila to introduce him��next time? (You had to be there for his opening remarks, please do watch the webcast when it becomes available).

Adam Del Gobbo is a JD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School.

The post IP Osgoode Speaker Series: The Honourable Mr. Justice Marshall Rothstein – Reflections on the Supreme Court of Canada 2012 Copyright Decisions appeared first on IPOsgoode.

IP Osgoode is proud to present our fall speaker series. The Honourable Justice Marshall Rothstein of the Supreme Court of Canada will be presenting a lecture on the recent cases at the Supreme Court entitled "Reflections on the Supreme Court of Canada 2012 Copyright Decisions" on November 27. The Honourable Mr. Justice Roger T. Hughes of the Federal Court of Canada will be presenting a lecture regarding advocacy skills entitled "Advocacy Skills and IP: Observations from the Bench" on November 29. These events are a must-see for anyone interested in Intellectual Property.

Details:

"Reflections on the Supreme Court of Canada 2012 Copyright Decisions" - November 27, 12:30pm-2:00pm, Moot Court, Osgoode Hall Law School, 91��ɫ, 4700 Keele St, Toronto, Canada. Please RSVP to , Event Code: Rothstein, by Monday November 20. Lunch will be served. All are welcome. Click for details.

"Advocacy Skills and IP: Observations from the Bench" - November 29, 3:30pm-5:00pm, Faculty Common Room (Room 2027), Osgoode Hall Law School, 91��ɫ, 4700 Keele St, Toronto, Canada. Please RSVP to , Event Code: Hughes, by Monday November 22. All are welcome. Click for details.

If you are unable to attend our speaker series lectures, a video archive of both presentations will be made available on the IP Osgoode website following the events.

The Honourable Mr. Justice Marshall Rothstein:��Born December 25, 1940 in Winnipeg, Manitoba. Educated at Winnipeg schools and University of Manitoba, B.Com., 1962, LL.B., 1966. Called to the Bar of Manitoba, 1966. Married to Sheila Dorfman of Montreal on June 12, 1966. Four children: Ronald, Douglas, Tracey and Robert, and three grandchildren. Associate Thorvaldson, Eggertson, Saunders and Mauro, 1966-69; Aikins, MacAulay & Thorvaldson, 1969-72; partner Aikins, MacAulay & Thorvaldson, 1972-92, member and periodic Chairman of Management Committee/Executive Board, 1981-92. Appointed Q.C., 1979.

Practised in the areas of Administrative Law and Litigation, primarily Transportation and Competition Law. Labour and commercial arbitrator. Adjudicator, Manitoba Human Rights Act, 1978-83. Member, Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, 1986-92. Appeared before federal and Manitoba Administrative Tribunals, Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench, Manitoba Court of Appeal, Federal Court, Federal Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada. Lecturer, Transportation Law, University of Manitoba Faculty of Law, 1970-83, 1988-92. Lecturer, Contract Law, University of Manitoba, Extension Department, 1970-75. Bar Admission Course Lecturer, Law Society of Manitoba, 1970-75. Secretary (Administrator), Civil Legal Aid Committee, Law Society of Manitoba, 1968-70. Chairman, Commission on Compulsory Retirement (Manitoba), 1981-82. Chairman, Ministerial Task Force on International Air Policy (Canada), 1990-91. Member, Manitoba Transportation Industry Development Advisory Committee, 1985-87, and Chairman, 1987-90. Member, Airports Task Force, 1985-86. Member, Airports Transfer Advisory Board, 1988-92. Member, External Advisory Committee, University of Manitoba Transport Institute, 1989-92.

Judge of the Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division, and member ex officio Appeal Division, June 24, 1992 – January 20, 1999. Appointed to the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada, October 29, 1992. Judicial member of the Competition Tribunal, May 31, 1993 – January 20, 1999. Appointed to the Federal Court of Appeal, January 21, 1999. Appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada, March 1, 2006.e.

The Honourable Mr. Justice Roger T. Hughes: Born September 16, 1941, in Montreal, Quebec. Educated at Queen’s University (B.Sc. 1963) and University of Toronto (LL.B. 1966). Called to the Bar of Ontario (1968) and Alberta (1976). Appointed Queen’s Counsel (1984). Associate and Partner, Sim, Hughes, Ashton & McKay and Sim & McBurney (1969 – 2005).

Certified Specialist in Intellectual Property Law and in Civil Litigation, Law Society of Upper Canada; Fellow, Chartered Institute of Arbitrators; Fellow, American College of Trial Lawyers; Fellow, Intellectual Property Institute of Canada; Registered Professional Engineer (1964), Registered Trade Mark Agent (1968), Registered Patent Agent (1969); Past-President, Patent and Trademark Institute of Canada; Past Director, Advocates’ Society; Author and speaker, Court practice and procedure, patent, trade mark and copyright law, and media and entertainment law.

Appointed Judge of the Federal Court, and ex officio, member of the Federal Court of Appeal, June 1, 2005. Appointed as a Judge of the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada on June 23, 2006.

The post IP Osgoode Speaker Series: Justice Marshall Rothstein & Justice Roger T. Hughes appeared first on IPOsgoode.

These cases will have an impact for years to come on all sides of the copyright industry, including creators, users and intermediaries. The teleseminar panel will be comprised of notable copyright counsel, including those involved in the cases, and will be moderated by Professor Giuseppina D’Agostino, Founder & Director of IP Osgoode. The teleseminar will explain the decisions and their implications, along with a discussion of various issues, such as:

• Sales by download – the Court’s finding that the internet is a “technological taxi”, and the implications of that interpretation
• Important confirmation of the treatment of streaming content. What will the future look like now?
• Critical new findings on Fair Dealing:
• Music download previews as “research”
• Teacher copying survives: understanding the Court’s analysis, application of the CCH factors
• The user perspective in assessing research purpose
• How do these ruling affect our understanding of fair dealing?
• How far might “research” be stretched?
• Clarifying the use of previously recorded music in film soundtracks
• Which previous copyright decisions are no longer good law?
• What the rulings mean for internet commerce and content
• Key issues that remain to be determined in future cases
• How will the new rulings mesh with the pending amendments to the Act?
• Split decisions: are rival camps developing? How stable is the current state of the law?

Participants will also be given an opportunity to ask questions of the panel. To register for the teleseminar or acquire more details, please see .

Students of Osgoode Hall Law School who are interested in attending the teleseminar should contact IP Osgoode (iposgoode@osgoode.yorku.ca).

The post IP Osgoode and Osgoode PD host Joint Teleseminar on Copyright Pentalogy appeared first on IPOsgoode.