Eligibility

To be eligible, you must be currently enrolled as a JD candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School.��

All applicants must possess strong grades, exemplary organizational skills, be proficient in legal research and writing, and have a strong interest in intellectual property law.

Term

May-August 2023, with a possibility of continuing on for the academic year.

The successful candidates will receive compensation.

Application Procedure

To apply, please submit:

1. A cover letter;
2. A copy of your resume;
3. A copy of your grades (can be unofficial grades; please include any previous degrees); and
4. A sample of your written work on any topic of your choice (please limit to 3-5 pages).

to��iposgoode@osgoode.yorku.ca��by��March 31, 2023.

We thank all applicants in advance, only those students who will be interviewed will be contacted.

The post CALL FOR APPLICATIONS - Research Assistants (Summer 2023) appeared first on IPOsgoode.

Meena Alnajar is an IPilogue Senior Editor, IP Innovation Clinic Senior Fellow and 3L JD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School.

Photo by Buda Photography

On November 9, IP Osgoode, Reichman University and Microsoft hosted the first in-person Bracing for Impact Conference since 2019. The conference focussed on “The Future of AI for Society.” While AI is full of exciting possibilities, real-world application and integration are relatively nascent. Implementing AI technology in society requires complex interdisciplinary engagement between engineers, social scientists, application area experts, policymakers, users, and impacted communities. At the conference, an esteemed lineup of speakers across disciplines discussed the forms that interdisciplinary collaboration could take and how AI can help shape a more just, equitable, healthy, and sustainable future.

Spot was one of many unforgettable guests at IP Osgoode’s Bracing for Impact Conference. A four-legged metal friend, Spot is an inspection robot from Boston Dynamics that explores hazardous spaces to capture digital images and generate mapping data. Currently, Spot is used by , Boston Dynamics’ North American partner. Spot is tasked with gathering data in hazardous spaces, such as construction sites and mines. The hope is that Spot can reduce harm and liability that stem from working in dangerous spaces. Spot has pre-assigned walking routes over huge expanses. While walking, Spot can take images through a mounted camera. We watched Spot scan a symbol resembling a QR code on the wall before completing its pathway. Spot also avoided obstacles, such as a large box in its way, by walking over the obstacle, walking backwards, or walking around it. MFE Inspection Solutions has other inspection drones that create 3D maps, but Spot was the four-legged star of the conference, with the flexible limbs necessary to enter these spaces and promote workplace safety.

The Bracing for Impact Conference closed with two impactful announcements: the launch of 91��ɫ’s Center for AI and Society (CAIS) and the IP Osgoode David Vaver Medal of Excellence in Intellectual Property Law Award Ceremony.

Launch of the 91��ɫ Centre for Artificial Intelligence & Society

Photo by Buda Photography

, Vice President of Research and Innovation at 91��ɫ, introduced the Centre for AI and Society. Given that 91��ɫ has an edge in its application of AI in its academic programs, this Centre is dedicated to addressing AI’s ethical issues to ensure AI is applied to society’s benefit. Directors Professor , Associate Professor at Osgoode, and Professor , Professor and 91��ɫ Research Chair in human and computer vision, lead the centre. The Centre is the positive result of 91��ɫ’s AI Task Force, whose report “Fostering the Future of AI” demonstrated that an organized research unit was needed to examine AI’s impacts on society. The Centre brings members from seven faculties together to understand AI’s potential, mitigate AI’s risks, and make AI use more inclusive. The Centre is currently partnered with Microsoft and is a collaborative mission that will hopefully expand to include more members to investigate how AI can empower society.

IP Osgoode David Vaver Medal of Excellence in Intellectual Property Law Award Ceremony

Photo by Buda Photography

For the first time since 2018, the IP Osgoode David Vaver Medal of Excellence in Intellectual Property Law was presented in person. This award recognizes students who are involved with and committed to IP law during their time at Osgoode. Toronto-based artist and designer for the Royal Canadian Mint designed the medal. The Honourable Justice Rothstein and Professor Vaver presented the award. Justice Rothstein remarked, “medals and awards are named after people for a reason; this one carries Professor Vaver’s name … he is one of the foremost academics of our generation.” Justice Rothstein highlighted Professor Vaver’s achievements, such as being cited 23 times by the Supreme Court of Canada, an impressive feat considering how few IP cases are argued at that level.

Each recipient offered reflections on the award and hopes to engage with AI in their future career. The 2019 recipient, Aviv Gaon, remarked that the medal reflects the highlights of his rich academic journey. The 2020 recipient, Ian Stedman, pointed out that AI has tremendous potential to help those with rare diseases. The 2021 recipient, Ryan Wong, hopes to exude some of Professor Vaver’s qualities, such as his rigour and spirit. Wong urged us to be ready to tackle complicated issues as we approach the inevitable: the inclusion of AI in our society. This year’s recipient, Bonnie Hassanzadeh, told the audience that IP Osgoode helped her find purpose and commitment in her law student experience and she looks forward to the future of AI and precision medicine.

Professor Vaver concluded the ceremony with a reminder: In IP law, you cannot be a hedgehog, a creature who knows only to roll into a ball. Rather, we must be foxes, remaining flexible and knowing many things deeply. This award serves as a reminder to be creative and invested in new ideas, as these skills are essential in the practice of IP law.

The post Bracing for Impact: Meet Spot, Learn about the Launch of the CAIS and Awarding IP Excellence appeared first on IPOsgoode.

Prof. David Vaver is a member of IP Osgoode's Advisory Board, an Intellectual Property Law Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School and an Emeritus Professor of IP & IT Law at the University of Oxford.

A version of this paper is scheduled to be published in the Intellectual Property Journal. Thanks to Ronald M. Lieberman, Christopher G. Moore, and Maxine Vaver for helpful comments on an earlier draft. They of course share no responsibility for what appears here.

Is there such a thing as “inducing” copyright infringement? There isn’t in the United Kingdom, but the Federal Court in Bell Canada v L3D Distributing Inc (INL3D) 2021 FC 832 (“L3D Distributing”) thought there was in Canada and the defendants had done it. Indeed, the court thought that inducing infringement, which to date had been considered wrong only in respect of patents, applied to all forms of intellectual property (“IP”).

In Compo Co Ltd v Blue Crest Music Inc [1980] 1 SCR 357, 372, the Supreme Court said that “[c]ourts in this technical field of copyright have found it prudent to make their judicial answers congruent with the legal issues raised in the pro­ceeding at hand leaving, so far as possible, analo­gies, examples and hypothetical questions to another day.” This caution applies particularly where the case is undefended, as L3D Distributing was, and the plaintiffs are asking the Court to make new law. Where a case would succeed on more familiar grounds, it is prudent simply to record the additional plea or treat it as raising a hypothetical question; for what may look rock solid when presented by one side often crumbles once the other side is put. As Justice Megarry said when repudiating a view he had expressed in his standard land law treatise, it is dangerous to reach a settled conclusion “without the aid of the purifying ordeal of skilled argument on the specific facts of a contested case” (Cordell v Second Cranfield Properties Ltd [1969] Ch 9, 16, emphasis added). Audi alteram partem is, after all, prudence epitomised.

It thus seems best to treat the Federal Court’s views on inducement as an indication that the point was arguable, rather than necessarily sound, especially since such a holding was not strictly necessary. The defendants had been retailing pre-loaded set-top boxes that gave viewers unauthorized access to television broadcast and cable programming in which the plaintiffs owned or controlled the copyright. The Court unexceptionably found the defendants liable on three counts other than inducement: (a) making copyright-protected work available for telecommunication to the public; (b) authorizing such communication by telecommunication (both contrary to the Copyright Act RSC 1985, c C-42); and (c) selling equipment that decrypted cable transmissions (contrary to the Radiocommunication Act RSC 1985, c R-2) — none of which the plaintiffs authorized. Neither the inducement count nor the radio-communication count added anything material to counts (a) and (b): the Court thought the latter two counts themselves enough to sustain the grant of an injunction and a $30 million award of statutory and punitive damages and costs against the defendants.

So is the Court’s view, that inducing copyright or IP infringement is indeed a Thing, sound? I suggest not.

One must of course first start with the Copyright Act itself and deal with what the Supreme Court also said in Compo (above):

“Mr Hughes … put it very well when he said that copyright law is neither tort law nor property law in classifi­cation, but is statutory law. Copyright legislation simply creates rights and obligations upon the terms and in the circumstances set out in the statute. … It does not assist the interpretive analysis to import tort concepts. The legislation speaks for itself…” ([1980] 1 SCR at 372-3).

So, if we take the Supreme Court literally, since the Act defines copyright infringement as doing “anything that by this Act only the copyright owner has the right to do” (s. 27(1)), and “inducement” is — unlike making available and authorization — not something only the copyright owner has the right to do, the inquiry should stop right there: inducement cannot be a Thing because the Act doesn’t say it is.

The trouble is that the Court’s statement in Compo, despite being parroted in countless copyright cases, cannot be taken literally; for in its very next paragraph, the Court approves decisions of the UK and US courts that hold authorization generally, and authorizing the making of sound recordings specifically, to be “separate torts” (the Court’s emphasis), if done without the copyright owner’s consent. So, according to the Court, the interpretation of the Copyright Act is not assisted by importing tort concepts into something the Court chooses to call a “tort.” The authority for this method of reasoning is presumably Justice Humpty Dumpty’s well-known dicta in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass.

In fact, it is well settled that tort concepts of accessory liability — the civil law equivalent of aiding and abetting in criminal law — do apply to the Copyright Act, and indeed all IP Acts, even where the legislation is silent on the point. How else are corporations found vicariously liable for IP infringements committed by their employees? How else are directors held liable for any egregious conduct in connection with their company’s IP infringements? All legislation that creates a statutory tort or wrong is presumed to make accessories liable the way they are in tort, unless the legislation expressly or impliedly excludes such liability (Majrowski v Guy's & St Thomas' NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34 at [16], [72], [74]). IP infringements are one such example of a statutory tort, as Compo and many other courts in Canada and elsewhere have long recognized. Accessories are considered themselves to infringe IP jointly and severally by participating in another’s infringement. They are thus subject to the full panoply of infringement remedies, subject to whatever is recovered from the primary infringer. The most common accessory is the joint tortfeasor or joint infringer, who is indeed specifically contemplated by the Copyright Act (see, e.g., sections 17(2) (right of remuneration), 38.1(1) (statutory damages), 44.07(4) (charges for border stoppage)).

Some academic writing argues for a wider tort principle of accessory liability: anyone who contributes knowingly and substantially to another’s infringement by helping, encouraging, or inducing them to infringe should be liable to the IP holder for the full panoply of monetary, injunctive, and other equitable remedies: see, e.g., Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Oxford: Hart 2015), passim. US courts have gone this far (MGM Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd 545 US 913 (2005)) but the UK Supreme Court has not. Concerned to keep accessory liability within reasonable bounds, the Court has insisted on the additional requirement that the wrongdoing must be found to be joint before monetary remedies can be imposed on defendants. The combination of “active co-operation and commonality of intention” then helps avoid “constrict[ing others’] freedom to engage in activities which are otherwise lawful” (Sea Shepherd UK v Fish & Fish Ltd [2015] UKSC 10 at [44], also [56] & [58]; similarly Google LLC v Defteros [2022] HCA 27 at [204], [212] (Aust HC) (defamation)). In other words, inducing copyright or other IP infringement is a Thing only if, additionally, a common design or intent between an inducer and inducee to do acts that amount to infringement is found to exist, so that they become joint infringers (CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Plc��[1988] RPC 567, 606-9 (HL)).

Joint infringement is a flexible enough concept to encompass even the financing of infringing activities, as occurred in the Sea Shepherd case (above). But flexibility can create uncertainty and division and much will depend on the view a judge takes of the facts of a case (Rutman v Rabinowitz 2018 ONCA 80 at [31]-[5]). Thus in Sea Shepherd, while agreeing on the legal principles of joint liability, the UK Supreme Court divided on their application. All accepted the presence of a common design between Sea Shepherd UK and its overseas parent organisation, Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (“SSCS”), under which the UK company supported SSCS in its attempts to stop bluefin tuna fishing in the Mediterranean. A majority of the Court, however, held that the UK company’s local fundraising efforts for SSCS’s activities were too insignificant to have induced the trespass that SSCS committed in attacking the boats that were hauling tuna to the plaintiff’s fish farm off Malta.

Joint liability is largely about finding someone worth suing for another entity’s sometimes more substantial wrongdoing — someone with the wherewithal to pay compensation or hand over any wrongfully made gains. That was what the fish farm or its insurers in Sea Shepherd were ultimately after. Sea Shepherd UK’s assets might not be enough to cover the plaintiff’s claimed losses and anyway it had not carried out the attack. The UK company could, however, be used as a way to get the English courts to take jurisdiction over the better-funded foreign-based SSCS and then hold both companies jointly and severally liable. The tactic would have succeeded had the UK company influenced SSCS’s activities more. The UK company would then have been a participant in a tort partly committed in England, even though the major wrongdoing occurred abroad. As it turned out, however, the finding of no joint tortfeasance meant that the plaintiff could not proceed against either defendant and had to find some other way or place to recoup its losses.

Behaviour that is not serious enough to rise to the level of joint infringement can nevertheless have consequences. The person may not have to pay money but they may have to adjust their conduct. Courts everywhere have proved willing to deal with intermediaries such as online marketplaces and search engines that facilitate or enable IP infringement while not technically being infringers or accessories. Thus, a British Columbian court issued an injunction against Google ordering it to de-index websites worldwide that offered specified IP-infringing goods, and was upheld on appeal (Google Inc v Equustek Solutions Inc [2017] 1 SCR 824). Google was no infringer or accessory but it at least owed the IP holder a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent such infringements on its platform as were brought to its attention. It was liable to pay money only if the injunction was ignored. ��

Canadian case law has not adopted a generalized tort principle of accessory liability beyond joint infringement. The IP cases reflect this by refusing to label as infringer anyone who merely helps, facilitates, or contributes to another’s infringement (e.g., Copeland-Chatterson Co v Hatton (1906) 10 Ex CR 224, 241, aff’d without appealing this point (1906) 37 SCR 651 (patent); Nycomed Canada Inc v Teva Canada Ltd 2012 FCA 195 at [3], aff’ing 2011 FC 1441 (patent); Prest-O-Lite Co v People's Gas Supply Co (1917) 16 Ex CR 386, 389, aff’d (1917) 55 SCR 540 (trademark)). Such a person may, however, owe IP holders a duty to take steps, where feasible, to prevent infringements IP holders bring to its notice, although without any monetary liability to them except where any injunction is disobeyed.

Whether Canadian IP policy should change tack and hold that inducement or contribution, without more, creates monetary liability — as well as the remaining panoply of remedies — for infringement is thus a decision more suited to legislative amendment than to a first instance court in an undefended case. Parliamentary drafters know how to extend such liability where that is intended, and IP rights are, after all, “derived from statute and not from the Ten Commandments” (CBS Songs, above, at 608).

There is, admittedly, one exception to this position, and it is what the Federal Court in L3D Distributing relied on. The Court’s predecessor, the Exchequer Court of Canada, held over a century ago that knowingly inducing�� infringement of a patent, without more, itself infringes the patent and subjects the inducer to the full range of infringement remedies, where the inducement works (Copeland-Chatterson, above, at 92). A line of Federal Court and Court of Appeal decisions since then has consolidated this position for patents (see, e.g., Corlac Inc v Weatherford Canada Inc 2011 FCA 228 at [162]ff; Western Oilfield Equipment Rentals Ltd v M-I LLC 2021 FCA 24 at [48]-[70]), eclipsing (until recently) pleas of joint infringement by common design (see now Rovi Guides Inc v Videotron Ltd 2022 FC 981 at [46]-[7]). These decisions on inducement are probably now beyond question, even though the Supreme Court has never examined the issue. Yet a major weakness runs through them: the key English patent case on which Copeland-Chatterson (above) relied, Innes v Short (1898) 15 RPC 449 (QB), is not treated in England as holding that inducement is itself wrongful. Rather, in line with the general law of torts, Innes v Short has been authoritatively interpreted there as holding that the inducement must be in furtherance of a common design, so that the inducer and the inducee are joint infringers (see CBS Songs, ��above at 606-7; similarly Sea Shepherd, above at [23]). Without the presence of a common design, Innes is otherwise a case of “somewhat doubtful authority” (Adhesive Dry Mounting Co Ltd v Trapp & Co (1910) 27 RPC 341, 353 (Ch); see too Re L’Air Liquide SA’s Patent App’n (1930) 49 RPC 428, 430; Firth Industries Ltd v Polyglas Engineering Pty Ltd [1975] HCA 25 at [16] (Aust HC); CCOM Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (No 2)�� at [153], aff’d [1994] FCA 1168 (Aust Full Fed Ct)), even though the judge there decided to award only an injunction but no monetary remedy against the infringer.

The Federal Court in L3D Distributing went into none of this. It simply applied the syllogism that what held for Canadian patent law held for copyright and indeed all Canadian IP. Inducing infringement was therefore, without more, wrongful (L3D Distributing at [71]-[4]). This conclusion, however, rests on shaky ground. Since inducement liability is not found in the Copyright Act, the first question must be whether the Act includes it by implication. That in turn depends on the answers to two further questions: Is inducement a general principle of accessory liability in tort? If so, is its inclusion consistent with the Act?

The most likely answer to both these questions is, no. Since inducement is not a general tort law principle in Canadian law, it is a large leap to add it as such to copyright law, or indeed any non-patent IP. The patent law anomaly need not infect other IP. And even if inducement were such a general principle, its inclusion seems inconsistent with the Copyright Act. Section 27 sets out in some detail who infringes what copyright and when. No room seems left for another form of infringement, even more so because someone who induces infringement necessarily “sanctions, approves, and countenances” it and thus falls within the ������’s authorization right (SOCAN v Entertainment Software Ass’n 2022 SCC 30 at [104]). Authorization indeed elevates inducement to primary rather than accessory liability: authorization is complete whether or not any later infringement occurs (SOCAN, ibid at [104]-[5], [107]). The greater liability (authorization) must thus encompass the lesser (inducement).

The undefended nature of the case before the Federal Court highlights further concerns with its conclusions. First, on copyright: (i) inducement liability is found in no other Canadian copyright decision in the century since the Copyright Act was enacted; and (ii) the Court took no account of the unanimous contrary holding of the UK’s highest court on comparable copyright provisions, that inducement is only a form of joint infringement (CBS Songs, above, at 608-9, foll’d as a general tort principle in Southpaw Credit Opportunity Master Fund LP v Asian Coast Development (Canada) Ltd 2013 BCSC 187 at [200], [205]).

Second, on non-patent IP generally: (i) the Court’s comments here were clearly obiter; (ii) the Court did not consider the contrary views proffered in the leading UK decision, that inducement as a form of joint infringement applies to all IP (Sea Shepherd, above at [44], [56], [58]); (iii) the only non-copyright authority the Court cited (Hanson Int’l Inc v Whirley Industries Inc 2002 FCT 1045) was an industrial design case where a prothonotary’s refusal to strike an assertion of inducement before trial as being unarguable is clearly no authority that such an assertion would succeed; (iv) the Court’s statement that inducement is a “common law cause” that is “[i]n addition to the statutory causes of action” (L3D Distributing, above at [71]) is an odd comment for a court that lacks jurisdiction over any “common law cause;” (v) inducement is anyway not a “common law cause” (McCain Foods Ltd v J R Simplot Co 2021 FCA 4 at [62] (“not a distinct tort”)), but at best only a form of accessory liability.

Had joint copyright infringement been properly pleaded in L3D Distributing, the defendants would likely have been found to be joint infringers with their consumers. The necessary common design or intent between inducer and inducee need not be express. A tacit agreement, inferable from the circumstances of even an undefended case, suffices. Thus UK courts have found joint infringement based on a common design or intent where (i) the inducer was a peer-to-peer file-sharing operation or an app using BitTorrent or some other means of circumventing encrypted or password-protected content, and (ii) the targets were users or hosting websites that were induced or persuaded to stream, download or make infringing content available in furtherance of the common design (Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2012] EWHC 268 at [82]-[3] (Ch) (Pirate Bay); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Sky UK Ltd [2015] EWHC 1082 at [51]-[6] (Ch) (app using BitTorrent protocol); Young Turks Recordings Ltd v British Telecommunications Plc [2021] EWHC 410 at [68]-[71] (Ch) (“stream ripping” app). Since a finding of joint infringement is both “fact sensitive and policy-driven” (Barclay-Watt v Alpha Panareti Public Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 1169 at [62]), it is no great leap in L3D Distributing to infer not only inducement but also a common design to infringe copyright between the sellers and buyers of the equipment. Everyone intended that it be used to access programming which all knew was lawfully available only through other services authorized by the copyright owners of the programming. All roads can lead to Rome, provided one avoids the ditches.

The post “Inducing” Copyright Infringement in Canada: Is it a Thing? appeared first on IPOsgoode.

Eligibility

To be eligible, you must be currently enrolled as a JD candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School.��

All applicants must possess strong grades, exemplary organizational skills, be proficient in legal research and writing, and have a strong interest in intellectual property law.

Term

September 2022 to April 2023, with a possibility of continuing on for the summer in 2023.

The successful candidates will receive compensation.

Application Procedure

To apply, please submit:

1. A cover letter;
2. A copy of your resume;
3. A copy of your grades (can be unofficial grades; please include any previous degrees); and
4. A sample of your written work on any topic of your choice (please limit to 3-5 pages).

to��iposgoode@osgoode.yorku.ca��by��September 9, 2022.

We thank all applicants in advance, only those students who will be interviewed will be contacted.

The post CALL FOR APPLICATIONS - Research Assistants for the 2022/23 Academic Year appeared first on IPOsgoode.

Tasks

Students will be considered in two broad categories:

• One student will be part of an interdisciplinary 91��ɫ research team;
• Additional positions are available for further intellectual property research

Eligibility

To be eligible, you must be currently enrolled as a JD candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School.��

All applicants must possess strong grades, exemplary organizational skills, be proficient in legal research and writing, and have a strong interest in intellectual property law.

Term

May 2022 to August 2022, with a possibility of continuing on for the 2022/2023 academic year.

The successful candidates will receive compensation and should be available to work full-time.

Application Procedure

To apply, please submit:

1. A cover letter;
2. A copy of your resume;
3. A copy of your grades (can be unofficial grades; please include any previous degrees); and
4. A sample of your written work on any topic of your choice (please limit to 3-5 pages).

to��iposgoode@osgoode.yorku.ca��by��April 8, 2022.

We thank all applicants in advance, only those students who will be interviewed will be contacted.

The post CALL FOR APPLICATIONS - Summer 2022 Research Assistants appeared first on IPOsgoode.

Professor David Vaver is a Member of IP Osgoode’s Advisory Board and a Professor of Intellectual Property Law at Osgoode Hall Law School.

The Monash University Faculty of Law recently announced the passing of their Juris Doctor Director, Professor Ann Monotti. Prof. Monotti was a leader in intellectual property law and a wonderful person, and is remembered below by our own Prof. David Vaver.

The first reaction Maxine and I had on hearing from Alan the sudden news of Ann’s passing was to say what a lovely person she had been in so many ways and how tragic it was that she left us so early.

We remember Ann not just from her work as a legal scholar and professor of international repute, but as someone who delighted in her husband, children, grandchildren, and her colleagues.

We remember her zest for life, and her love of the arts and of good food and wine — and what enormously great company and fun she was.

I remember her first from the thesis that I examined of hers some decades ago - unlike many, a delight to read, from which I emerged both wiser and better informed. Ann went on of course to develop the work into the standard book she co-authored on the regulation of intellectual property in universities.

I remember our keeping in touch over the years from afar as a wealth of learned articles and books poured out of her office at Monash, making her a leading international authority on intellectual property law, particularly its intersection with employment law.

I remember Ann’s great learning and curiosity, and her modesty in her accomplishments.

I remember particularly one of her pieces on patent law being referred to by judges in the High Court of Australia for its “percipient” remarks and how we joked afterwards about her promotion to the newly minted chair of “percipient professor”.

We remember the stories she told about the travels she and Alan took round the world — Italy, Korea, France, Austria, Britain of course — often mixing business with pleasure and teaching classes or speaking at conferences.

We remember the many delightful meals we shared with her and Alan during a prolonged period we spent in Melbourne, and how she meant to make a tarte tatin from a recipe which Maxine passed on to her — except Ann never got round to it, because each time she bought the pink lady apples recommended for the dish, somehow they kept getting eaten beforehand.

We remember that what pride she had she reserved for her family, and how one evening when, while we were busy imbibing pre-dinner drinks, she was busy knitting a woollen jacket for her new grandson.

And we remember Ann’s smile and ready laugh — those will be with us for ever.

The post For Ann - In Memory of Professor Ann Monotti appeared first on IPOsgoode.

Photo by Prof. Pina D'Agostino

Emily Xiang is an IPilogue Writer, the President of the Intellectual Property Society of Osgoode (IPSO), and a 2L JD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School.

��

For fifty years, the Copyright Society of the USA (CSUSA) has invited numerous esteemed figures to present the annual . This past Monday, Osgoode’s very own Professor David Vaver delivered the 2021 Brace lecture on “User Rights: Fair Use and Beyond” as the series’ very first international speaker from outside the United States. Professor Vaver spoke on the origins of fair dealing in Canada and its differences and similarities in comparison to the American legal concept of “fair use”, its evolution throughout the history of Canadian common law jurisprudence, and its potentially far-reaching future beyond Canada and copyright law.��

Professor Vaver opened his lecture by introducing Jack McClenaghan’s novel Moving Target[1], a man-on-the-run thriller set in New Zealand during World War II that follows an army deserter as he is hunted by the military. Similarly, the boundary between copyright and user rights can also be likened to a “moving target” – elusive, ever-evolving, and always open to debate. And like McClenaghan’s fictional account of militant pursuit, the history of tension between copyright and user rights has been a tale of survival on the part of both.��

“Fair dealing” in Canada is a statutory exception to copyright infringement, and has been “as an integral part of the Copyright Act [and more] than simply a defence”. The Court refers to it more specifically as a “user’s right”. However, fair dealing’s designation as an “exception” inherently produces a negative implication: that copyright law is the “natural order” of things. That anyone’s use of a copyright-protected work infringes the copyright owner’s property. That any deviation from that rule must be an “exception”.��

However, the history of copyright law has always read quite differently. Up until the 20th century, , the public had relatively free reign and plenty of rights to use and to benefit from the circulation of works at the time. However, over the course of the 20th and 21st centuries, the island of copyright law that once stood amidst a sea of user rights began to expand, and as the sea around it shrank, the two eventually seemed to switch in character altogether.��

It wasn’t until the late 1900s that courts in the UK began to recognize a problem with the tendency towards legal copyright. In , the Church of Scientology sued a former member for publishing a book criticizing Scientology that contained material copied from Scientology books and documents, as well as confidential information pertaining to Scientology courses. The Court of Appeal unanimously held that the scope and content of the fair dealing defence should include works of criticism. Along a similar vein in the US, Professor L. Ray Patterson and Judge Stanley F. Birch argued in their 1996 article that “the subject matter of copyright is information and learning, which implicates the right of citizens to know. This right is protected by both the First Amendment and the copyright clause”.��

Over time, Canadian courts also began to increasingly recognize the need for a careful balancing act to weigh the rights of copyright owners against those of the public. In , the court noted that “[t]he Copyright Act is usually presented as a balance between promoting the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator...In crassly economic terms it would be as inefficient to overcompensate artists and authors for the right of reproduction as it would be self-defeating to undercompensate them.” Professor Vaver also credited Chief Justice McLachlin (as she then was) and Justice Abella for influencing this trajectory in Canadian copyright jurisprudence, as reflected by their rulings in more recent copyright law cases such as , in which the Court unanimously held that the Law Society’s practice of providing photocopy services to researchers fell within the ambit of fair dealing, and , in which the use of previews of musical works on online music services was also considered to be fair dealing.��

In conclusion, Professor Vaver invited listeners to consider how the idea of user rights may extend beyond the concept of fair dealing as a legal defence, perhaps beyond copyright law, or even beyond Canadian borders. In quoting from his own 2013 article “[J]urisdictions that view copyright's primary purpose as - to quote Nimmer - ‘not to reward the author but rather to secure the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors’ may find user rights a concept worth considering for their copyright law. And, while one is at it, why not for all intellectual property laws?”

[1] Jack McClenaghan, Moving Target (Gollancz, 1966).

The post Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture by Professor David Vaver – “User Rights: Fair Use and Beyond” appeared first on IPOsgoode.

Prof. David Vaver is the Acting Director of IP Osgoode and a Professor of Intellectual Property Law at Osgoode Hall Law School. The following is a preview of a paper to be published in the Intellectual Property Journal.

��

Something has recently gone awry with the law of copyright ownership in a movie or other film — a “cinematographic work”, as s. 2 of the [Act] calls it. ��

Part I of the Act deals with the ownership of copyright in works. Section 13(1) provides that the author of a work is its first copyright owner. Section 13(2) provides one exception: where the work is done by an author-employee for their employer as part of their job and there is no contrary agreement. All this applies to cinematographic works, a species of dramatic work, as the Quebec courts recently confirmed: at [12], aff’ing at [51]-[2] [Choko]. A copyright owner may of course transfer the right as it wishes (s. 13(4)); but apart from another exception on Crown works (s. 12), these provisions in s. 13 are the only ones that deal with the ownership of copyright in works. Another section in Part II of the Act (s. 24) deals with first ownership of copyright in subject-matter other than works: performer’s performances, sound recordings, and communication signals.

Owning copyright is one thing; proving ownership is another. Section 34.1(1) of the Act helps plaintiffs out by giving them certain presumptions if they sue for infringement or take other civil proceedings. The section reads (emphasis added):

"In any civil proceedings taken under this Act in which the defendant puts in issue either the existence of the copyright or the title of the plaintiff to it,

(a)��copyright shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, to subsist in the work, performer’s performance, sound recording or communication signal, as the case may be; and

(b)��the author, performer, maker or broadcaster, as the case may be, shall, unless the contrary is proved, be presumed to be the owner of the copyright."

At first sight, the words in (a) — “work, performer’s performance, sound recording or communication signal” — appear to be paired with those in (b), in the same order, to mean “author [of a work], performer [of a performer’s performance], maker [of a sound recording], or broadcaster [of a communication signal]”. It would seem unnatural, for example, to read “maker” as referring to both a “sound recording” and a “work”. That however overlooks the fact that s. 2 of the Act defines “maker” as referring to both a work and a sound recording.

Does that definition apply here so as to disturb the apparent pattern of paras. (a) and (b)? Or do the words in context make s. 2 inapplicable? I suggest that they indeed do disapply s. 2 for cinematographic works and that, in context, “maker” in para. (b) means only the maker of the sound recording referred to in para. (a).

Not everyone thinks so — in particular, some judges of the Federal Court.

*

Section 34.1(1) is supposed to make a plaintiff’s life easier in starting and running a copyright claim in court. It neither creates presumptions outside civil proceedings nor creates, transfers, or changes anyone’s actual title, and any proceeds recovered from a defendant are held for the benefit of the true owner: see Hogg v Toye & Co [1935] Ch 497, 520 (CA) on the corresponding provision in the (UK) on which the Canadian section is based. If any presumption happens to be displaced by contrary evidence, the proceedings can be amended and other parties joined so that defendants are not put in double jeopardy.

The presumption was applied straightforwardly in Choko (above). The plaintiff claimed a declaration of copyright ownership in a documentary he had shot for the defendant, while the defendant counter-claimed that the copyright belonged to the defendant as the plaintiff’s employer. The court applied s. 34.1(1)(b) to presume ownership in the plaintiff, he being the “author” of the “work” (Choko, QCCS at [55]). The defendant lost at trial and on appeal because he failed to prove the contrary, i.e., that he employed the plaintiff under a contract of employment (Choko, QCCA at [13]).

The Federal Court of Canada has, however, in at least three decisions said that s. 34.1(1)(b) presumes that the film’s “maker” is the copyright owner of the “work” unless the contrary is proved: see at [24]-[6]; at [32]; at [47]. The ultimate result in these cases may be justifiable: agreement or employment may have given the plaintiff actual ownership in Interbox (see [24] & [26]-[8] of the decision); ownership was “uncontested” in CBC (see [36] of the decision); and certificates of registration would have shifted the presumption of ownership to the plaintiffs in Bell (see [53] of the decision).

Interbox nonetheless does appear to be a decision on the s. 34.1(1)(b) point and was treated as such in CBC at [32]. ��

The correct view however seems to be that, read in context, “maker” in s. 34.1(1)(b) refers only to the maker of a sound recording. Were it to include the maker of a cinematographic work, s. 34.1(1)(b) would be the only provision in the entire Act where "maker" alone bore this meaning. It would also make s. 34.1(1)(b) create two inconsistent presumptions on ownership of the same work, with no way to decide which should prevail. Suppose an “author” and “maker” of a film sue each other, each claiming to be the copyright owner: whose duelling presumption should prevail? To call the result a stalemate would stultify the point of having presumptions at all and would anyway probably be contrary to art. 15(1) of the [Berne], which requires the author to prevail if their name appears on the work in the usual manner.

The problem is that, although “author” and “maker” can mean much the same thing in ordinary parlance, they do not in copyright law. The Act does not define “author” but judicial decisions identify this person as the individual or individuals who give a work’s ideas their original form or expression ( (NBCA)) — a question of fact in each case. Authorship is established easily enough for the video shot on someone’s smartphone; less so for a complex production such as Star Wars, which could involve multiple authorship or the director as sole auteur, the individual responsible for translating the work’s vision into its final expression.

By contrast, “maker”��—��producteur��in the French version —��has a definition in s. 2 of the��Act��that spans both cinematographic works and sound recordings. For a cinematographic work, the “maker” is��“the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the making of the work are undertaken”; for a sound recording the same formula applies to the first fixation of sounds.����

In cases like��Choko��(above) which involved a single individual shooting and editing a film, the same person may coincidentally be both maker and author: the two roles are easily enough mistakenly conflated (see, e.g.,�� at [156]-[7], appeal dismissed 2021 ONCA 532 for non-compliance with order to post security). In many major commercial films, however, the maker and author��—producteur��and��auteur��—��will be different persons, particularly because the maker may be a corporation whereas an author must be a natural person, i.e., a flesh-and-blood human being:��,��234 [Massie].��

One might ask: if “maker” in s. 34.1(1)(b) really applies only to sound recordings, what is the point of having a definition of “maker” of a cinematographic work at all? The answer: to allow Canada to comply with Berne article 4 and ensure that films are protected in Canada even where none of the authors is a Berne national or resident, no matter who owns the work’s copyright. This s. 5(1)(b)(i) of the Act achieves (see Bell, above, at [47]) and also extends protection to other states as required by treaties such as the of 1994. The relevant part of s. 5 reads: ��

"5.(1) Subject to this Act, copyright shall subsist in Canada, for the term hereinafter mentioned, in every original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work if any one of the following conditions is met:

���������������������� …

(b) in the case of a cinematographic work, whether published or unpublished, the maker, at the date of the making of the cinematographic work,

(i)��if a corporation, had its headquarters in a treaty country, or

(ii) if a natural person, was a citizen or subject of, or a person ordinarily resident in, a treaty country [emphasis added]."

Section ��34.1(2)(c) reinforces this provision, as Berne art. 15(2) requires, by providing that “if, on a cinematographic work, a name purporting to be that of the maker of the cinematographic work appears in the usual manner, the person so named shall, unless the contrary is proved, be presumed to be the maker of the cinematographic work” — note, not the “copyright owner”, an error made in Wiseau (above) ONSC at [156], although the court ultimately found the person who wrote, acted in, and produced the film to be its “author” and at least a co-owner (ibid at [157]).

Sections 5(1)(b)(i) and 34.1 (2)(c) are the only provisions to which the definition of “maker” of a cinematographic work applies. Had the drafters integrated the contents of s. 34.1(2)(c) into s. 5(1), as they could easily have done, the definition of “maker of a cinematographic work” could also have been shifted from s. 2 to s. 5(1). The mischief its location in s. 2 causes would have disappeared. Such are the potential effects of drafting decisions that are thought to be stylistic but which others misunderstand as having a substantive effect.

Let us examine more closely why s. 34.1(1)(b), in context, cannot include the maker of a cinematographic work. Admittedly, s. 2 could make it include that person — which raises the question: had the drafters intended to confine “maker” to sound recordings, why did they not just add the phrase “of a sound recording”? The answer is because, in the context of section 34.1 and the Act as a whole, the drafting in this respect is often elliptical, and the drafters here thought that meaning was already implied.

The drafters used a similar ellipsis in the next subsection, s. 31.1(2), where the word “maker” in the phrase “author, performer, maker or broadcaster” in the concluding portion of s. 31.1(2)(a), and in s. 31(2)(b)(i) and (ii), clearly means the “maker of the sound recording” specifically mentioned earlier in s. 31.1(2)(a)(iii).

They also used the same ellipsis elsewhere in the Act. Thus s. 29.21(1)(b) requires the creator of user-generated content to name their available source if they are to avoid infringement. The source is stated to be “the author, performer, maker or broadcaster” of the prior “work or other subject-matter.” “Other subject-matter” is the shorthand used throughout the Act for a performer’s performance, sound recording, or communication signal, and the preceding section (s. 29.2(b)(iii)) again makes it clear that the “maker” referred to is the “maker of a sound recording”.

The fact is that the words found in s. 34.1(1)(a) “work, performer’s performance, sound recording or communication signal” in either their singular or plural form appear as a set throughout the Act and are typically linked distributively to the set of persons the Act designates as their respective first owners: “author, performer, maker of a sound recording, or broadcaster” (see, e.g., s. 2, definition of “collective society”). Thus s. 13(1) designates the author as first owner of a work and sections 24(a), 24(b), and 24(c) respectively — and significantly, in the same order — designate the performer, maker of a sound recording, and broadcaster as first owner of their respective subject-matter.

The maker of a cinematographic work would be the odd one out in s. 34.1(1)(b), for the provision otherwise designates the presumption only in favour of first owners. Nothing in the Act, other than employment, contradicts s. 13(1)’s grant of first ownership to the work’s author. The Act nowhere suggests that the maker of a film displaces the author as first owner. Nor does the Act bridge the gap between “maker” and “author” the way UK law does by deeming a film’s author to be its maker — or “producer,” as UK law has it—together with the principal director ( (UK), s. 9(2)(ab)). Although Canadian and UK ownership rules may differ, both are internationally compliant: Berne art. 14^bis(2)(a) allows member states to decide ownership rules for films for themselves since the states had widely disparate views on the matter and no agreed position could be struck at Berne.

It is equally noteworthy that the maker of a cinematographic work is omitted from the list of persons whose interests may be recorded on the Copyright Register — namely, “authors, performers, makers of sound recordings, broadcasters, owners of copyright, assignees of copyright, and persons to whom an interest in copyright has been granted by licence” (s. 54(1)(b)). All these categories are persons whom the Act designates as first or later owners of copyright or an interest in copyright. The omission of the maker of a cinematographic work as such — nowhere designated as a category of owner or holder of an interest — is striking were it is indeed presumed to be an owner for civil proceedings. ��

In general, it makes sense when civil proceedings are brought, to start with a presumption that the person the Act designates as the first owner of any copyright is still its owner unless someone proves the contrary. It generally makes no sense to start with a presumption that a person that the Act nowhere designates as such as first or any owner should currently be presumed the owner. The only exception is where material is anonymous or pseudonymous: for reasons of privacy, s. 34.1(2)(b) provides that the publisher whose name appears on a work is presumed to be its owner — even though the publisher is likely not the first owner and, as Berne article 15(3) states, is really only “deemed to represent the author” to vindicate the latter’ s rights.

None of this will come as any surprise to corporate broadcasters and film producers. They have known for decades that they cannot rely on the presumption in s. 34.1(1)(b) favouring a film’s “author” since in Canada, as noted earlier, the term “author” is reserved for flesh-and-blood human beings: Massie (above) at 234. They have also known for decades of the “intolerably heavy” burden and “serious handicap” the author/ownership presumption imposes on them or any other plaintiff who happens not to be the author: , 605. They also have known for decades of the cheap and effective way to overcome this burden and handicap, as endorsed by Circle Film, itself a case on cinematographic works: before filing infringement proceedings, just spend the $50 and the few minutes it takes to apply online to register the film’s copyright with the Canadian Intellectual Property Office, and get a certificate of registration stating one’s copyright ownership. Registration then provides all the contrary proof needed for the registrant to rebut the author/owner presumption (Act, s. 53(2); Circle Film, at 606-7). That is why no practical need has existed to amend the law to include a presumption of ownership in favour of the maker of a cinematographic work. Registrations can go where presumptions fail to tread.

It is therefore hard to understand why s. 34.1(1) has been pressed into doubtful service where clear and simple alternative means of initially establishing copyright subsistence and title for film “makers” so readily exist. The sooner the Federal Court clears the matter up, the better.

The post Copyright Ownership of Movies and Films in Canada: Who's on First? appeared first on IPOsgoode.

It is our great pleasure to provide you all with a sneak preview of what we have planned for the 2021-2022 academic year and encourage you to participate.

IPilogue

Our is one of Canada’s leading IP Blogs with an enthusiastic international following. To date, we have published over 2,600 original posts and 1,400 comments.

The number of visitors to our website and our weekly newsletter () readership continue to grow exponentially and span the globe. Our diverse continued to blog throughout the summer and constitutes to be an important part of IP Osgoode’s team and vision of fostering diverse views on intellectual property and technology matters. In order to keep abreast of the latest in IP and technology in Canada and around the world, and to learn more about IP Osgoode’s events and activities, please to the IPIGRAM and follow us on , , and .

We are for this academic year. If you are interested in joining the IPilogue Team, please send your cover letter, CV, law school transcripts, and a writing sample to iposgoode@osgoode.yorku.ca by the end of the day today.

We will also continue to accept submissions on a guest basis. For more information about submitting articles to the IPilogue, click .

IP Innovation Clinic

Now in its eleventh year of operation, the IP Innovation Clinic continues to complement Osgoode’s rich history of clinical offerings by providing students with an opportunity to gain hands-on, practical experience while learning about some common early-stage IP and business-related issues facing under-resourced inventors, entrepreneurs, and start-up companies.

To this end, we our AI-powered , a free online service offering IP law information to users and further empowering creators with the tools to protect their IP. We look forward to continuing to develop the IP Innovation ChatBot by expanding its knowledge base and making it more accessible, but in the meantime, we encourage you to ask our as many questions as possible. The more questions it receives, the better it becomes at answering them. You can learn more about it by watching the recording of our launch event .

The continues to expand our client base and provide our students with a valuable and unique experiential learning opportunity. We are currently for the 2021-2022 academic term. If you are interested, please send your completed application to iposgoode@osgoode.yorku.ca by the end of the day today.

Open Research Assistant Positions

Prof. Pina D’Agostino and Prof. David Vaver are hiring , primarily for assistance in copyright law. If you are interested, please send a completed application to iposgoode@osgoode.yorku.ca by September 10, 2021.

Oxford International Intellectual Property Law Moot & USPTO National Patent Application Drafting Competition

Following from the momentum of our , we will soon host tryouts for this year’s competition, as well as the USPTO National Patent Application Drafting Competition. Look out for our emails and social media posts to learn about how you can get involved in either competition.

IP Intensive

The IP Intensive is a unique program that gives students practical, experiential education in a workplace setting for an entire term in lieu of being in the classroom. Our students gain valuable practical experience which will assist them in obtaining employment after law school, and some of our students’ research in the program has been published in the Intellectual Property Journal (IPJ).

Each year we build upon what we accomplished in previous years in the and offer our students an even more enriched and engaging experience. For the Fall 2021 term, we are proud to have partnered with two new placement organizations: Canadian Heritage (International Trade Branch) and Xanadu Quantum Technologies. We are pleased to welcome our returning placement organizations: Alectra Utilities, AstraZeneca Canada Inc., the Bergeron Entrepreneurs & Science and Technology (BEST) Lab, Canadian Heritage (Broadcast, Copyright and Creative Marketplace Branch), CBC, Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO), SOCAN, The Globe and Mail, TEVA Canada Limited, TVO, and ventureLAB.

Professor will be the Director of the IP Intensive program this year. Throughout the term, he will meet with the students to discuss topics relating to intellectual property law, to share their experiences in the work environment, and to participate in a cross-pollination of ideas. The students will also blog on the IPilogue and maintain a reflective journal about their internship experiences. The students will be responsible for leading seminar presentations during the last week of November, and ultimately submitting a major research paper.

The IP Intensive Program kicks off with two weeks of class seminars featuring experts from the IP community. The seminars cover a wide variety of topics, from “Collective Copyright Administration” to “Intellectual Property Reform Process”, and from “IP Litigation & Remedies” to “Digital Content Platforms & Broadcasting Industry”, just to name a few. Some of our experts speaking include members of the judiciary, officials from the Government of Canada, Canadian and U.S. IP litigation experts, in-house counsel, top executives from a broad range of industries, and practitioners from major Canadian law firms.

Olha Senyshyn’s Departure and Ashley Moniz’s Welcome

This Fall, we bid a bittersweet farewell to IP Osgoode’s Assistant Director, Olha Senyshyn. Olha has been a valuable member of the IP Osgoode team for the past two years. We will miss her very much and wish her all the best in her future endeavours.

We are pleased to share that Ashley Moniz, who joined us this past January, will continue in his role as Assistant Director and succeed Olha. We look forward to continue to work with Ashley as he has already proven to be wonderful addition to our team.

“Bracing for Impact: Webinar Series” continues & “IP Osgoode Speaks Series” Returns

Building on the success of our signature and in our webinar series over the past year, we plan to continue to use our Bracing for Impact: Webinar Series to maintain the dialogue among academic scholars, practitioners, and industry leaders from Canada and around the world, including Israel and the EU. The series of events explores critical issues in emerging technologies, data policy and governance strategies, with a focus on AI, blockchain, privacy, disruptive technology and tech innovation and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In collaboration with the Harry Radzyner Law School at the IDC Herzliya in Israel and Microsoft Canada, we have so far hosted 3 events in our Bracing for Impact Webinar Series: “” (22 June 2020), “” (1 December 2020), and “” (28 June 2021), the latter webinar was also hosted in collaboration with Alectra Inc.’s GRE&T Centre and featured the newly-minted Ontario Minister of the Environment, Conservation & Parks, David Piccini. Each webinar took place virtually over Microsoft Teams in the format of a panel discussion featuring scholars from across North America, Europe, and Israel.

You can read more about each of our past events and watch recordings of each webinar on our . We look forward to launching our new Bracing for Impact website very soon, so stay tuned for that!

We also plan to revive our IP Osgoode Speaks Series. Since 2008, we’ve hosted 29 IP Osgoode Speaks lectures with guests from industry, academia, and the judiciary (including the Supreme Court of Canada) from Canada and around the world. We hope to have even more distinguished speakers join us this year.

Please stay tuned for more details on upcoming events by visiting our ��and subscribing to our weekly e-Newsletter, the .��

Our Writing Competitions

Gowling WLG Best Blog in IP Law & Technology Prize

Each year, through the sponsorship of Gowling WLG, four prizes are awarded to full-time Osgoode students. The recipients for the 2020-2021 academic year were on the IP Osgoode website. Eligibility for the opens today. All submissions by Osgoode JD students between now and the end of the Winter term will be considered for the prize.

Canada’s IP Writing Challenge

IP Osgoode, together with the Intellectual Property Institute of Canada (IPIC), runs to further enhance intellectual property public policy research and discussion. This competition is open to three categories of entrants: JD students, LLM and PhD students, and practitioners.

The submission deadline is July 1 every year. This year, we received a wide range of entries from a broad spectrum of backgrounds and institutions across Canada.�� We thank all those who participated in the Writing Challenge. We are grateful to Dan Bereskin, Professor Ikechi Mgbeoji and Justice Roger Hughes for agreeing to judge the articles again this year. Stay tuned, as we will announce the Challenge winners in late October and open our next competition early next year, among various other initiatives.

A community is only as vibrant as its contributors. Given the challenges of the ongoing pandemic, we continue to confront complex and challenging debates in intellectual property and related areas of technology.��Please share with us your ideas to enrich our program and to do our part to make a difference during these unprecedented times. Let us know if you would like to get more involved or if you would like to announce any IP & tech-related research projects or activities.

The post Welcome Back to IP Osgoode: Here's a Sneak Peek at what's to come this year appeared first on IPOsgoode.

Eligibility

To be eligible, you must be currently enrolled as a JD candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School.��

All applicants must possess strong grades, exemplary organizational skills, be proficient in legal research and writing, and have a strong interest in intellectual property law.

Term

September 2021 to April 2022, with a possibility of continuing on for the summer in 2022.

The successful candidates will receive compensation.

Application Procedure

To apply, please submit:

1. A cover letter;
2. A copy of your resume;
3. A copy of your grades (can be unofficial grades; please include any previous degrees); and
4. A sample of your written work on any topic of your choice (please limit to 3-5 pages).

to��iposgoode@osgoode.yorku.ca��by��September 10, 2021.

We thank all applicants in advance, only those students who will be interviewed will be contacted.

The post CALL FOR APPLICATIONS - Research Assistants for the 2021/22 Academic Year appeared first on IPOsgoode.