Facts

The of this case is related to police recordings of several conversations between Dutch police agents and the real estate investor Willem Endstra, a man suspected of organizing various crimes in the Netherlands, including money laundering. These informal and freely-given conversations revealed details about Endstra's connections with other prominent criminals and their activities. After the in May 2004, the transcripts of these conversations were published in 2006 in the book "The Endstra-Tapes" without any consent of Endstra's heirs. These heirs later filed a lawsuit against the publisher based on copyright infringement, arguing that expression of knowledge and opinions of Endstra – even in an informal dialogue – should be protected by copyright as a literary work.


Decision by Dutch Supreme Court

In February 2007, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals ruled that backseat conversations per se can not be protected by Dutch copyright law. After an appeal by Endstra's heirs, however, the Dutch Supreme Court on May 2008 that the copyright protection for such kind of conversation is not absolutely excluded. The author may enjoy protection if his/her work fulfills two criteria, namely that (i) “it must possess its own original character”, so that it is not copied from another work, and (ii) “it is a result of the human creativity and of creative choices, and thus is a product of the human mind”, so that the protection does not include cases in which the form of expression is banal or trivial. After this decision, the Supreme Court referred the case back to the Amsterdam Court of Appeals, which should use the new criteria in judging the case.


New Decision by Amsterdam Court of Appeals

On July 16^th, 2013, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals – based on the criteria set out by the Dutch Supreme Court – rendered a rejecting copyright protection of the conversations. According to the Court, Endstra's transcribed sentences are to the point that they are so difficult to understand that their final design is banal and does not give the impression that the work is a result of an intellectual creation. Unlike oral presentations, diaries, letters and improvisations, which have more complex designs in their structures, ordinary conversations, which in general have a poor syntax, are usually characterized by their banal aspects.


As a consequence of this decision, Endstra's heirs can not impede the publisher to keep commercializing the book on the market without their consent and do not have any right to an equitable compensation of the commercial use of the content of the conversations.


Evaluation

The main of the decision is related to the criteria used by the Amsterdam Court of Appeals to determine the banality of Endstra's conversations. The Court considered completeness of the sentences, grammatical correction, ease of understanding and coherence of communication as complexity elements of the creative work, which are conditio sine qua non for copyright protection. The requirements of a coherent and "high-level" creation, however, are provided neither in international copyright agreements (such as the and the ), nor in the decision by the Dutch Supreme Court. In fact, the identification of individual creativity applied to a specific work is not related to the technical precision of its expression, but to the development and expansion of individual and intellectual characteristics, thoughts and feelings expressed by the person.


For purposes of this article, it is not possible to affirm that the backseat conversations of Willem Endstra resulted in a creative and individual expression that is copyright protected. Such conclusion would only be possible after a detailed analysis of the published book and the quotes taken from the dialogue. It is possible that these dialogues contained developed thoughts, opinions, and feelings expressed by the author. In such a case, even if an artistic and literary purpose was not present at the time of the expression, the final result of the conversations could possibly be considered as a copyright protected work.


Pedro Henrique Dias Batista is an IPilogue Editor and a PhD student at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich.

The post Amsterdam Court of Appeals: No Copyright for an Inarticulate Criminal appeared first on IPOsgoode.

The modus operandi of a P.A.E.,��such as��IPNav, is not complex: it is a company that acquires (usually temporary) rights on a batch of patents from different rights holders.�� After identifying companies that are��allegedly using these patents without authorization��from the patent holder, the P.A.E. will attempt to monetize its patents by charging licensing fees or threatening (and sometimes engaging in) costly lawsuits.

These practices��have been����by the media and society because P.A.E.s themselves do not commit any investment in the innovative process and��the legal arguments��used to support the rights claimed by the P.A.E.s are, in many cases, weak. In some instances, even if a patent has not actually been infringed upon, a company that receives notice by a P.A.E. may��consider it worthwhile to pay licensing fees in order to avoid the threat of further costs and time spent in a possible lawsuit. It is not a coincidence that the main targets of P.A.E.s are such as Amazon, Oracle, and Citigroup - businesses of higher net worth that may be willing to pay more in response to such claims. For these reasons, P.A.E.s are often referred to as “patent trolls.” A by researchers at Boston University School of Law reveals that the activities of patent trolls in 2011 cost approximately US$ 29 billion for “trolled” companies.

Due to these business practices, P.A.E.s are often cited as the enemy of innovation.�� The President of the United States, Barack Obama, in February 2013 that patent trolls exist to extort money and do not contribute to innovation, and that legal reform is needed to prevent the misuse of the patent system. In June 2013, the White House major steps to improve incentives for future innovation in high tech patents by . These steps include executive measures, such as tightening functional claiming and strengthening the enforcement process of exclusion orders, and legislative recommendations, such as requiring patentees and applicants to disclose the real party-in-interest, permitting more discretion in awarding fees to prevailing parties in patent cases, and protecting off-the-shelf use by consumers and businesses.

P.A.E.s, however, claim to represent positive forces for innovation. P.A.E. owners often argue that their activities��are very important to , who��may��not have the organizational and financial structures necessary to enforce their exclusive patent rights. Through the support of P.A.E.s, small inventors can obtain appropriate compensation when their patents are��infringed by third parties, encouraging them to invest more time and money in new innovations. Furthermore, Erich Spangenberg emphasizes that entities like IPNav can also help large innovative companies monetize their patents, encouraging future investments by these companies in new technologies.

It is important to note that not all lawsuits filed by P.A.E.s are abusive or lack reasoned legal grounds. The P.A.E., IPCom, was successful in against the German company Deutsche Telekom and indirectly contributed to compensating inventors of the infringed technologies. From this perspective, P.A.E.s acting in accordance with ethical and legal standards actually by small inventors and large companies alike.

In this blog, and opinions about the activities of P.A.E.s have been reported, reflecting the contrasting positions held by the media and legal critics. This is also indicative of the fact that this topic will be open for continued discussion and debate. Currently, there are no specific legal provisions concerning these entities at��the international level, causing considerable legal��uncertainty.

In my opinion, considering all P.A.E.s as enemies of innovation and banning them indiscriminately is not compatible with current commercial practices, nor is it a way to promote innovation.�� It is a common occurrence that the direct economic beneficiary of an intellectual property right is not necessarily the inventor or creator per se, but a third party who has acquired these rights (e.g. copyright enforced by music publishers, patent rights enforced by large technology companies). The practice of assignment and transfer of patent rights is expressly allowed under . In principle, therefore, the activities of P.A.E.s��are not necessarily illegal or disadvantageous to society.

In fact, P.A.E.s only become a problem for development and innovation when they misuse patent rights, abuse procedural requirements, or threaten companies into settlements based on non-existent infringement. In such cases, bad faith actions of patent trolls have to be identified and punished by the courts on a case-by-case��basis. General and indiscriminate prohibition of P.A.E.s would achieve these goals but at the same time eliminate the benefits that these entities provide. Indeed, it may be that other areas of law and current policies need to be changed in order to��eliminate the misuse of patent rights. The importance of high-quality patents for avoiding patent trolls has been expressly by the European Commission - granting patents for imprecise and ambiguous claims lead to misleading interpretations on the scope of a patent and facilitate abusive practices.

Any current abuse of rights by patent trolls also reveals the major flaws in patent litigation procedures. Due to the high cost of litigation, extensive length of proceedings, legal uncertainty in the area of patents, and the risks of granting preliminary injunctions, companies are more apt to settle when faced with a claim from a patent troll�� - even if the claims lack a strong foundation.�� Reforming procedural law as it relates to patent litigation��should also be reconsidered by legislators in order to avoid potential abuse in the future.

In conclusion, the activities of P.A.E.s, when performed under ethical standards, are valid from a legal perspective and can actually support the innovative activities of both small and large companies. Instead of outright prohibiting P.A.E.s, the most reasonable solution would be to identify and evaluate abusive lawsuits filed by P.A.E.s on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, requiring Patent Offices to engage in a more thorough analysis of patent claims before granting intellectual property rights and effectively reforming procedural laws may help to prevent the proliferation of abusive patent trolls.

The post Patent Trolls or Patent Heroes? – The Increasing Pressure on Patent Assertion Entities appeared first on IPOsgoode.

Although new games could still be installed by using the disc and saved in the memory of different consoles, they could only be played if the original user was connected to his/her personal account. As a result, the secondary market of games could be controlled by Microsoft. Even if the game discs themselves could be exchanged or resold, the second users could not play these games without or of the first user. It is important to note that Microsoft´s measure was not explicitly designed to combat game piracy, but to place greater control on the retailer-driven secondary market.

In proposing restrictions against the freedom to dispose of used games for the Xbox One, Microsoft gave rise to a point of tension between copyright holders and consumers. This issue has been openly discussed in relation to the music industry and for the use of protected works on the internet for some years.

From the perspective of the video game industry, there are a number of valid reasons to implement such measures. Considering that profits and activities of video game companies have been threatened due to the and to the by several retailers, increasing revenue by controlling the secondary market would provide greater sustainability in the competitive video game market. By doing this, companies would have money not only to remain in the market, but also in developing new technologies in the medium- and long-term.��Furthermore, the increase of profits might contribute to the overall reduction of cost for original games, as the risk of losses arising from the independent secondary market would not be included in the price.

��

At this point, it is important to highlight that the adoption of measures of restriction of the secondary market is not something new in the digital age. The use of "one-way" CD-keys for activating software on computers and consoles has been used for some years, which combats against piracy and places greater control on the secondary market. Similarly, digital rights management (DRM) services such as - used by PC-gamers since 2002 - bind the games to the purchaser's account through the use of a licence.

In spite of these advantages, the changes purposed by Microsoft received a large number of . In binding the original games to a specific user account, users might be forced to pay costs to game publishers in order to acquire a licence needed to play an used game and would not be able to recover part of these costs through resale of the physical copy. Although it is argued that increased profits in the video game industry might help reduce the price of new games and promote the development of new games and consoles, there is no assurance that��(i)��it will really occur, and��(ii)��if it occurs, the price reduction and technology development will be satisfactory to compensate the restrictions imposed by Microsoft.

For these reasons, many gamers rejected the new system adopted by Microsoft and not to use this model in their upcoming competitor console, the Playstation 4. After the outcry, Sony confirmed that used game sales would by the Playstation 4.�� Microsoft, in fear of losing a considerable number of sales, , ensuring that XBox One games may be freely exchanged and resold without the need of purchasing a new licence.

While the license-based system of games sale proposed by Microsoft won't be implemented by the company in this hardware cycle, there are some legal and policy issues of great importance that should be highlighted.

Proposals such as this give rise to discussions about the boundaries of copyright law. Considering that intellectual property rights are often used as an instrument to increase market share and to maximize profits, their function would better be justified under a social and collective perspective than under an individualistic perspective. In that respect, the scope of copyrights should be limited to the function of promoting creativity. In my opinion, the development of the video game market in the last two decades shows that creativity and innovation in this sector is possible even if a secondary market is not restricted. Here, Microsoft's business strategy may require some fine-tuning.

Furthermore, the approach initially proposed by Microsoft might , a fundamental principle of property law. If Microsoft went ahead with their initial plans, discs would circulate in the market, but the games contained on them could not be played by other users without acquiring a new licence. By licensing access, publishers would effectively retain their right to control the product of its intellectual creation after its first sale in the market. In my view, in countries where the exhaustion of rights for creative works and software is ensured (i.e. USA, Brazil, EU-countries), sidestepping the practical effects of the "first sale doctrine" via licensing should be considered incompatible with the copyright system. If allowed, interests protected by the exhaustion doctrine would be ignored. If the measure suggested by Microsoft is performed by a company in the future, the Courts and legislative bodies should take into account its effect on the exhaustion of rights in order to shape the laws of the digital age appropriately.

The initially-proposed measure of controlling the secondary market might be considered at odds with the purpose of copyright and of the "first sale doctrine." In this situation, we saw that market forces stayed Microsoft's hand, but we must wait to see what the future brings as business models continue to evolve, and large and well-reputed players like Microsoft continue to commercialize new technologies.

Pedro Henrique Dias Batista is an IPilogue Editor and a PhD student at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich.

The post XBox One: (Not) Attempting to Modernize Through Monopolization appeared first on IPOsgoode.

, after discovering the exact location and sequence of the genes BRCA1 and BRCA2 – mutations of which may increase the risk of breast and ovarian cancer – was able to isolate these genes, enabling, inter alia, the identification of genetic predisposition to these cancers. Only a subset of��nucleotides can code for amino acids and consequently generate a protein ("exons"), while other nucleotides ("introns")are not able to perform this function.�� Myriad created synthetic DNA sequences (so-called "complementary DNA" or "cDNA"), in which the natural introns are removed and only the exons remain, providing significant advantages for genetic examinations and other scientific purposes. On this basis, Myriad obtained patents on isolated genes BRCA1 and BRCA2, as well as patents relating to their synthetic DNA sequences. After obtaining these rights, various stakeholders filed actions against Myriad and the , claiming the invalidity of patents based primarily on patent ineligibility of products of nature.�� The case made its way through the District and Federal Courts, and all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. (For some of the IPilogue's past coverage on this story, click and .)

In its decision, the U.S. Supreme Court�� stated that:

a) Laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas are not patentable under ;

b) Isolation of genes without any creation or alteration of genetic information is not an act of invention. Despite the great scientific relevance of Myriad's discovery, the isolated BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes and their genetic information are merely a product of nature, and therefore are not patentable under § 101; and

c) Unlike the genes BRCA1 and BRCA2, cDNA molecules, consisting only of exons, are not naturally occurring, but a result of human inventiveness. Even if the nucleotide sequence of cDNA is dictated by nature, it is unquestionable that the lab technician creates something new when cDNA is made. Therefore, cDNA is distinct from the DNA from which it was derived, so that it is patentable under § 101.

The U.S. Supreme Court also distinctly��pointed out that this case did not involve method patents, new applications of knowledge about BRCA1 and BRCA2, and alteration of order of naturally occurring nucleotides, thereby��preventing any��implication��of this case to these endeavors.

As a consequence of the decision, Myriad no longer has exclusive rights to the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, thereby allowing competitors in the biotechnological sector to recreate and use them. This will have important implications both socially and economically.�� Firstly, the free use of the genes by various companies increases the opportunity for development and innovation for identification and treatment of cancer and for the discovery of new functions for the genes. In this way, public health can potentially obtain a number of additional��long-term benefits.�� Secondly, due to the competition exerted by other companies, the price of tests for identifying��susceptability��to��cancer is expected to be reduced. Currently, the price of��a complete test��is around , making the test an unfeasible option for many people. The real economic benefits of the decision, however, are still questionable because (1) Myriad's patent on the cDNA was upheld and (2) Myriad likely has a number of�� related to mutations of the BRCA1 and BRCA2, guaranteeing it significant exclusivity in this sector.�� It will be necessary to observe the development of the market in the coming months to draw more concrete conclusions.

Despite its advantageous practical effects, the decision deserves criticism for some inconsistencies. In order to support the non-patentability of the genes BRCA1 and BRCA2, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that since the genetic information of these genes was not created or changed by Myriad, it should be considered as a product of nature and, consequently, ineligible for patentability. In order to support their conclusions on the patentability of the cDNA, however, the Court did not apply the same logic. Although the elimination of introns does not occur naturally, the genetic information contained in exons is pre-existing and results from purely natural processes, and by the Supreme Court's logic��applied to BRCA1 and BRCA2, should be considered non-patentable. Furthermore, even while recognizing the possibility that a molecule similar to cDNA may possibly occur naturally by an unusual and rare phenomena caused by viruses, the��Court confirmed its patentability as a composition of matter (§ 101) without providing a reasoned analysis of their opinion. Finally, the Court suggested that if the patent claims were focused merely on the chemical composition of the molecules of BRCA1 and BRCA2 instead of the actual genetic information of these genes, patentability may be possible; a statement which does not seem to be well-supported by the judiciary in light of § 101 and of the law of nature exception. In short, the U.S. Supreme Court did not exactly establish��a boundary between the concepts of "product of nature" and "the result of human inventiveness", and as a result there is still legal uncertainty with respect to��biotechnological patents.

Apart from the criticisms, it is important to note that the decision in Myriad under U.S. law��is opposite to��the current law in the European Union. states that isolated DNA sequences are patentable. Many scholars dispute whether the scope of protection provided by these patents is absolute (comprising all applications of the chemical compound) or purpose-bound (comprising only the applications indicated by the patent applicant). On this, the European Court of Justice decided prima facie that the scope of protection of biotechnological patents is purpose-bound (see ). This difference in legal treatment in the EU is favorable to holders of patents related to DNA sequences, who can still enjoy legal protection in several European countries.

In my opinion, the decision by the U.S. Supreme Court is, to some degree, appropriate. The acknowledgment that the isolated genes occur naturally is correct; if the product itself is not a result of the human inventiveness, but only found in the nature, it is not an invention. This view excludes the patentability of DNA sequences and promotes development and innovation by competitors. If the isolation of genes constitutes an inventive step, the methods of isolation may be considered patentable, but not the chemical compound itself. The novelty of the isolated genes, however, is questionable since its existence is known before isolation. In spite of this, there remains some well-founded criticisms of the decision, which the Court will need to address them in future cases.

The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Myriad creates an important precedent for cases related to the patentability of biotechnological inventions in the USA and, considering its subject-matter, can serve as a model for improvement for legislatures and judiciaries in other countries.

Pedro Henrique Dias Batista is an IPilogue Editor and a PhD student at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich.

The post Isolated Genes Are None Of Your Business! – SCOTUS Decides Myriad appeared first on IPOsgoode.

In the case, Mrs. Trine Sig ceased her employment as a sales and marketing assistant at Verstergaard. Along with two other former employees of the company, she formed companies to manufacture and commercialize insecticidal bednets (a product made by her former employer). Within the suit filed by Verstergaard for misuse of trade secrets, the evidence demonstrated that Mrs. Sig, while contractually obligated to maintain the confidentiality of the information and knowledge acquired while working for the company, (i)��did not have any access to technical information related to the production process of Verstergaard´s insecticidal bednets during her period of employment, and (ii) did not appreciate that the new companies misused Verstergaard´s trade secrets when developing their own products.

Given these facts, the first-instance judge .�� The judge reasoned that “a person can be liable... even if he is not conscious of the fact that what he is doing amounts to misuse of confidential information”. From this judgment, the subjective mind of the offender (actual knowledge of the trade secret and awareness of the infraction) plays little, if any, role in determining personal liability. Instead, objective knowledge of the infraction (the possibility of having access to the trade secret) in conjunction with strict liability terms implied in the contract were enough to find Mrs. Sig liable.

This decision was , which did not recognize an implied term imposing strict liability and held that there was “no business reason to imply a term of that harsh extent”. This appeal decision was upheld by the UKSC, which stressed the relevance of the previous knowledge of the trade secret by the offender and of his consciousness in the misuse of the trade secret:

“Given that she did not learn of any relevant trade secrets owned by Vestergaard when she was employed by them, and did not appreciate that any such secrets were being used by an employee of the company of which she was a founder and director, it would be oppressive to hold Mrs Sig (as opposed to the employee or the company) liable to Vestergaard for breach of confidential information, whether or not she had previously worked for Vestergaard pursuant to a contract containing a standard sort of provision aimed at protecting Vestergaard's trade secrets”.

This decision by the UKSC raises questions about objective and subjective knowledge in cases of liability for misuse of trade secrets -��the answers to which do��not enjoy sufficient legal certainty in several countries. In fact, the regulations on trade secrets at the international level do not specifically cover the extent to which parties should know of a misuse. Article 39.2 , for example, in which the protection of trade secrets is codified, does not provide details on the level of duty of care the offender would owe to escape liability. At the national level, the in the USA and Canada does not specifically rule which are the cases where a person "has reason to know" that a trade secret has been misused. In view of this uncertainty, the legislature and the adjudicators are charged to form plausible solutions from general principles of justice, which may lead to discrepancies from the applicable provisions.

In my opinion, the decision of the UKSC is equitable and appropriate.

From a legal perspective, the decision does not allow the involuntary extension of objective knowledge of breach of contract to situations in which the potential offender did not have access to confidential information and is completely unaware of trade secrets being misused. If a party does not have any knowledge of the trade secret and of their misuse, then there is no duty of care with respect to confidentiality and, therefore, that party cannot be held liable. In this case, the implicit and explicit obligations under the contract are recognizable by all parties, fully observing basic contractual principles.

At an economic level, the different interests involved in the protection of trade secrets have to be balanced in order to achieve a fair solution. On the one hand, we can not ignore the importance of the protection of trade secrets for the purpose of encouraging innovation and maintaining competitiveness in small and mid-sized companies in the market, for which intellectual property rights (like a patent) might be too costly to manage. In this sense, the European Commission stressed in its that “the protection of confidential business information as a trade secret is, for many businesses, often the only or the most effective way to protect their intellectual property” (see also ). Appropriate legal protection of trade secrets is therefore economically efficient and desirable.

On the other hand, the protection of trade secrets naturally restricts horizontal competition, since competitors may not use trade secrets obtained improperly to develop competing products and projects. An excessive protection of trade secrets��may stifle competition unreasonably, which is contrary to the purposes of competition law, and induces economic inefficiency. This, in addition to imposing strict liability for misuse of trade secrets may have negative impacts on the economy. In view of this, the UKSC held in this decision��that “the law should not discourage former employees from benefiting society and advancing themselves by imposing unfair potential difficulties on their honest attempts to compete with their former employers”.

Therefore, the subjective knowledge of the potential offender have to be considered, in order to observe the contractual principles of law and to achieve an fair economic balance of different interests when dealing with the protection of trade secrets.

Pedro Henrique Dias Batista is an IPilogue Editor and a PhD student at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich.

The post Beyond Knowledge and Consciousness – The Development of Liability for Misuse of Trade Secrets in the UK appeared first on IPOsgoode.

This announcement comes at a time when copyright law is being challenged by the digital revolution. The current copyright regime does not provide legal certainty to controversial issues such as the digitization of and increased virtual access to books. (IPilogue posts about this topic can be found and .) There is also legal uncertainty as to who is liable for infringing content posted on public access networks, and for the storing and sharing of supposedly illegal content through mechanisms of . The Megaupload saga is one prime example of a that is testing the limits of copyright law (see for IPilogue’s coverage of that story).

In light of the importance of the internet and these new challenges, the US Committee on the Judiciary is attempting to address the interests of various stakeholders by proposing solutions that will ensure effective protection and enforcement of copyright in the US. The US authorities, however, are not the only parties interested in modernizing the copyright system in their respective jurisdictions.

The adoption of the Intellectual Property Strategy in May 2011 (see "") outlined the main objectives of the European Union with respect to Intellectual Property Law. The European Commission (EC) later announced in December 2012, within��, its intention to proceed with modernizing copyright law in the digital economy. Through dialogue with various stakeholders and elaboration of market studies and legal drafts, the EC is hoping to achieve rapid progress in problematic fields such as: cross-border portability of content; user-generated content; data- and text-mining; private copying levies; access to audiovisual works; and cultural heritage. The Canadian legislative authorities have also attempted to find solutions to the new challenges to copyright law. The approval of Bill C-11 in June 2012 and its implementation are examples of steps being taken by the Canadian legislature to address these issues. (Further information on copyright reform in Canada can be found .)

The announcement by the US Committee on the Judiciary, however, does not effectively clarify the extent to which the changes will affect the current copyright regime in the US. ��In my view, by solely focusing on concerns about compensation for the use of protected works and the effectiveness of copyright enforcement, the Committee is neglecting review of the prevailing dogmatic standards for the protection of intellectual property. ��By virtue of the advent of the digital economy and significant public interest, copyright law has experienced a transition, in which a reassessment of its justification and legitimacy is required. The social and economic functions of copyright - especially in view of the economic exploitation of rights by the music industry and by collective societies - should be discussed under a new lens. This would not only��focus on the protection and enforcement of copyrights, but also on issues related to access to information, access to cultural elements, and the interests of creators and consumers alike.

In my opinion, if the review by the US Committee on the Judiciary does not take the above into account, it is unlikely that further legislative attempts will be justified and legitimized or provide legal certainty and solutions to the problems with the current system, and may in fact suffer the same fate as the SOPA and PIPA. ��Effectively considering the point of view of all stakeholders is essential for the modernization and advancement of copyright law.

Pedro Henrique Dias Batista is an IPilogue Editor and a PhD student at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich.

The post New Step for the Modernization of Copyright Law in the US – Progress or Regress? appeared first on IPOsgoode.