Disingenuous and Deceptive Behaviour

Prior to the whistleblower revelation of Facebook's involvement in Cambridge Analytica influencing , it had been popularising various quizzes and games on its platform. This was ��to engage users in order to conduct����to check if�� instigation of "emotional contagion” was possible through social media. Succeeding in such attempts, it gave multiple third parties��access to its users’ data (e.g., content posted on Facebook and messages exchanged through Messenger). Thus, it is imperative to regulate such social media platforms. Facebook superficially handles its privacy policies through��, which hampers the meaningful and����from users. Accordingly, the Canadian regulators are making painstaking efforts to protect citizens from such undue influences by penalizing such activities. The Bureau explicitly confirms that����do not in their entirety protect the users to control their respective messenger chats and other private activities. Rather, there are loopholes (such as, installation of third-party apps) by which third parties can access such information rendering enormous profits to Facebook. Though Facebook had contended to refrain from such activities in 2015, that such practice continued until 2018.

Intertwined Relationship of the Regulators in the Privacy Dispute

Due to complexity of the cases and inadequacy of laws in the field of data privacy, the OPC and Competition Commission have gone to great lengths to achieve a comprehensive settlement and enforcement in this case. As both had different approaches and interests, being regulated under different laws, including PIPEDA and the respectively, achieving consistency with regards to regulations can be a challenge. Intertwining both regulators helped in bridging the gap between the “” of federal and provincial privacy laws, while Competition Bureau sought an administrative penalty helping in the enforcement proceedings. Though the OPC has been criticized in the past for lack of enforcement powers, coalition of both regulators has demonstrated benefit to the Canadian privacy regime.

In conclusion, considering the��current scenario, it is foreseeable that more regulators may��interpret privacy issues differently and as per their mandates. This is because the privacy law framework in Canada, and elsewhere, has not entirely addressed online infringement issues and it will take a considerable period of time to develop comprehensive statutes to regulate these novel and often nefarious online activities.

Written by Aishwerya Kansal, IPilogue Contributor. Aishwerya is pursuing Master’s in Law in International Business Laws at Osgoode Hall Law School, and she is also an IP Innovation Clinic Fellow.

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In the Facebook- Cambridge Analytica scandal, people’s personal information was harvested without their consent and was used to create “psychographic”[1] profiles that were then used as part of political manipulation in the Brexit vote, as well as the 2016 American Election.[2] More recently, Facebook was caught outsourcing the transcription of audio-chats that occurred in Facebook Messenger to contractors working as a third-party, thus exposing the private conversations of those Facebook users who had opted into the transcription service offered by Facebook.[3]

But the collection of data occurs in all aspects of daily life not just through social media. A statistician working for Target explained how the retailer kept tabs on its customers’ purchasing habits and tried to target (no pun intended) pregnant women based on their purchasing patterns.[4] This led to a father learning that his teenage daughter was pregnant after Target sent maternity flyers addressed to the teen. These instances highlight the lack of consumer awareness, truly informed consent, and control that people have over their own information. This is a huge issue as “data flakes off us like dead skin cells”[5] and in those moments corporations should not be profiting.

To address the issue of data exploitation, the European Union has implemented the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”)[6] that aims to protect a citizen’s privacy and increase the amount of control an individual has over their own data. The GDPR also addresses the transfer of EU citizens’ personal data outside of the EU in jurisdictions like Canada, that don’t have equivalent legislation already in place. Currently, the federal government has a measly two pieces of legislation governing Canadian’s privacy and personal data, the [7] and the (“P���ʷ��ٴ�”).[8] The Privacy Act applies to federal institutions and is meant to govern “a person’s right to access and correct personal information that the [Canadian] Government […] holds about them” while PIPEDA oversees the private sector. However, neither of these provide resources to Canadians to educate themselves or protect their data. PIPEDA outlines “”[10] but these fail to provide avenues for consumers to seek recourse when their privacy has been violated, or ways of monitoring and protecting their privacy. Canadians might be protected by the patch-work privacy laws that provinces have enacted, or the set by some Canadian courts.[11] Canada lags in data protection and empowering people to control their data.

This becomes increasingly important in the discussion of autonomous vehicles which are an emerging area of data collection. Data will need to be collected to ensure the safe operation of these vehicles and to prevent security breaches that could be exploited by ill-meaning entities. to the advancement of autonomous vehicles, but it is unclear what data has been collected, and how this data has been collected.[12] Deployment of these vehicles doesn’t make clear how future data will be collected and used but could lead to the evisceration of privacy altogether, which could have devastating consequences. I believe that in order to successfully and safely integrate autonomous vehicles, rigorous data regulation must first be developed and well-established before the day that my future car drives me to my destination.

The Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal threatened democracy, and now the potential improper collection and management of data could threaten our physical safety in the form of autonomous vehicles. The type of successful data regulation I foresee ought to require the informed consent, control, and awareness of consumers that the data collection is occurring.[13] No longer should “Terms and Condition” pages or mandatory cookie tracking agreements be used to exploit the average internet user.

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Written by Julianna Felendzer, Osgoode JD Candidate, enrolled in Professors D’Agostino and Vaver 2019/2020 IP & Technology Law Intensive Program at Osgoode Hall Law School. As part of the course requirements, students were asked to write a blog on a topic of their choice.

[1] Psychographic profiles rely on a consumer’s psychological characteristics to describe them, this encapsulates values, opinions, attitudes, interests, and lifestyles and can be used to personalize advertising. ��See William D. Wells, “Psychographics: A critical review” (1975) Journal of Marketing Research 12 at 196.

[2] Issie Lapowsky, “How Cambridge Analytica Sparked the Great Privacy Awakening”, WIRED (17 March 2019), online: <www.wired.com> [perma.cc/VL7T-FRE6].

[3] Sarah Jeong, “No, Facebook Is Not Secretly Listening to You”, New 91��ɫ Times (20 August 2019), online: <www.nytimes.com> [perma.cc/8C9M-3E3F].

[4] Charles Duhigg, “How Companies Learn Your Secrets”, New 91��ɫ Times (16 February 2012) online: <www.nytimes.com> [perma.cc/ENG8-D47Z].

[5] Charlie Warzel, “The High Stakes of Living Online”, New 91��ɫ Times (6 August 2019), online: <www.nytimes.com> [perma.cc/JP7Q-D7KZ].

[6] EC, Commission Regulation (EC) 679/2016 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), [2016] OJ, L 119/1.

[7] Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c P-21.

[8] ��Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c 5.

[9] Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Summary of privacy laws in Canada”, online: <www.priv.gc.ca>�� [perma.cc/PC8J-XNJY].

[10] Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “PIPEDA fair information principles”, online: <www.priv.gc.ca> [perma.cc/5W8C-4ZYU].

[11] Douez v Facebook, Inc., 2017 SCC 33 [Douez].

[12] ��Magnolia Potter, “Big Data’s Role in Self-Driving Car Development” (5 April 2019), online: <www.insidebigdata.com> [perma.cc/CU5J-983F]. See also Bernard Marr, “BMW: Using Big Data And Artificial Intelligence To Create Autonomous Cars”, online: <www.bernardmarr.com> [perma.cc/Q62M-6BWA].

[13] Lucille Perreault, “Big Data and Privacy: Control and Awareness Aspects”(Paper delivered at the International Conference on Information Resources Management (CONF-IRM), Ottawa, 20 May 2015) [unpublished].

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You’re a��celebrity and had a threesome. Your partner wasn’t one of them. You want the affair to remain private. You go to a court in England where your family resides and get an interim injunction. It prevents the English press from publishing the tawdry details to protect your privacy and the privacy of your family. The affair becomes widely known in other countries including the US, Canada, and Scotland. The��English public finds out about it through foreign web sites. They also find the story when using search engines, even when not looking for it. The��English public is incited��to access websites where details about the encounter can be found by the tabloids which thrive on selling papers filled with salacious details of sexual encounters. The tabloids create a frenzy working up the public claiming they are being censored when their foreign counterparts are not, then move to set aside the injunction.

After scuffles before the lower courts the case gets to England’s highest court. Upholding the rule of law and demonstrating it takes privacy rights seriously, last week the UK Supreme Court ordered the interim injunction continued until trial, stating also that search engines should geo-block links to foreign websites from which the story can be accessed to protect the applicant’s privacy rights.

The reasons of the Supreme Court in [2016] UKSC 26 (19 May 2016) to maintain the injunction in place despite the tsunami of public pressure to rescind it were delivered in 4 sets of reasons, each of which (except for the dissent) was concurred in by the three other judges making up the 4:1 majority. Central to the decision were the following reasons concurred in by all of the justices writing to maintain the injunction.

• The ground on which the court acted was to preserve the privacy interests at stake in the case. (In this case, that of the appellant, his partner and their young children in England and Wales.)
• Unlike causes of action based on breach of confidence, claims to protect privacy can be maintained even when private information is already widely known. Even the repetition of known facts about an individual may amount to an unjustified interference with the private lives not only of that person but also of those who are involved with him.
• Claims based on respect for privacy and family life (under��English law) are based on the two core components of the rights to privacy: unwanted access to private information and unwanted access to or intrusion into one’s personal space.
• The English/EU courts give very little weight to claims for “free expression” when the expression purely concerns private sexual encounters. Any such disclosure or publication will on the face of it constitute the tort of invasion of privacy, the repetition of which is capable of constituting a further tort of invasion of privacy, even in relation to persons to whom disclosure or publication was previously made – especially if it occurs in a different medium.
• Injunctive relief to protect privacy can be granted to protect privacy interests even if the information is widely known (including significant internet and social media coverage) if the injunction can prevent extensive and qualitatively different privacy breaches. (That was the situation in the PJS case.)
• Exemplary or punitive damages and an account of profits may be recoverable at common law for misuse of private information in order to deter flagrant breaches of privacy and to provide adequate protection for the person concerned. (The court left this question open.)

Lord Mance (with whom Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale and Lord Reed agreed) concluded his judgement summarizing the rationale for maintaining the injunction as follows:

The circumstances of this case present the Supreme Court with a difficult choice. As in the Court of Appeal, so before the Supreme Court the case falls to be approached on the basis that the appellant is likely at trial to establish that the proposed disclosure and publication is likely to involve further tortious invasion of privacy rights of the appellant and his partner as well as of their children, who have of course no conceivable involvement in the conduct in question. The invasion would, on present evidence, be clear, serious and injurious. On the other hand, those interested in a prurient story can, if they try, probably read about the identities of those involved and in some cases about the detail of the conduct, according to where they may find it on the internet. The Court will be criticised for giving undue protection to a tawdry story by continuing the injunction to trial. There is undoubtedly also some risk of further internet, social media or other activity aimed at making the Court’s injunction seem vain, whether or not encouraged in any way by any persons prevented from publishing themselves. On the other hand, the legal position, which the Court is obliged to respect, is clear. There is on present evidence no public interest in any legal sense in the story, however much the respondents may hope that one may emerge on further investigation and/or in evidence at trial, and it would involve significant additional intrusion into the privacy of the appellant, his partner and their children.

At the end of the day, the only consideration militating in favour of discharging the injunction is the incongruity of the parallel – and in probability significantly uncontrollable – world of the internet and social media, which may make further inroads into the protection intended by the injunction. Against that, however, the media storm which discharge of the injunction would unleash would add a different and in some respects more enduring dimension to the existing invasions of privacy being perpetrated on the internet. At the risk of appearing irredentist, the Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that, on a trial in the light of the present evidence, a permanent injunction would be likely to be granted in the interests of the appellant, his partner and especially their children. The appeal should therefore be allowed, and the Court will order the continuation of the interim injunction to trial or further order accordingly.

Enjoining the tabloids from publishing the salacious details of sexual encounters would not have prevented members of the��English public from accessing stories about the affair published on foreign sites. This was amply demonstrated by the privacy breaches suffered by Max Mosley who waged precedent setting legal battles against media sites and Google in several jurisdictions to get stories about his private life removed from web sites and de-indexed by Google. See, .

The Court recognized that to protect the applicant’s privacy interests it was necessary not only to enjoin the tabloids, but also for search engines to geo-block links to the story to prevent access in England, something ��was reportedly doing. Lord Neuberger (the President of the Court with whom Lady Hale, Lord Mance and Lord Reed agreed) dealt with this issue stating the following:

It also seems to me that if there was no injunction in this case, there would be greater intrusion on the lives of PJS and YMA through the internet. There may well be room for different views as to whether the lifting of the injunction would lead to an increase or a decrease in tweets and other electronic communications relating to the story. However, if the identity of PJS and the story could be communicated within England and Wales, then it would be likely that anyone in this jurisdiction who was searching for PJS (or indeed YMA) through a search engine, for reasons wholly unconnected with the story, would find prominent links to that story. But if search engines serving England and Wales are geo-blocked from mentioning PJS, or indeed YMA, in connection with the story, as they should be so long as an injunction is in place, this would not happen. It might be said that PJS and YMA could ask the search engine operators to remove any links to the story pursuant to the decision of the Court of Justice in��Google Spain SL v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos��(Case C-131/12)��[2014] QB 1022, but it seems unlikely that the reasoning in that case could apply to a story which has only recently become public and is being currently covered in the newspapers…

It is one thing for what should be private information to be unlawfully disseminated; it is quite another for that information to be recorded in eye-catching headlines and sensational terms in a national newspaper, or to be freely available on search engines in this jurisdiction to anyone searching for PJS or YMA, or indeed AB, by name in a different connection. If, as seems to me likely on the present state of the evidence and the current state of the law, PJS will succeed in obtaining such an injunction at trial, then it follows that he ought to be granted an injunction to restrain publication of the story in the meantime. (emphasis added)

The PJS case has been the subject of considerable commentary. A good roundup can be found here, .

Comments

Canadian common law courts are still struggling to develop the contours of the emerging tort of intrusion upon seclusion first recognized in Ontario in the , 2012 ONCA 32 case. Some provinces have recognized it, British Columbia (which has a statutory tort of invasion of privacy) does not. See, , 2015 BCCA 468. A Federal Court decision rendered earlier this year has suggested that the Canadian common law courts may also recognize another US privacy tort that provides a remedy against the wrongful disclosure of private information that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and not of legitimate concern to the public. See, , 2015 FC 916.

However, Canadian common law courts are still far behind the��English courts which have developed a much more flexible tort of misuse of private information, as well as remedies for breach that include damages to compensate for the loss or diminution of a right to control private information, and now following the PJS case, perhaps also exemplary or punitive damages and an accounting of profits. See, [2015] EWCA Civ 1291 (17 December 2015). The damages recoverable in��England for the tort are more extensive than those recognized as being recoverable in Canada so far.

Surprisingly, Canadian courts have not had to canvass recently whether the��English common law tort of misuse of private information should be adopted in Canada. The courts have also not had to tackle whether the torts that have been recognized so far would enable a claimant to obtain interim or final injunctive relief to protect disclosure of private information that is widely available in other countries.

is an IP Osgoode Advisory Board Member and a senior partner with McCarthy Tétrault in the Toronto office.

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The Spokeo decision’s requirement that there be a concrete injury in order to ground privacy damages is not just a U.S. issue. Canadian courts have been wrestling for some time with the question of what damages look like in the context of privacy breaches, especially in class actions. While not definitive or binding north of the border, Spokeo may provide insight into how future statutory privacy breach actions are framed in Canada.

On May 16, the Supreme Court of the United States (“SCOTUS”) released its reasons in (“Spokeo”). The case is significant because it addressed the issue of what degree of damages are necessary in order to assert standing to bring such a claim, an issue that has long troubled “privacy breach” claimants in both Canada and the U.S. The existence of a private right of action under a U.S. federal statute does not automatically suffice to meet the “real” harm standard.

The court ultimately adopted a middle-ground position, allowing the action to proceed but maintaining a narrow approach to the type of injury that will give rise to standing. Of interest, the dissent raises new questions about the legal recourse available to those who allege injury from the mismanagement or inaccuracy of their personal information.

illustrates a contrast between privacy and consumer reporting law regimes in Canada and the U.S., and the associated legal risk exposure of organizations that manage the personal information of consumers, clients, or members of the public.

Background

Spokeo operates a “people search engine” that reviews a wide spectrum of databases to provide its users with information about individuals. The site markets itself as a mechanism for reuniting with lost connections, but can also be used for investigative purposes, such as evaluating job applicants.

The respondent, Thomas Robins, discovered that his Spokeo profile contained inaccurate information. He filed a federal class action complaint against Spokeo, alleging that the company failed to comply with its requirements under the (the “FCRA”). The FCRA requires consumer reporting agencies to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy” of consumer reports and imposes liability on “[a]ny person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement [of the FCRA]” with respect to any individual.

(Canada does not have a “fair credit reporting act” per se, but provincial statutes such as Ontario’s require consumer reporting agencies to “adopt all procedures reasonable for ensuring accuracy and fairness in the contents of its consumer reports.[1] In additional, Canada’s privacy legislation incorporates the principle of accuracy and a right of correction.[2])

Robins alleged that Spokeo disseminated false information related to his education, family status, and wealth, causing Robins to fear that potential employers would rely on this inaccurate information and be disinclined to consider him for employment. Spokeo argued that Robins’ fear, without more, did not constitute actual harm.

The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that Robins had not suffered an actual injury, and therefore had not properly pleaded “injury-in-fact”, as required by (“Article III”). As a result, he lacked standing. On appeal, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court decision. The Ninth Circuit’s decision was appealed to SCOTUS.

The Decision

The SCOTUS panel filed a 6-2 split decision. The majority determined that the Ninth Circuit’s decision was incomplete for failing to satisfy the “injury-in-fact” requirement under the test for standing.

The test for standing before federal courts in the U.S. has a constitutional basis. establishes the judicial branch of the federal government. It gives courts the authority to adjudicate “any case or controversy”. The court has developed these principles fairly narrowly. A plaintiff only has standing in federal court if they suffer a concrete and particularized injury, that is�� “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” For an injury to be particularized, it “must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way”. A concrete injury must actually exist, though it can be either tangible or intangible.

Significantly, the court in Spokeo emphasized that violations of FCRA procedural rights do not necessarily result in concrete harm and that “not all inaccuracies cause harm or present any risk of harm.” SCOTUS held that a “bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm,” will not “satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.” This is likely to reign in attempts by lower courts which have taken a more lenient view of standing. In one regard, it represents a reiteration and clarification of SCOTUS’ position in , which stated that a “‘threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact,’ and that ‘[a]llegations of possible future injury’ are not sufficient.”

Clapper opened the door to much debate (and litigation) in respect of the scope of a “certainly impending” injury – a door which SCOTUS appears to be have incrementally closed. However, the court did not say outright that a plaintiff must have suffered concrete harm in order to sue. It noted that in some circumstances, a “risk of real harm” may be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of concrete harm.

In the end, the Spokeo majority ultimately concluded that the Ninth Circuit failed to fully appreciate the distinction between concreteness and particularization in its reasons, and it sent the matter back for the lower court to consider of whether “the particular procedural violations alleged in this case entail a degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement.”

The dissent agreed with the majority’s analysis, but took issue with the need to remand the decision to the Ninth Circuit for an assessment of whether Robins’ injury was, in fact, particular and concrete. The dissent found that the evidence before the court had shown that Spokeo’s inaccurate information about Robins could jeopardize his candidacy for jobs he had or would apply for, and could cause potential employers to make negative judgments, based on inaccurate information, about his suitability for certain work demands. In the dissent’s view, this was far more egregious than an incorrect zip code (citing the majority’s example).

Privacy Damages in Canada

Spokeo raises a number of considerations for organizations that manage consumer and public data, both in the U.S. and Canada.

In the U.S., the decision raises questions about the ability of claimants to sue to enforce privacy-compliance requirements or other procedural matters under causes of action established by legislation like the FCRA. This is particularly so where the statutory right of action does not explicitly include requirements for concrete or particular injuries or where no clear harm has (yet) materialized that the plaintiff can point to.

Moreover, the split decision illustrates a divide on the SCOTUS bench over the harm that can accrue from the mismanagement of personal information and the growing importance of strong consumer privacy laws in a data-rich and networked world. While the majority characterizes the erroneous Robins profile as an error of no particular consequence, the dissent appears to be alive to the consequences and risks to individuals of poor data gathering, management, and publication where personal information is concerned.

These issues are very much alive in the Canadian privacy landscape as well. Canadian courts and legislators continue to grapple with the nature and quality of damages required to prove a claim.

Across Canada’s legislatures, there have been a patchwork of statutory suit provisions enacted for privacy complaints. For instance, the explicitly includes a statutory tort, actionable without proof of damage,[3] as do the privacy acts of , , and .[4]�� The creates only administrative offences, and contains no civil right of action.[5]

Under the personal information legislation of some provinces, the statutes create a right to sue for damages only after the statutory administrative processes have resulted in an order or conviction, and then only for “for damages for loss or injury that the individual has suffered as a result of the breach”.[6] Canada’s federal (“PIPEDA”), takes a similar approach, but permits a court to “award damages to the complainant, including damages for any humiliation that the complainant has suffered.”[7]

Canadian courts’ struggle with these issues are evident in decisions like :

The fixing of damages for privacy rights’ violations is a difficult matter absent evidence of direct loss. However, there is no reason to require that the violation be egregious before damages will be awarded. To do so would undermine the legislative intent of paragraph 16(c) which provides that damages be awarded for privacy violations including but not limited to damages for humiliation.

Privacy rights are being more broadly recognized as important rights in an era where information on an individual is so readily available even without consent. It is important that violations of those rights be recognized as properly compensable.[8]

An earlier decision, , addressed the issue as well, but took a more cautious approach:

Section 16 of PIPEDA provides that “[t]he Court may, in addition to any other remedies it may give … award damages to the complainant, including damages for any humiliation that the complainant has suffered.”�� This provides the Court with exceptionally broad power to award damages.�� Nevertheless, any damages awarded must be awarded on a principled basis, and be appropriate and just in the circumstances.[9]

Of note, the amendments to PIPEDA made under the regarding mandatory data breach reporting set the reporting trigger as “real risk of significant harm” and state explicitly that “significant harm includes bodily harm, humiliation, damage to reputation or relationships, loss of employment, business or professional opportunities, financial loss, identity theft, negative effects on the credit record, and damage to or loss of property”.[10] An organization which concludes that it must report a breach may, in doing so, be inadvertently conceding a measure of damages.

© McCarthy Tétrault LLP

[1] Consumer Reporting Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.33 at s. 9.

[2] See, for instance, Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5, Sch. I at “Principle 6 – Accuracy”.

[3] Privacy Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. P-22.

[4] Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 373; Privacy Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. P125; Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. P-24.

[5] An Act respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, C.Q.L.R., c. P-39.1. In Québec, the right to privacy is also protected by several provisions of the Civil Code of Québec and by the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, and a breach of these rights to privacy can lead to broad damages awards.

[6] Personal Information Protection Act, SA 2003, c P-6.5, section 60. See Martin v. General Teamsters, Local Union No. 362, 2011 ABQB 412, at paras. 47-48, in which the Court struck portions of a Claim on this point; Personal Information Protection Act, SBC 2003, c 63.

[7] Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c 5 at s. 16. Along with the statutory regime, there is the common law intentional tort of “intrusion upon seclusion”, developed in Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32. However, this tort has been rejected in B.C. and Alberta, where the courts have found that the provincial privacy statute excludes a common law action for intrusion upon seclusion. See Ladas v. Apple Inc., 2014 BCSC 1821 at paras. 76-77 and Martin v. General Teamsters, Local 362, 2011 ABQB 412 at paras. 43-48.

[8] Chitrakar v. Bell TV, 2013 FC 1103 at para. 24.

[9] Nammo v. TransUnion of Canada Inc., 2010 FC 1284 at para. 66.

[10] Digital Privacy Act, S.C. 2015, c. 32 at s. 10.1(7)

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