The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law Archives - IPOsgoode /osgoode/iposgoode/tag/the-copyright-pentalogy-how-the-supreme-court-of-canada-shook-the-foundations-of-canadian-copyright-law/ An Authoritive Leader in IP Wed, 14 Aug 2013 05:20:44 +0000 en-CA hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.9.4 The Context of the Supreme Court’s Copyright Cases /osgoode/iposgoode/2013/08/14/the-context-of-the-supreme-courts-copyright-cases/ Wed, 14 Aug 2013 05:20:44 +0000 http://www.iposgoode.ca/?p=22105 In the summer of 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada created history by simultaneously releasing five copyright judgments: Entertainment Software Association v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada [ESA],[1] Rogers Communications Inc. v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada [Rogers],[2] Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada […]

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In the summer of 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada created history by simultaneously releasing five copyright judgments: Entertainment Software Association v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada [ESA],[1] Rogers Communications Inc. v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada [Rogers],[2] Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Bell Canada [Bell],[3] Alberta (Education) v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency [Alberta (Education)],[4] and Re:Sound v Motion Picture Theatre Associations of Canada [Re:Sound].[5]

This historic event reverberated in a number of domains.

These five judgments mark the final moments before a long anticipated major reform in Canada’s copyright law: on 12 July 2012, when the five judgments were released, the Copyright Modernization Act had been passed by Parliament but had not been declared in force.[6]

In addition to marking the end of one version of the Copyright Act, in the context of intellectual property development in Canada, the “pentalogy” instantly enormously multiplied the total jurisprudence from Canada’s highest court that bears on copyright. Indeed, between the time McLachlin J became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 2000 and the release of the pentalogy, there had only been five copyright judgments from the Court:[7] ճé v Galérie d’Art du Petit Champlain [ճé],[8] CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada [CCH],[9] Society of Composers, Authors, and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Association of Internet Providers [SOCAN v CAIP],[10] Robertson v Thomson Corp [Robertson],[11] and Euro-Excellence Inc. v Kraft Canada Inc. [Toblerone].[12] Taken together, these ten cases represent a greater volume of interest from the Supreme Court in copyright than has been evinced at any time since it became Canada’s final appeal court.[13] For example, in Ian Bushnell’s history of the Federal Court, spanning 1875 to 1992, there is mention of only one intellectual property case being appealed to the Supreme Court,[14] a trademark case, Benson & Hedges v St. Regis Tobacco Corporation.[15] Others did reach the Supreme Court but did not merit discussion in Bushnell’s history: for example, in copyright, on appeal from the Exchequer Court (predecessor to the Federal Court), the Supreme Court decided Cuisenaire v South West Imports Ltd in 1969—but consideration of copyright by the Supreme Court under previous Chief Justices has definitely been infrequent.[16] One reason for this relative paucity of copyright cases in the Supreme Court may be the strong contribution to intellectual property jurisprudence between 1964 and 1980, which is universally acknowledged as being made by Jackett CJ of the Federal Court.[17]

But, beyond the context of copyright jurisprudence, the release of these five copyright decisions together was a landmark in the history of Supreme Court jurisprudence in general. This chapter will focus on the historic copyright “pentalogy” but, rather than considering these judgments primarily in light of Canadian copyright jurisprudence— or, indeed, in light of intellectual property jurisprudence more broadly—the discussion will focus on these five judgments in the context of Canada’s Supreme Court jurisprudence generally...

Featured here is the first part of a book chapter written by Dr. Margaret Ann Wilkinson,Faculty Scholar and Director of the Area of Concentration in Intellectual Property, Information and Technology Law at Western University. The full chapter is available for download . The book is entitled "The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law" edited by Michael Geist, and is available for purchase or download .


[1] 2012 SCC 34, [2012] 2 SCR 231 <> [ESA].

[2] 2012 SCC 35, [2012] 2 SCR 283 <> [Rogers].

[3] 2012 SCC 36, [2012] 2 SCR 326 <> [Bell].

[4] 2012 SCC 37, [2012] 2 SCR 345 <> [Alberta (Education)].

[5] 2012 SCC 38, [2012] 2 SCR 376 <> [Re:Sound].

[6] Passed 29 June 2012, much of the Copyright Modernization Act, SC 2012, c 20 <>, amending the Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42 <>, has been brought into force on 7 November 2012. Those sections of the revised Copyright Act which are not yet in force (but pending implementation under the Copyright Modernization Act when declared in force) are, new or revised, s 2(1) (the definitions of “moral rights” and “treaty country” replaced), s 5 (1.01) to (1.03) replaced, s 15 (2.2) added, s 15(4) added, s 18(2) replaced, s 18(2.2) added, s 18(4) added, s 19(1.2) added, s 19.2 added, s 20(1.2) added, s 20 (2.1) added, s 22(1) replaced, ss 41.25, 41.26 and 41.27(3) added and, finally, s 58(1) replaced <>.

[7] In 2002, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal from Delrina Corp. (c.o.b. Carolian Systems) v Triolet Systems Inc. [2002] OJ No 676 (CA); see [2002] 178 OAC 200, 2002 CarswellOnt 4080 <>.

[8] 2002 SCC 34, [2002] 2 SCR 336 <> [ճé].

[9] 2004 SCC 13, [2004] 1 SCR 339 <> [CCH].

[10] 2004 SCC 45, [2004] 2 SCR 427 <> [SOCAN v. CAIP].

[11] 2006 SCC 43, [2006] 2 SCR 363 <> [Robertson].

[12] 2007 SCC 37, [2007] 3 SCR 20 <> [Toblerone].

[13] The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had oversight of Canada’s Supreme Court in criminal cases until 1933 and in civil cases until 1949. Ian Bushnell, in introducing his The Captive Court: A Study of the Supreme Court of Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992), makes the observation that the Supreme Court was not an important part of Canadian society until after 1949 when appeal to the Privy Council of the House of Lords in England was abolished (see xi).

[14] Ian Bushnell, The Federal Court of Canada: A History, 1875–1992 (Toronto: The Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 1997) at 190.

[15] Benson & Hedges (Canada) Ltd. v St. Regis Tobacco Corpn. [1969] SCR 192 <>.

[16] See Cuisenaire v South West Imports Ltd., [1969] SCR 208 <>. In 1998, leave was refused from both Gould Estate v Stoddart Publishing Co. (1998), 39 OR (3d) 545 (CA) <>; and Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc v American Business Information, Inc., [1998] 2 FC 22 (CA) <>.

[17] WR Jackett became President of the Exchequer Court, predecessor to the Federal Court, in 1964 and was made Chief Justice of the Federal Court when it was created in 1971. He retired in October of 1979. See Richard W Pound, Chief Justice Jackett: By the Law of the Land (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999) at 185- 192 and 270-276. There was tension between the Federal Court and the Supreme Court in those years, and especially between Jackett CJ of the Federal Court and Laskin CJ of the Supreme Court (1973–1984), especially over the jurisdiction of the Federal Court. However, this tension played out in fields other than intellectual property. See both Pound’s monograph, cited here, and Bushnell’s The Federal Court of Canada, supra note 15 at 220-23.

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Acknowledging Copyright’s Illegitimate Offspring: User-Generated Content and Canadian Copyright Law /osgoode/iposgoode/2013/08/07/acknowledging-copyrights-illegitimate-offspring-user-generated-content-and-canadian-copyright-law/ Wed, 07 Aug 2013 10:49:48 +0000 http://www.iposgoode.ca/?p=22022 Bill C-11[1] provides for a new exception to infringement for user-generated content (UGC), along with new grounds for fair dealing. These provisions, combined with a strong and clear message from the Supreme Court of Canada’s pentalogy of copyright cases regarding users’ rights and the copyright balance, signal a new paradigm for copyright law in Canada—one […]

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Bill C-11[1] provides for a new exception to infringement for user-generated content (UGC), along with new grounds for fair dealing. These provisions, combined with a strong and clear message from the Supreme Court of Canada’s pentalogy of copyright cases regarding users’ rights and the copyright balance, signal a new paradigm for copyright law in Canada—one that tolerates a much greater level of interaction with copyright-protected works.

This chapter considers the shape Parliament has given to the UGC exception and examines its place within the scheme of the Copyright Act, particularly in light of recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence. The chapter begins with a discussion of the definition of UGC, followed by an analysis of the statutory exception. It next considers the relationship between the UGC exception and the fair dealing exception. Although opponents might characterize both the UGC exception and expanded fair dealing as unjustifiable encroachments upon the rights of copyright owners, this chapter argues that these exceptions reflect the shifting realities of cultural production and dissemination.

 

1. Defining User-Generated Content

User-generated content, or UGC,[2] is a term that has been used to describe a fairly wide range of Internet-based activity from blogging to file-sharing.[3] Gervais, admitting the difficulty of defining a term that covers such a broad range of conduct, has characterized it as “content that is created in whole or in part using tools specific to the online environment and/or disseminated using such tools.”[4] Hilbert defines it not so much in terms of what it is, but in terms of who makes it, writing that UGC is “used to describe activities engaged in by those typically seen not as cultural producers but cultural consumers.”[5]

Although these characterizations emphasize different features of UGC, together they highlight the profound transformations wrought by the digital information context. On the one hand, digital technologies empower users of digital works to interact in new ways with copyright-protected content; at the same time, the proliferation of new and modified content from non-professional sources has undermined the traditional content intermediaries, creating a radically transformed context for the dissemination of information and cultural content.[6] It is precisely this new paradigm that underpins the recent Supreme Court of Canada copyright jurisprudence.[7]

The expansive definitions of UGC have led to further attempts to categorize UGC for the purposes of legal analysis. Trosow et al[8] offer a taxonomy for UGC that features three broad categories: creative content, small-scale tools (such as apps) and collaborative projects (such as wikis). In this taxonomy, the focus is on function, and it is certainly worth reflecting upon the broad range of purposes served by UGC. UGC may be innovative, creative or informative. Indeed, in fields of activity where UGC has had an impact on knowledge generation and dissemination, the focus of inquiry has been on the substantive issues around the quality and reliability of the new content, rather than on issues of copyright.[9] Copyright lawyers employ a different taxonomy. Gervais offers a taxonomy based on the nature of the content in relation to copyright principles. He would divide UGC into three broad categories[10]: content authored by users,[11] content derived by users[12] and content copied by users.[13] This taxonomy emphasizes the different ways in which individuals now engage with digital works and digital modes of dissemination. The focus on the characterization of the user’s activity, as opposed to, for example, the form of the work, is echoed as well in the Supreme Court of Canada’s emphasis in SOCAN v Bell Canada [ Bell ] on the importance of the perspective of “the ultimate users” and their purposes in relation to the works at issue.[14]

The UGC exception in Bill C-11 is oriented only toward the second category in Gervais’ taxonomy: content that is created by users and that incorporates, to a greater or lesser extent, copyright works by others. It is therefore this category of UGC that will be the focus of this chapter. Because this chapter is about intellectual property law, it is the copyright lawyers’ taxonomy that is adopted. Nevertheless, it is important to note that UGC in its many forms is already becoming accepted in different fields of activity as a source of information and creativity, and inquiries in these fields have moved ahead to issues of how best to use, integrate and derive benefit from these new modes of knowledge creation.

 

Featured here is the first part of a book chapter written by Teresa Scassa, Canada Research Chair in Information Law and Professor at the University of Ottawa. The full chapter is available for download . The book is entitled "The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law" edited by Michael Geist, and is available for purchase or download .

 


[1] Bill C-11, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2011. At the time of writing, the Bill has been passed into law, but its coming into effect has yet to be proclaimed. This is a matter of some concern. It is possible that ongoing industry opposition to provisions such as the UGC exception and expanded fair dealing is delaying and may derail the coming into effect of these amendments. They cannot, however, derail the fundamental transformations that have made addressing UGC and its relationship to copyright law essential.

[2] Note that the OECD has used the term “user-created content” or “UCC” to describe the same phenomenon. See: OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, Committee for Information, Computer, and Communications Policy, “Participative Web: User-Created Content” (12 April 2007) <>.

[3] Daniel J Gervais, “The Tangled Web of UGC: Making Copyright Sense of User-Generated Content” (2009) 11 Vand J Ent & Tech L 841 at 842 <www.jetlaw.org/wp-content/journal-pdfs/Gervais.pdf>. See also Steven Hetcher, “User-Generated Content and the Future of Copyright: Part One – Investiture of Ownership” (2007-08) 10 Vand J Ent & Tech L 863.

[4] Gervais, supra note 4 at 842. Note that the UGC provision in Bill C-11, supra note 2, is not limited to digital works and digital dissemination. Hetcher, supra note 4 at 873, also argues that digitization is a key element of UGC.

[5] Debora Hilbert, “Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses: A Manifest for User-Generated Rights” (2009) 11 Vand J Ent & Tech L 921 at 924 <www.jetlaw.org/wp-content/journal-pdfs/Halbert.pdf>.

[6] See e.g. Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006) <>; Cass R Sunstein, Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Mary WS Wong, “‘Transformative’ User-Generated Content in Copyright Law: Infringing Derivative Works or Fair Use?” (2009) 11 Vand J Ent & Tech L 1076 at 1077.

[7] For example, in Rogers Communications Inc. v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 35 at para 30, [2012] 2 SCR 283 <> [Rogers], the Court emphasizes the need to look beyond the “technicalities of the alleged infringer’s chosen method of operation”, and to focus on the substance rather than the form of online activities.

[8] Samuel E Trosow et al, “Mobilizing User-Generated Content for Canada’s Digital Advantage” (1 December 2010) <>.

[9] In the context of Volunteered Geographic Information (VGI), a subset of UGC, see, for example: Christopher C Miller, “A beast in the field: The Google Maps mashup as GIS/2” (2006) 41:3 Cartographica 187 <>; Michael F Goodchild, “Citizens as sensors: The world of volunteered geography” (2007) 69:4 GeoJournal 211; Sarah Elwood, “Volunteered Geographic Information: Key Questions, Concepts and Methods to Guide Emerging Research and Practice” (2008) 72 GeoJournal 133.

[10] Gervais, supra note 4.

[11] This type of content could include reviews of products or services, blog postings and photographs uploaded to social networking sites. (See e.g. Len Glickman and Jessica Fingerhut, “User-Generated Content: Recent Developments in Canada and the U.S.” (2011-12) 12:6 IECLC 49 at 49).

[12] This would be new content created through the modification of existing works.

[13] Note that others have argued as well that user-copied content takes on a new significance in certain contexts, and can thus also pose challenges for copyright law and policy. For example, the copying of copyright-protected content for viral dissemination on the Internet may be a way in which important ideas are shared more broadly than the copyright owner might wish (see e.g. Hilbert, supra note 6 at 937-38). Such issues are interesting and important, but are beyond the immediate scope of this chapter.

[14] Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Bell Canada, 2012 SCC 36 at para 34, [2012] 2 SCR 326 <> [Bell].

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The Internet Taxi: Collective Management of Copyright and the Making Available Right, after the Pentalogy /osgoode/iposgoode/2013/07/31/the-internet-taxi-collective-management-of-copyright-and-the-making-available-right-after-the-pentalogy/ Wed, 31 Jul 2013 08:00:04 +0000 http://www.iposgoode.ca/?p=21954 Just after the adoption of Bill C-11,[1] the Supreme Court of Canada handed down five decisions, which are now referred to as the “pentalogy”, to follow the heretofore famous trilogy.[2] The pentalogy, like its three-legged predecessor, marked a significant shift in Canadian copyright policy. The five cases dealt in one form or another with collective […]

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Just after the adoption of Bill C-11,[1] the Supreme Court of Canada handed down five decisions, which are now referred to as the “pentalogy”, to follow the heretofore famous trilogy.[2] The pentalogy, like its three-legged predecessor, marked a significant shift in Canadian copyright policy. The five cases dealt in one form or another with collective management of copyright in that they originated from appeals of decisions made by the Copyright Board of Canada.

Of the five cases, two do not seem particularly controversial. In the first case, Re:Sound v Motion Picture Theatre Association of Canada,[3] which involved the 1961 Rome Convention,[4] a unanimous Court agreed with the Copyright Board that sound recordings embedded in movie soundtracks were not (or were no longer) to be treated as sound recordings under the Copyright Act,[5] thus rejecting the application in Canada of an Australian precedent based on a similar fact pattern but on very different statutory language. Given the wording of section 2 of the Act, the outcome seems reasonable. While the Rome Convention might have led the Court to take a longer look at the appellants’ arguments that a pre-existing sound recording reproduced in a soundtrack is still a sound recording and/or that a new sound recording is created by ripping the soundtrack—based on the principle that statutes should be interpreted in accordance with treaties ratified or adhered to by Canada[6]—the statute seems rather unambiguous in defining a soundtrack as something other than a phonogram because it is not exclusively “aural”.[7] The idea that an existing sound recording ceases to exist under Canadian copyright law when (while) it is embedded in a soundtrack and re-emerges when ripped would deserve a longer comment, but the point is not one I wish to belabour here.

In the second case, Rogers v SOCAN,[8] the Court decided (unanimously on this point[9]) that a series of point-to-point on-demand transmissions of works constituted a form of communication to the public (covered by an exclusive right) even if each individual transmission was not, at least colloquially, public. The Court referred to the WIPO Copyright Treaty[10] and the making available right in that context. That case was, I believe, rightly decided if the normative basis for the definition of “public” that has applied to signals sent to groups of private homes, hotel rooms, etc. (which, together, constitute a “public”) is to be followed.

Two of the three other cases in the pentalogy were 5-4 splits. Not surprisingly, they are controversial. I return to those two cases below. I will also mention the fifth (and last case) of the pentalogy, namely SOCAN v Bell, later on. It is not particularly controversial but it needs to be contextualized. However, before embarking on our review of the cases, I wish to take the reader for a quick a tour of ancient China and Greece...

 

Featured here is the first part of a book chapter written by Daniel Gervais, Professor of Law and Director of the Intellectual Property Program at Vanderbilt University. The full chapter is available for download . The book is entitled "The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law" edited by Michael Geist, and is available for purchase or download .


[1] Now An Act to amend the Copyright Act, SC 2012, c 20 <> [Bill C-11].

[2] Namely ճé v Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc., 2002 SCC 34, [2002] 2 SCR 336 <> [ճé]; CCH Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13, [2004] 1 SCR 339 <> [CCH]; and Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Association of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45, [2004] 2 SCR 427 <>[SOCAN v CAIP].

[3] Re:Sound v Motion Picture Theatre Associations of Canada, 2012 SCC 38, [2012] 2 SCR 376 <>.

[4] International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, 26 October 1961, 496 UNTS 43 (entered into force 4 June 1998, accession by Canada 4 March 1998) <> [Rome Convention].

[5] Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42 <>.

[6] See Daniel Gervais, “The Role of International Treaties in the Interpretation of Canadian Intellectual Property Statutes” in O Fitzgerald, ed, The Globalized Rule of Law: Relationships between International and Domestic Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) 549.

[7] The term “phonogram” is defined in the Rome Convention to mean “any exclusively aural fixation of sounds of a performance or of other sounds” [emphasis added], Rome Convention, supra note 5, art 3(b).

[8] Rogers Communications Inc. v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 35, [2012] 2 SCR 283 <> [Rogers].

[9] The court was unanimous on the copyright aspects of the case, though not on the administrative law—the standard of review—aspects. This would need to be studied in a separate paper, but somehow I am not entirely certain how one should reconcile ESA and Alberta (Education) (infra note 58) on this point.

[10] WIPO Copyright Treaty, 20 December 1996, WIPO Publication No 226, 36 ILM 65 (entered into force 6 March 2002) <> [WCT].

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Technological Neutrality: (Pre)Serving the Purposes of Copyright Law /osgoode/iposgoode/2013/07/04/technological-neutrality-preserving-the-purposes-of-copyright-law/ Thu, 04 Jul 2013 10:30:54 +0000 http://www.iposgoode.ca/?p=21629 In the realm of law, neutrality is widely hailed as a fundamental principle of fairness, justice and equity; it is also, however, widely criticized as a myth that too often obscures the inevitable reality of perspective, interest or agenda. It should come as little surprise, then, that the principle of technological neutrality, recently employed by […]

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In the realm of law, neutrality is widely hailed as a fundamental principle of fairness, justice and equity; it is also, however, widely criticized as a myth that too often obscures the inevitable reality of perspective, interest or agenda. It should come as little surprise, then, that the principle of technological neutrality, recently employed by the Supreme Court of Canada when applying copyright law to online activities, seems similarly fundamental in the copyright realm—but also largely mythical and potentially obfuscatory.

In what is now dubbed the Supreme Court’s “copyright pentalogy”—five copyright judgments released concurrently by the Court in July 2012[1]—the unprecedented importance accorded by the Court to the principle of technological neutrality is clear; what remains unclear is precisely what “technological neutrality” means, why it matters, and whether or how it can (or should) ever be attained.

This chapter aims to critically assess the significance of the principle and its potential to guide the future development of copyright law and policy in Canada. In Part 2, I set out the various shades of meaning that can be attached to technological neutrality, first as a principle of sound regulation, and then as a principle of statutory interpretation by the courts. I review, in Part 3, the reasons delivered by the Justices in three of the five cases to examine the various and divergent ways in which the principle of technological neutrality was defined and rationalized by members of the Court. I proceed to explore the application of the principle and its role in resolving the legal issues before the Court, drawing connections between conceptualizations of the principle and its interpretive impact, and focusing on its capacity to support the extension and/or circumscription of owners’ and users’ rights.

In Part 4, I consider whether the role accorded to technological neutrality as a guiding principle is justifiable or appropriate in the context of Canadian copyright policy. Arguing that its justification is found in, and flows from, the concept of balance at the heart of the copyright system, I proceed to offer some thoughts on its potential significance in the future of Canadian copyright law and in light of the recent amendments to the Copyright Act.[2] Part 5 concludes that the new emphasis placed by the Court on technological neutrality as a guiding principle is an important and positive development for Canada’s copyright system. The caveat, however, is that the principle cannot perform this role effectively if conceived (or rhetorically invoked) as a limited principle of formal non-discrimination that merely justifies the extension of copyright’s reach. Rather, I argue, it must be conceived in a functional sense, shaping copyright norms to produce a substantively equivalent effect across technologies, with a view to preserving the copyright balance in the digital realm.

 

Featured here is the first part of a book chapter written by Carys Craig, Associate Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School. The full chapter is available for download . The book is entitled "The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law" edited by Michael Geist, and is available for purchase or download .

 


[1] Entertainment Software Association v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 34, [2012] 2 SCR 231 <> [ESA]; Rogers Communications Inc. v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 35, [2012] 2 SCR 283 <http://scc.lexum.org/decisia-scc-csc/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/ item/9995/index.do> [Rogers]; Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Bell Canada, 2012 SCC 36, [2012] 2 SCR 326 <> [Bell]; Alberta (Education) v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2012 SCC 37, [2012] 2 SCR 345 <> [Alberta (Education)]; Re:Sound v Motion Picture Theatre Associations of Canada, 2012 SCC 38, [2012] 2 SCR 376 <> [Re:Sound].

[2]Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42 <>; Copyright Modernization Act, SC 2012, c 20 <>.

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The Arithmetic of Fair Dealing at the Supreme Court of Canada /osgoode/iposgoode/2013/05/30/the-arithmetic-of-fair-dealing-at-the-supreme-court-of-canada/ Thu, 30 May 2013 15:38:55 +0000 http://www.iposgoode.ca/?p=21181 In the 2012 Supreme Court of Canada copyright cases, the Court found an opportunity to redefine the law of fair dealing in Canada. While the Court acknowledged that fair dealing is a question of fact, and thereby properly adjudicated by triers of fact like the Copyright Board of Canada, the Court stepped in to revisit […]

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In the 2012 Supreme Court of Canada copyright cases, the Court found an opportunity to redefine the law of fair dealing in Canada. While the Court acknowledged that fair dealing is a question of fact, and thereby properly adjudicated by triers of fact like the Copyright Board of Canada, the Court stepped in to revisit the facts all over again. When compared to its common law counterparts like the UK and the US, Canada stands alone in its willingness to rehear fair dealing cases, which are a matter of first impression.[2]

I argue that while it is salutary to re-emphasize the existence of users’ rights as per CCH v Law Society of Upper Canada [CCH], and indeed that these rights are here to stay, it cannot be beneficial for the Court to reinterpret the facts, which is the job of courts and tribunals of first instance, or to make policy, which is the job of government; here, unfortunately, the Court indulged in both. In its reasoning, the Supreme Court of Canada showcases rigid reliance on CCH’s six-factor framework and elevates the framework to the level of law.[3] Ironically, in doing so, the Supreme Court of Canada is actually going against the spirit and the benefit that CCH created for copyright law in Canada and, more specifically, for fair dealing.

Fair Dealing and the Copyright Pentalogy

The Supreme Court of Canada released five copyright cases, commonly referred to as the copyright pentalogy, on the same day in July 2012, setting abuzz all circles in the legal community and beyond. Many fundamental copyright issues were raised: delineating the scope of various rights and the overlapping nature of rights in the Copyright Act, technological neutrality, questions of payment and, more broadly, appropriate standards of review, as each of these cases originated from the Federal Court of Appeal’s judicial review of the Copyright Board of Canada decisions. Among the five cases, two dealt squarely with the doctrine of fair dealing: within certain limits, what a user can do with a substantial part of a copyright work without permission of the owner.[4]

In Canada, the doctrine of fair dealing is statutorily entrenched in the Copyright Act. As a result of the recently enacted Copyright Modernization Act, there are now five allowable purposes for fair dealing: (1) research or private study (s. 29); (2) criticism or review (s. 29.1); (3) news reporting (s. 29.2); (4) parody or satire (s. 29); and (5) education (s. 29).[5] Fair dealing is a question of fact and a matter of first impression.[6] The onus is on the defendant to prove that the dealing (1) fits within one of the enumerated allowable purposes; (2) is “fair”; and (3) for “criticism or review” and “news reporting”, sufficient acknowledgement is given. In CCH, a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada ruled that fair dealing, alongside the other exceptions in the Copyright Act, “must not be interpreted restrictively”[7] and that more or less six factors may be used when assessing fairness.[8] In that case, the Law Society of Upper Canada did not infringe copyright, because its Great Library request-based reproduction services fell squarely within the allowances of the fair dealing doctrine. Lawyers carrying on the business of law for profit were held to be conducting noninfringing research. Research should be accorded a “large and liberal interpretation in order to ensure that users’ rights are not unduly constrained.”[9]

In SOCAN v Bell [Bell], Abella J for a unanimous court agreed with the Board that song previews provided by Internet service providers for consumers constituted fair dealing for the purposes of research and thus were not subject to a tariff. Consistent with the spirit of CCH, the term “research” should be given a “large and liberal interpretation”. For the Court, it would be far too restrictive to limit “research” to its ordinary meaning, as it can include “many activities that do not demand the establishment of new facts or conclusions. It can be piecemeal, informal, exploratory, or confirmatory. It can be undertaken for no purpose except personal interest.”[10]

On the other hand, Alberta (Education) was a heavily contentious case, with a 5-4 split decision over the appropriate deference afforded to the Board and the interpretation of fair dealing. At issue was whether copies made at the teacher’s initiative in Kindergarten to Grade 12 classrooms and provided to students with instructions to read the material were made for the allowable purpose of research or private study.[11] While the matter was sent back to the Copyright Board for reconsideration, the Board later ruled that the copying at issue was fair dealing.[12] For Abella J’s majority, the Board misinterpreted the six fair dealing factors. For Rothstein J’s dissent, the six factors are not statutory enactments; fair dealing is a question of fact, and deference should be accorded to the Board. In both cases, the Court seized the opportunity to clarify the interpretive framework set out in CCH.[13]

In Bell, Abella J clarified that a generous, “low-threshold” interpretation should occur for the first part of the test, with respect to determining the allowable purposes, “so that the analytical heavyhitting is done in determining whether the dealing was fair.”[14] While the Court is quite liberal in the first part of the test—some would say too liberal[15]—it is ironically rigid in the fairness analysis.

What follows is a discussion of the Court’s enthusiasm to rehear facts when it does not agree with the outcome, in specific reference to (1) an emerging user perspective test the Court used for determining both the allowable purpose to warrant fair dealing and the first fairness factor (i.e. the purpose of the dealing), and (2) the Court’s general approach to determine fairness: by methodically examining each of the six fairness factors proposed in CCH. I will tackle the latter first, as I find this development the most troubling.

 

Featured here is the first part of a book chapter written by Giuseppina D’Agostino, Founder and Director of IP Osgoode, the Founder and Director of the IP Intensive Program, and an Associate Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School. The full chapter is available for download . The book is entitled "The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law" edited by Michael Geist, and is available for purchase or download .


[1] The author would like to thank Osgoode JD students Benjamin Farrow and Mekhala Chaubal for their research assistance.

[2] Hubbard v Vosper, [1972] 2 QB 84 at para 94 (CA) [Hubbard], cited with approval in CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13 at para 52, [2004] 1 SCR 339 <> [CCH].

[3] CCH, supra note 2 at paras 53-60.

[4] Giuseppina D’Agostino, “Healing Fair Dealing? A Comparative Copyright Analysis of Canada’s Fair Dealing to U.K. Fair Dealing and U.S. Fair Use” SSRN (2008), 53 McGill LJ 309 <> [D’Agostino, “Healing Fair Dealing”].

[5] Copyright Act, RSC 1985 c C-42 <>; Copyright Modernization Act, SC 2012 c 20 < (parody or satire and education were recent additions).

[6] Hubbard, supra note 2 at para 94.

[7] CCH, supra note 2 at para 48.

[8] Ibid at paras 53-60.

[9] Ibid at para 51.

[10] Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Bell Canada, 2012 SCC 36 at para 22, [2012] 2 SCR 326 <> [Bell].

[11] Alberta (Education) v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2012 SCC 37, [2012] 2 SCR 345 <> [Alberta (Education)].

[12] Re: Access Copyright - Elementary and Secondary School Tariff (2005-2009) (19 September 2012) (CB) <>.

[13] Alberta (Education), supra note 11.

[14] Bell, supra note 10 at para. 27.

[15] Casey Chisick, “Thoughts on SOCAN v Bell” (Remarks delivered at the IP Osgoode & Osgoode Professional Development (OPD) Copyright Teleseminar, September 13, 2012).

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New Book - The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law /osgoode/iposgoode/2013/05/08/new-book-the-copyright-pentalogy-how-the-supreme-court-of-canada-shook-the-foundations-of-canadian-copyright-law/ Wed, 08 May 2013 15:58:06 +0000 http://www.iposgoode.ca/?p=20907 In the summer of 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada issued a series of rulings in five major copyright cases (referred to as the “copyright pentalogy”). A new book has just been released that examines the possible long-term impact of these decisions. The Copyright Pentalogy rocked the foundations of Canada’s media industries, and will have […]

The post New Book - The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law appeared first on IPOsgoode.

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In the summer of 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada issued a series of rulings in five major copyright cases (referred to as the “copyright pentalogy”). A new book has just been released that examines the possible long-term impact of these decisions.

The Copyright Pentalogy rocked the foundations of Canada’s media industries, and will have wide reaching repercussions for Canadian copyright law. The book, entitled “” is the first comprehensive scholarly analysis of the pentalogy. The text covers a range of topics, including the standard of review in the courts, the implications and evolution of fair dealing, technological neutrality, the scope of copyright and copyright collective management.

The book is edited by Prof. Michael Geist of the University of Ottawa and includes contributions from many of Canada’s leading copyright scholars, including IP Osgoode’s very own Prof. Giuseppina D’Agostino and Prof. Carys Craig. It is sure to be a must have resource for anyone interested in Canadian copyright law in the future.

Print copies are available from the and an open access PDF version is available as a .

The post New Book - The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law appeared first on IPOsgoode.

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