This leaves authors of works which do not qualify for these categories to seek out alternative methods of enforcing their moral rights, such as through the use of contracts and state laws. [3] An indie video game studio has recently opted to use the Digital Rights Millennium Act (“DMCA”) to champion their moral rights claim. [4]

“Let’s Play” videos involve people prerecording or livestreaming themselves playing video games so that audiences can experience their reactions and commentary as they play. The occupation is both popular and highly lucrative, with its most popular streamer, Felix Kjellberg (known as “PewDiePie”), having over 57 million subscribers.[5] The videos are generally hosted on YouTube or Twitch.tv, a live-game streaming site, and can include hours of video game content being shown online. Sometimes this can feature the experience of playing an entire video game from beginning to end. It is not hard to imagine that if this same act was replicated on other forms of entertainment media—for example, the streaming of an entire movie with commentary—then it would quickly fall victim to a DMCA takedown. But video games have never operated the same way as movies or music.

There is a tacit understanding between Let’s Play video makers and video game developers; the owners of the copyrighted work ignore the potential infringement of their copyright in turn for the free publicity that the videos generate for their games. Camp Santo, for example, loved that “people stream and share their experiences in the game.” [6] They loved it, that is, until they requested a DMCA takedown for a video of PewDiePie playing their video game, Firewatch.

DMCA allows holders of intellectual property to request takedowns from service providers. [7] It is the hated, red-headed stepchild of the internet, especially in the gaming community,  where  it  is  seen  as  a  mechanism  for  blocking  out  competition  and  censoring criticism.[8] Camp Santo wasn’t attempting to curtail a negative review. They simply did not want their game featured on PewDiePie’s channel. Their problem with PewDiePie? His casual use of Nazi jokes and racial slurs.

A little while ago, the YouTuber paid Indian actors to hold up signs that read “Death to All the Jews”. The stunt cost him his partnership with Disney’s Maker Studio, YouTube and Google’s Preferred ads. [9] He followed that up with the use of the n-word in another one of his live-stream videos. Neither one of these offending videos featured Camp Santo’s work. Nevertheless, Camp Santo did not want their brand and their work associated with PewDiePie. Camp Santo believed that by allowing their content to be featured on PewDiePie’s channel they were implying a tacit endorsement of his behavior, thereby tarnishing their reputation. Under the Canadian Copyright Act [10], prejudice to Camp Santo’s reputation, as the author of a work associated with PewDiePie, would constitute infringement of Camp Santo’s moral rights. In the U.S. the ambit of moral rights protection is limited to selected works which do not include video games. Google, YouTube and Disney had partnerships they could terminate, and contracts they could fall back on. Camp Santo had only the DMCA to dissociate their work from PewDiePie.

The DMCA is not a panacea to moral rights problems for works existing online. A major problem with using DMCA is the issue of the fair use exception US law. [11] Let’s Play video makers insist that their commentary makes their work a product of fair use. Since the matter has never been taken to Court, it is an undetermined area of law. Here, once Camp Santo requested the takedown, PewDiePie removed the video and it was later deleted by Google. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether this novel way of protecting moral rights may have any further use in the realm of video games.

Tina Mirzaei is a JD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School and was enrolled in Osgoode’s Intellectual Property Law Intensive Program. As part of the program requirements, students were asked to write a blog on a topic of their choice.

[1] 17 USC § 106A.

[2] 17 USC § 101.

[3] Greg J Yonover, “The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody and Fair Use” (1996) 14:79 Cardozo Arts & Entert LJ 79 at 94.

[4] Jonathan Ore. “Is Playing Video Games on YouTube a Copyright Infringement? No One Wants to Find Out”, CBC News (October 7, 2017), online: < 1.4309312>

��5����Ibid, Note 4.

[6] Kyle Orland, “Firewatch Dev Uses DMCA Against PewDiePie After Streamed Racial Slur”, arsTECHNICA (September  11,  2017),  online:    <https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2017/09/firewatch-dev-uses-dmca-against-

pewdiepie-after-streamed-racial-slur/>

[7] 17 USC § 1201.

[8] Sebastian C Mejia, “Fair Play: Copyright Issues and Fair Use in YouTube’s ‘Let’s Play’ and Video Game Livestreams” (2013) 1 at 5. Online: <>

��9����Supra, Note 4.

[10] See section 28.2(1) of the Canada Copyright Act RSC 1985, c. C-42.

[11] See 17 USC § 107 and 1201(c)(1).

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Clearing the History

In Adler’s view, copying and imitation has always been essential to art as evidenced by the Italian Renaissance master Giogrione’s used as a strong reference in 1538 when Titian created the . Adler claims that art has a history of innovation built on emulation. In modern times, digital technology has not only allowed for copying to become a central building block to visual art but has become a technique used by many artists, including Director X and his music video for Drake’s Hotline Bling that uses the spatial light work of American artist . According to YouTube, the  has been streamed over 1 billion times.

Drawing the Line

The Copyright Clause found in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution empowers the United States Congress “to promote the progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” To act as a defense to copyright law, considers four factors when determining “fair use”, or free and legal use, of copyrighted material that is also able to advance the purposes set out in the Copyright Clause:

1. Purpose and character of the use, including whether the use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
2. Nature of the copyrighted work;
3. Amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
4. Effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

In 1992, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a copyright infringement ruling against best-selling American artist for basing his sculpture too closely on another artist’s photograph. The Court relied on Koons’ opinion of what the new art represented and, based on his inability to communicate a substantial difference, the Court ruled against him. In 1994, the Supreme Court introduced the term “transformative” to determine if the new work, in comparison to the existing work, “added something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning or message.” In a separate infringement case, Koons carefully adapted his testimony to the Court’s definition of transformation and stated, “I want the viewer to think about…those images and…gain new insight into how they affect our lives.”

The Court held that Koons’ intention was to create a new artwork and ruled in his favour.  Adler considers the Court’s definition of "transformative" to be an unreliable standard of measure because it ultimately allows legal authorities to become curators, arbitrarily deciding an artist's intention, an artwork's representation and whether the new artwork is sufficiently different than the original artwork.

Copy and Haste

The ability to select media from densely populated online content is a form of rapid curating that has become an issue for the modern artist. Adler was involved in Cariou v Prince, a landmark 1994 copyright case in the New 91��ɫ Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Within 30 of his own collages, American artist Richard Prince copied underlying material to varying degrees from American photographer Patrick Cariou.

Prince refused to testify in accordance with the Court’s definition of transformation, and simply stated that he did not attempt to noticeably differentiate his artwork. , the Court was unable to use Prince’s testimony as a basis for differentiation and was forced to adopt a “reasonable person” standard. By simply conducting a side-by-side comparison of each of the 30 collages, the Court concluded that 25 were sufficiently distinct but was unsure of the remaining five, ultimately remanding the insufficiently distinct collages.

Evidently, great uncertainty exists when attempting to claim that fair use progresses the arts. In response to the New 91��ɫ Court of Appeals’ side-by-side comparison, Adler argues the photographer Sherrie Levine’s identical reproductions of Walker Evans’ photographs could not coexist with this understanding because the artwork’s meaning transcends visual interpretation.

Redefining the Rule

Adler strongly opposes an authoritative definition of art. Not only does she believe that problems arise from an artist’s forced explanation of their artwork but also that it is inherently difficult to reduce images to digestible ideas for the general public to collectively understand or for courts to effectively rule for or against. In this view, it can be justified that an artist’s intention should be irrelevant to the meaning of their work because it is an arbitrary and ever-changing standard of measure.

For example,  saw his art as collaboration with everyone who viewed it and in a sense disowned authorship of his works, while the works of expressionist  were inherently abstract and are publicly perceived as sharing no immediate identity with the works of others.

Multiple artists, editors or assistants contribute to multiple meanings of the work and consequently displace the responsibility of any individual contributor. Adler provides the example of an unknown editor of Nick Ut’s who cropped out various subjects to focus on the victims of war and, in turn, redefined the original photograph’s meaning and intent. Another example Adler provides is ’s appropriation of ’s photograph of Barack Obama to create the iconic “” illustration. Garcia claims he did not initially recognize the original photo as his own. In Adler’s view, the law’s inability to recognize an artist’s increasing reliance on the work of others is a major source of litigation and is yet another reason to abolish copyright protection for the visual arts.

The Future of Art

Adler’s first step to effectively addressing the issue of copyright and modern art is to stop thinking of art in terms of its message or meaning and to instead think about the economic market. She believes in a modification of the fair use test that incorporates market usurpation because, when it is “art-on-art stealing,” there is no market usurpation due to market’s negligible demand for copies of original artwork. Although it is difficult for some to classify visual art as a simple commodity to be traded among the wealthy, Adler believes this is the direction the market is evolving towards.

The second step, and the more radical of the two, is to abolish copyright for the visual arts because fair use lawsuits would no longer exist. Adler believes the reason copyright protection exists is mainly utilitarian and is based on economic incentives to create ideas. From this, she concludes that the worry is not about the act of copying itself but instead the allowance of a cheap copy to monetize another’s art.

The Art of Crime

Typically, the theft, duplication and resale of other types of art such as motion pictures and sound recordings create an economic loss for the rightful owner. However, in the visual art market, Adler claims there is no market substitution between copies and authentic originals. What about moral rights? Adler answers that, in the United States, an infringement of moral rights for violating copyright only applies if an individual has used a limited edition photograph of . She claims that most works of visual art do not have a re-sale value and that over 99% of visual art cannot be resold, with the exception of a small class of considerably successful artists. To incentivize the creation of art, it is important to promote the revenue generated from the first sale of an original artwork, as it is the most lucrative because the value of a copy is simply a small fraction of the first sale.

For example, Richard Prince took screenshots of  from a burlesque collective, the Suicide Girls, and turned the original screenshot into original prints that sold for $90,000 or more. Instead of taking legal action, the Suicide Girls and tried to sell them for $90. However, because visual art is more concerned unique, authentic originals rather than duplicates, the market did not react in favor of the Suicide Girls.

To resolve this discrepancy, Adler claims that the only artists generating significant revenue from copies, although relatively a small amount, are those who are already capable of generating large amounts of revenue from their original artwork. In a sense, Richard Prince conferred money on the Suicide Girls as a result from his copying. Adler believes that this economic distribution is made possible by modern artists continuing to rely on imitating their surroundings, now virtually limitless in an interconnected and online world.

As a co-founder of a visual art collective, I agree that the use of open-source references and online images allow for greater economic prosperity. This freedom grants artists a wider degree of creativity to build their brand, the main force that drives revenue generation. Although Adler’s claims are limited in scope to visual arts and focus on the protection of commercially successful artists, the abolishment of copyright law may ultimately benefit smaller artists who rely on the copying of another artist’s work for inspiration or reference. Adler reminds us that, while unfortunate to some, the art market values the brand of an artwork's creator more than the content of the actual artwork.

Robel Sahlu is an IPilogue Editor and a JD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School.

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Artist has developed his artistic career by appropriating imagery and adding his own elements, presumably as a form of social commentary. Prince images from plaintiff Patrick Cariou’s Rastafarian photography. The scanned pictures were printed directly onto canvas and were altered by Prince’s addition of new elements. An example of Prince’s work using Cariou’s photography may be seen .

Prince claims that the images used are merely while Cariou’s lawyer maintains that Prince  This distinction is important because it goes to the determination of Fair Use, which is the key issue in determining the legality of appropriation art.

The issue of whether Prince’s works are transformative is essential to the existence of ; however, this is a subjective determination. The of an artwork is analyzed through observations regarding how the artist’s contributions have varied the original. Further, to be transformative, the additions some form of criticism or commentary on the original work.

The United States District Court decided against Prince. His works were found not to be transformative and therefore do not quality as fair use. It that the court focused largely on Prince’s inability to explain effectively how his additional elements generated any further meaning or provided any commentary on Cariou’s originals. Furthermore, Prince did not adequately articulate any particular meaning for his appropriated works. This finding emphasizes the subjective element involved in fair use rulings and critics of this decision are quick to point to other that are able to find a transformative element without any direct commentary on the original work. In any event, Prince has appealed the District Court’s decision and a ruling will likely be heard early this year.

This appeal should be helpful in clarifying some of the surrounding art and copyright in light of modern technological developments. In addition to changing notions of what constitutes art, new are providing new mediums for creativity. The Internet provides users with countless images that they can easily download and save for various creative purposes.

This case also illustrates some of the that can arise when applying legal principles to the realm of art and creation. It has been argued that what is considered transformative to an artist cannot be reconciled with legal concepts.

Nora Sleeth is a JD candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School.

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