Innovation and technology conversations are almost always oriented toward what comes next, what lies ahead, what will disrupt, or what will transform. Intellectual property law sits at the centre of these forward-looking debates, shaping how innovation is protected, disrupted, and governed. Yet the conversation at the launch of , hosted recently by IP Osgoode, suggested a more compelling perspective: looking towards IP futures does more than help us anticipate change; it helps us see the present more clearly. ÌęArtificial intelligence, digital globalization, and shifting economic models are not only reshaping innovation—they are also illuminating the blind spots embedded within todays IP structures. These blind spots surface in unresolved questions about originality and human authorship, the erosion of local normative priorities within global trade flows, and the largely invisible human labour underlying IP and information technologies.

, co-editor of the volume, opened the event by emphasizing the importance of emerging scholars in shaping the vitality of IP research. Reynolds, alongside co-editors and , has brought together an impressive collection of 18 chapters by 23 authors who participated in the 2023 workshop hosted at UBC's Allard School of Law. The resulting volume spans five thematic areas: the future of international IP treaties; evolving questions in Canadian law and artificial intelligence (AI); the relationship between Indigenous legal traditions and colonial IP frameworks; the future of IP in a digital and global environment; and the ways in which IP law can both reinforce and mitigate inequality. Together, these themes underscore that IP law is not merely a technical regulatory tool, it is a place where economic priorities, social justice concerns, and cultural values converge. Viewed through a future-oriented lens, each of these domains reveals pressures already reshaping the doctrinal foundations of IP.

Originality, Human Authorship, and the Limits of Existing Doctrine

Innovation debates are oriented toward what comes next, and questions of authorship reveal how unprepared existing doctrines may be. The rapid rise of AI-generated content forces copyright law to confront assumptions long taken for granted: that creativity is human, that authorship is identifiable, and that originality reflects individual intellectual effort. In his presentation, “Protection of AI-Generated Images in Canadian Copyright Law,” examined whether such works can satisfy the originality requirement, suggesting that protection may arise only where users provide sufficiently detailed inputs and where AI systems faithfully execute those executions -conditions that are rarely satisfied in practice. Most users do not invest the level of skill and judgment required to craft detailed prompts, and the outputs of AI black box systems often deviate from what the user intended. Dr. Rei-Anderson illustrated this point by referencing models’ tendency to hallucinate when asked to produce precise outputs or maintain specific spatial relationships.

[*The image below is Chat-GPT's output when asked, “What would it look like if I looked outside an acoustic guitar?” The fingerboard, strings, bridge, and saddle are all incorrectly positioned.]

Recognizing the gaps between expressive intention and AI-generated outputs highlights a deeper theme: the originality doctrine may have to adapt as technologies evolve if copyright law is to preserve a normative commitment human intellectual effort.

Viewed through a future-oriented lens, this is not simply a novel doctrinal puzzle. It exposes a present blind spot. When outputs emerge from opaque systems blending prompts, training data, and algorithmic processes, authorship becomes diffuse and originality difficult to anchor. The debate over AI-generated works therefore reveals an existing tension: doctrines built around individual human creativity struggle to accommodate collaborative, machine-mediated forms of production. The future of authorship, in this sense, illuminates the fragility of its present foundations.  

Globalization and the Disappearance of Local Normative Priorities

’s presentation shifted the discussion to the tension between the territorial nature of IP law and private international law (PIL), a dynamic that reveals another blind spot within IP law: the erosion of local normative priorities. Territoriality in IP law, she noted, is not merely technical, rather, it represents a manifestation of a state’s sovereign authority to protect fundamental national policies, including freedom of expression, education, and access to knowledge. These policies reflect deeply embedded social and economic values, and IP law often serves as a vehicle for their expression.

However, territoriality increasingly conflicts with the goals of PIL, which seeks to reduce multi-jurisdictional litigation and improve efficiency across borders. Daniel introduced the concept of “ICE Bias” (Initiative, Choice, and Enforcement) to describe the systemic imbalance between right holders and users in cross-border disputes. Right holders typically initiate proceedings, select favorable forums, and possess stronger incentives to enforce judgments, while users are often limited to seeking declaratory relief.

This imbalance encourages strategic litigation, where rights holders obtain judgments in restrictive jurisdictions and attempt to enforce them globally. Through cases such as and ., Daniel illustrated how global injunctions risk undermining domestic policy decisions. Her concern reflects a broader question about the future of IP in a globalized environment: how can law remain responsive to local values while operating within transnational networks?

In this manner, globalization does not merely generate efficiency, it risks flattening normative diversity. When enforcement mechanisms privilege scalability and uniformity, local concerns can be overshadowed by global market interests. Daniel proposed the development of specialized IP forums to complement general PIL venues, thereby preserving territorial policy choices while managing cross-border disputes.

Labor Exploitation in AI Training Processes

While AI is often framed as an autonomous technological force, Professor Teshager Dagne redirected attention to the human labor embedded within AI systems, emphasizing that data labeling, preprocessing, and model training depend on workers in economically vulnerable regions whose contributions remail largely invisible within IP frameworks.

Drawing on research conducted in Uganda and Ethiopia, Dagne described environments resembling digital “sweatshops,” where workers labeled data behind laptops rather than operating sewing machines. Although copyright doctrine recognizes human skill and contribution, data-labeling labor often falls outside traditional authorship frameworks. Dagne suggested joint ownership as a potential remedy, but acknowledged doctrinal and practical barriers, particularly where workers have signed away rights. This gap reflects a broader policy deficiency and highlights the need for statutory reform.

Dagne’s intervention emphasizes the socio-economic values embedded within legal systems: IP law does not merely regulate innovation; it shapes the distribution of benefits and burdens. A future-oriented IP perspective highlights that fairness in IP cannot be assessed only at the level of ownership or protection, it must account for the full technological pipeline and the conditions under which knowledge and data are produced.

Seeing the Present Through IP Futures

The launch of Intellectual Property Futures: Exploring the Global Landscape of IP Law and Policy does more than anticipate technological change; it provides an opportunity to identify and critically examine the blind spots embedded within the contemporary IP legal landscape. Looking ahead, in other words, becomes a way of more clearly seeing the problems with the present – and this wide-ranging, open-access collection provides us with an excellent vantage point to do just that. Ìę

Xiang Zhang is a doctoral student at Osgoode Hall Law School and a Senior IP Osgoode Research Fellow, with a strong interest in advancing open-source and open access to knowledge.

Dominic Rochon is a 2L J.D. student at Osgoode Hall Law School and an IP Osgoode Research Fellow, with an interest in music, copyright, and user-generated content.

16 April 2026

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Artificial intelligence systems often “give the vibe” of complete automated processing without human involvement. However, as reminds us, upon a closer “vibe check” there are layers of unseen and under-appreciated human inputs, efforts, and labour involved. The efforts of those unseen human hands are, in fact, the engine of AI innovation.

Dr. Dagne is the Ontario Research Chair in Governing Artificial Intelligence and an Associate Professor at 91ŃÇɫ’s new Markham campus in the School of Public Policy & Administration. He also teaches Property Law at Osgoode Hall Law School, where he is an Affiliated Researcher with IP Osgoode. His current project, which he recently presented at the at the University of Cape Town, highlights how copyright enables the proactive exploitation of digital workers’ contributions as inputs to AI training or, in some cases, AI-assisted outputs.

By bringing to the fore the roles of digital workers, Dagne hopes to unearth the collaborative creation that goes into the AI production chain and feeds into the AI output. His paper, “Unseen Hands, Invisible Rights: Unmasking Digital Workers in the Shadows of AI Innovation and Implications for the Future of Copyright Law”, is soon to be published in a forthcoming volume on IP’s Futures: Exploring the Global Landscape of Intellectual Property Law and Policy (Ottawa UP, 2025), which Dagne is co-editing with and . His chapter probes the future of copyright law, attempting to turn the focus of copyright to collaborative authorship. This move, Dagne argues, could respond to demands for the fair allocation of rights between digital workers, as authors or joint authors in some cases, and AI designers as exploiters of digital works. 

Digital Workers are the Lifeblood of AI Development

As , “[AI] doesn’t run on magic pixie dust
 [AI training] is a job that actually takes quite a bit of creativity, insight, and judgment.” Such ingenuity involves the preparation of data works for the datasets used to train and build AI technologies, which consists of a number of decisions as to the kind of data to collect, curate, clean, label, abstract, index, etc. The process of dataset development starts with formulating the problem, which is the conceptualization of the machine learning task by making the problems “into questions that data science can answer”. The task conceptualization is typically the responsibility of the AI designer, which may be an AI company like Open AI or Anthropic AI, for example, or platform company like Microsoft, Meta, or Amazon. After the conceptualization process comes the data collection, refining, and measuring stage. Dagne’s focus is on the “digital workers” who enter the picture at this stage in the AI production process.

According to these digital workers contribute to the training process of AI systems in three steps: generating and annotating data (AI preparation), verifying model output (AI verification), and directly mimicking model behaviour to produce a service (AI impersonation).  They range “from higher-skilled, ‘macro-task’ [
] workers [who] offer their services as graphic designers, computer programmers, statisticians, translators, and other professional services, to [those engaged in] ‘micro-task’ [work] which typically involve clerical tasks that can be completed quickly and require less specialized skills.” () As described by , “complex projects are broken down into smaller, easily accomplished tasks, which can then be distributed to a large number of workers.” Micro-task activities mainly involve the AI preparation aspect of AI training processes but can also include the AI verification and AI impersonation steps in AI training.

The Copyright Question

Much of the debate around copyright and AI has focused on whether using the underlying work of which inputs are constituted (the images, texts, musical works and other subject matter) for unauthorized learning constitutes copyright infringement. However, Dagne’s focus is on the copyright that can subsist over collected data, as we see in some and cases, and whether digital workers’ activities in the preparation of training data sets in the AI pipeline could itself give rise to a copyright interest. This question can be answered by examining the nature of digital workers’ contributions to the tasks assigned to them and the ownership of copyright under the contractual agreements that digital workers sign with platforms.

Digital workers in the AI production value chain collect raw data and help add extra meaning by associating each piece of data with relevant attributive tags. Although have argued that this attributive task is a mundane exercise that could ultimately be automated, others like have contended that tasks such as attribution will always be assigned to humans because of their capacity to recognize and classify data. Indeed, human intervention is now in demand to recognize the nuances and sophisticated details of specific data. As noted by , an example of such demand is in the medical field, where an understanding of scientific vocabulary is required.

From a doctrinal perspective, the copyright question is whether the contribution of digital workers described above meets the threshold of originality—which is defined, in Canadian law, by the Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling in , and requires more than trivial skill and judgment in the selection or arrangement of data. If so, we might ask whether recognizing the copyright status of such contributions could address these workers' invisibility. Even if, on account of originality, the tasks executed by digital workers amount to authorship, of course such authorship does not automatically translate into ownership. The ownership of the creative tasks conducted by digital workers as part of the collaborative venture is determined either by the workers’ status as employees or otherwise by contract—which means that it is determined in the context of significant power asymmetries and the routine exploitation of digital workers.

If copyright entrenches the inequities of an asymmetrical situation—by ensuring that the collective effort of digital workers in compiling essential datasets for AI training and AI development remains unseen and undervalued—Dagne thinks the time has come to confront its complicity. He suggests that, spurred by the arrival of AI, the copyright system needs to restructure the relationship between authors-as-(data)workers and corporate proprietors in pursuit of greater fairness.

‘Damola Adediji is a Visiting Researcher with IP Osgoode and Doctoral Candidate with the Centre for Law, Technology & Society at the University of Ottawa.

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It’s no secret that memes have taken the internet by storm. Whether they’re coming from your dad, who finally posted a Bernie Sanders mitten meme to his Facebook feed, a year late, after pestering you for help (good luck, he now thinks you’re a tech tycoon and you will never see another day of peace) or your kid sister, who continues to remind you how old twenty-four is –memes are the universal language of laughter. Ìę

A meme is simply a photo or video with text overlaid. This text usually describes the image and outlines a feeling or idea that is culturally relevant and relatable. Memes exist in collections, as they are often reposted by various creators, adding slight alterations. The term “” was coined in 1976 by Richard Dawkins, who likened them to genes, because of how quickly they replicate and spread.

The etymology of the word may make sense, but can the same image be copied over and over without intellectual property repercussions?

Copyrighting a Meme

In Canada, copyright protection is afforded to every original literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic work that is fixed. Although originality seems like a low threshold to meet, memes may not exactly make the cut.

Artistic Work

Memes that contain both artistic and literary components may comprise both an artistic and literary work: originality may exist in their combination. Multiple elements selected or arranged in an original way, may also qualify the meme as a protected .

Authorship

The next component to copyright is authorship. Although the term “” is not defined in the federal statute, the first owner of copyright is presumed to be the person who creates the work. This can become difficult to track with memes, as they often appear out of nowhere, on anonymously-run meme pages, such as @memezar and @insta.single. Although TikTok has simplified source tracking, as individual creators have been known to go viral for their content, knowing the identity of the original poster doesn’t always allow authorship to be easily ascertained, as other creators often replicate memes, adding their own twist.

Originality

Another key component of copyright, is originality: the work must be more than a mere copy (). The author need not prove their work is entirely novel or, as would say, “show-stopping, spectacular, never the same, totally unique, completely not ever been done before.” They must demonstrate only that their expression required skill and judgment. This may become tricky in the context of social media, as memes only become popular by copying and reposting. However, while memes reference and communicate with one another, any changes beyond the trivial and mechanical may meet the originality threshold, even if the later work infringes the earlier

Fixation

Lastly, fixation requirements may also be difficult to prove, especially because memes arguably exist in groups. While one image or video is fixed, collections are constantly changing.

Is Infringement Even Possible Then?

While the protection of memes remains unclear and unresolved, plaintiffs can claim copyright, trademark, and personality rights in the underlying images. According to of the Copyright Act, only rightsholders can reproduce their work or “any substantial part thereof.” Copying the whole or a substantial part of a meme could therefore constitute infringement even if new matter is added.

This may become a concern in Canada only when memes are used in a commercial context, as the Copyright Act allows exceptions for non-commercial user-generated content (s.). Infringement may however occur where brands use meme marketing to profit off popularized images — as when, in the US context, Grumpy Cat coffee company, Grenade, and Kim Kardashian fast fashion brand, Missguided, for using memes to sell merchandise.

On the flip side, many companies welcome the meme-ification of their brand, because of the free publicity they receive. This was seen with and, more recently, with the brands responding to logo redesigns.

Possible Remedies?

One defence to copyright infringement is fair dealing for the purpose of parody or satire ( of the Copyright Act). However, holds that, to be allowable, parodies that draw on original works must exhibit noticeable differences. New memes do not usually meet this criterion. If correct, it would affect many forms of parody, such as comedy that pull verbatim from the original.

Conclusion

All this to say – repost with caution, because the scope of what is and isn’t copyrightable or infringing creates problems by the day.ÌęÌę

Ìę

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Photo by Seenbutnotsurd ()

Sabrina Macklai is an IPilogue Senior Editor and a 2L JD Candidate at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law.

Happy spooky season! From “Evil Midweek Cutie” to “Juice Demon”, the Internet has been buzzing with featuring hilarious knock-off Halloween costumes. But why do many retailers resort to using these creative names? Consumers can clearly identify the source material for these costumes (i.e., Wednesday Addams and Beetlejuice). Is changing the name from sufficient to escape liability?

Copyright Creeping into Costumes

In general, any clothing, including costumes, is not protected by copyright laws. In Canada, under section 64(2) of the , it is not an infringement of copyright to reproduce the design of a “useful article”, so long as more than 50 copies are made. The Act defines a “useful article” as having a utilitarian function, which encompasses most clothing.

There are notable exceptions. For one, section 64(3)(a) states that copyright may persist in graphic or photographic representations that are applied to useful articles. In other words, one cannot avoid copyright infringement by merely reproducing a copyrighted work on a shirt or other “useful article.” While this may not apply to most costumes, this can prevent retailers from replicating images of Disney princesses and other copyrighted characters onto their clothing. Another exception, section 64(3)(b), states that copyright infringement may still be found when reproducing an article that contains “a trademark or a representation thereof or a label.” This explains why retailers cannot use logos like the Star Wars logo on their unlicensed costumes.

Courts have interpreted the scope of section 64(2) and it’s U.S. counterpart, , to exclude jewellery and masks. In (c.o.b. SpareParts), the Federal Court of Appeal suggested that original jewellery designs may be subject to copyright protection as the mere fact that they are worn does not make it ipso facto a “useful article.” In a way, purely ornamental jewellery may be analogous to works of art. However, the case was settled before a trial of the issues. Nonetheless, the notes that those in the jewellery industry may be granted industrial design registrations, offering a different kind of intellectual property protection. This is contrary to the U.S. where original jewellery designs are automatically protected under copyright law as . Fortunately for trick-or-treaters, most jewellery designs are not to be registered with the U.S. Copyright Office. Wearing—or selling—a string of pearls to complete a Great Gatsby themed costume will not land anyone in a lawsuit.

Perhaps more relevant to Halloween costumes, in the U.S., to fall outside of the “useful article” classification, as they are not considered to serve a utilitarian function. Therefore, they may be protected by copyright. Although Canada lacks an equivalent case, Pyrrha Designs Inc suggests a flexible interpretation for “useful article”. Even though masks may receive copyright protection in the U.S., they must still meet a threshold for originality. For example, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania that the Michael Myers mask from John Carpenter’s classic Halloween (1978) lacked the requisite originality for copyright protection; the mask was just a mold of actor William Shatner’s head!

More recently, on September 27, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New 91ŃÇÉ« that the parodical and satirical use of Fun World’s copyrighted “Ghost Face” mask was permitted under the fair use doctrine. American professional basketball player Terry Rozier, nicknamed “Scary Terry”, had launched a line of merchandise that included a cartoon image of him wearing the “Ghost Face” mask, as popularized by the Scream film franchise. While the decision does not support retailers wishing to sell their own Scream-inspired mask, with the court even stating that Fun World’s copyright registration gives rise to a presumption of validity, it does demonstrate that there are ways to legally use copyrighted works in one’s own design without seeking permission. Interestingly, the court noted that Rozier produced evidence which called into question whether Fun World’s mask possessed the requisite originality, given that a third-party created and marketed a similar “Wailer” mask several months before the “Ghost Face” mask was registered. Though not resolved in this case, the validity of Fun World’s copyright hangs in the balance.Ìę

Outside of masks and jewellery, a 2017 U.S. Supreme Court case, held that aesthetic elements of useful articles could be copyrightable only if they can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article and would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work if it were imagined separately from the useful article. The decision was applied in the costume context, in the 2019 case . Here, it was held that although a full-body banana suit is a “useful article”, the sculpted banana design itself may be copyrighted. It appears in the U.S., copyrighting Halloween costumes is not as bananas as one may think!

Scary Issues with Licensing and Trademarks

Although costumes are generally not afforded copyright protection, trademark laws still prevent retailers from selling and marketing unlicensed versions of costumes using the names which they are based on. protect brands’ corporate image via a sign or combination of signs used to distinguish their goods or services from those of others. This can include words, designs, three-dimensional shapes, textures, etc.

To avoid trademark infringement, retailers will avoid using trademarked names (like and ) and opt to sell their unlicensed costumes under parodied titles that give rise to the comical memes on our social media feeds.

Even so, rights-holders have initiated lawsuits against copycat designs with changed names that do not infringe trademarked words. For example, Fashion Nova is routinely sued for copying iconic fashion designs, even being . The central argument lies in trademark law—that the clothing has acquired the such that it is strongly associated with the brand or designer and copycats would create a high amongst consumers. Although it is unclear how strong these claims are, there remains a risk of being sued and facing litigation costs for copying a well-known design, especially given the decision in Silvertop Associates.

DIY Tricks?

Luckily for at-home costume designers, making your own costume, even of a licensed character, is unlikely to provide grounds for copyright violations. In Canada, provides that an individual does not infringe copyright by reproducing an otherwise copyright-protected work if the individual only uses the reproduction for their own private purposes. Although the U.S. lacks an analogous statutory provision, it is that using copyrighted materials for personal, non-commercial purposes is permissible.

While the last-minute, homemade Supermans and Catwomans can breathe a sigh of relief, issues may still arise if one were to sell their homemade creations on a site like Etsy. Doing so would prevent the maker from claiming a private purpose.

Overall, DIY costume-makers and even commercial costume retailers are very likely safe from liability. Still, it may be better to err on the side of caution and ensure that any costumes created do not infringe copyright (as limited as copyright protection may be) or are sold under trademarked names. Ghosts and skeletons might be scary, but there’s nothing more terrifying than an intellectual property infringement suit!

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Emily Prieur is an IPilogue Writer and a 3L JD Candidate at Queen’s University Faculty of Law

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Olivia Rodrigo rose to stardom this year when her song Drivers License dominated pop music charts across the world. However, Rodrigo’s subsequent album Sour has recently been circulating the news cycle for less sweet reasons. Rodrigo has come under fire for copyright theft and plagiarism for her songs Deja Vu and Good 4 U.

What happened?

Rodrigo’s highly anticipated debut album, Sour, was released in the wake of the success of Drivers License. Music fans quickly noted the similarities between Rodrigo’s songs and already popularized songs including . Despite the similarities, some are arguing it’s questionable if Rodrigo committed copyright theft. Good 4 U has a similar melody and chord progressions with Paramore’s Misery Business, but besides the angsty punk undertones many generations of teens have come to love, many contend the songs are not all that similar.

What is copyright and copyright infringement?

Copyright is the or perform a musical work. Copyright infringement is the use or production of copyright-protected material without the permission of the copyright holder. In essence, copyright infringement is plagiarism. In Canada, courts will determine whether a body of work has been infringed upon using the . Copyright protections are granted as soon as a work is created, so long as it meets the conditions set out in the Act.

What are music royalties? Why did Rodrigo pay them?

Music royalties are payments received by songwriters, music composers, and publishers . Essentially, artists pay royalties to copyright holders in exchange for using part of their work. Like them or not, the music industry heavily depends on royalties and many artists rely on them as a primary form of income. The growing popularity of music streaming platforms like Spotify, , further cements their importance.

This royalty debacle has been costly for Rodrigo. Hayley Williams and Joshua Farro were given writing credits on Good 4 U and Swift, Antonoff, and Clark will also receive writing credits and on Deja Vu. These moves will likely cost Rodrigo millions of dollars in publishing royalties. When weighing the costs of paying royalties versus lengthy litigation against fellow hitmakers in court, Rodrigo and her team likely felt it was most cost-beneficial to simply pay the royalties.

Are artists abusing copyright?

Artists are becoming increasingly concerned about outlandish copyright claims in the wake of the 2013 case involving the estate of Marvin Gaye and the trio behind Blurred Lines, Robin Thicke, Pharrell Williams, and Clifford Harris Jr. (T.I.). The trio alleged that the Gaye estate staked an ownership claim of not a song or an album, but rather an entire genre of music. Thicke and Williams were found guilty of copyright infringement and were ordered to pay This amount was , in addition to half of all future royalties from Blurred Lines.

Although caselaw is rife with examples of major royalty deals ordered to artists, not all cases end with million-dollar payouts. Katy Perry was successful in her appeal against rapper Flame for her song Dark Horse, which Flame asserted plagiarized his song, Joyful Noise. Specifically, the case centered around an eight-note “ostinato.” The judge ruled that the ostinato . Perry’s lawyer praised the ruling and proudly stated, “building blocks cannot be monopolized.”

The controversy has only further advanced the argument that outrageous music copyright lawsuits are going to lead to stagnation in the music industry. Some record labels are going so far as to hire on-call musicologists who can review new releases for potential copyright claims. Artists signed with major record labels are also encouraged to sign “Errors and Omissions” insurance, which protects them from legal challenges to their intellectual property. Errors and Omissions policies . Shockingly, copyright litigation in the United States . Along with its high costs, the fear of copyright litigation risks preventing less established, albeit talented, musicians from climbing the charts without the support of a major record label.

Although new to the hit music scene, Olivia Rodrigo has not only offered music lovers catchy pop anthems, but has also advanced the conversation surrounding copyright theft in the music industry. While some believe Rodrigo is guilty of plagiarism, others feel she is a victim of the corollary impacts of the growing popularity of streaming services and increasingly outrageous copyright infringement suits. The latter camp can only hope that the courts will become more stringent in future suits to prevent music monopolies.

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Eight Mile Style, the company copyright-holder of “Lose Yourself” an action on copyright infringement against the National Party for copying an original musical work protected by copyright. In response, the National Party agreed that “Eminem Esque” borrows certain chords from the composition “Lose Yourself”. The National Party admitted that such borrowing might have resulted in the similarities between the two musical compositions. However, according to the National Party, such borrowing is not tantamount to copyright infringement. The court that to resolve the dispute; one must first distinguish between “illegitimate copying and permissible borrowing”. Such distinction is crucial for upholding , which is to provide a just reward for the creator and to encourage creative process.

IP Osgoode's Prof. emphasizes that is an . Musicians often experiment with previously known chords and tunes to develop original compositions, a process that often results in the emergence of whole new genres of . For example, such genres as jazz and blues represent the result of cross-fertilization of Western European and African traditions. Expansive copyright protection may if it penalizes borrowing in the . In this case, any musician aspiring to create a composition will second-guess herself in fear of a potential lawsuit for copyright infringement. Limited copyright protection may not only strip the copyright holder of her reward but also result in the situation when the creators will borrow from already known compositions without adding any creative value. Such an outcome is problematic for creators, users, the and public at large. The reason is that over a period of time such borrowing can produce a creative desert when all songs in the music charts sound alike. Copyright law is thus charged with striking a between the competing interests of the stakeholders.

In the Eight Mile Style case, the court agreed that musicians could be inspired by previous musical compositions and even use similar chords and melodies as building blocks for their own works. However, the unique compilation of these blocks in the musical work provides for distinctiveness and originality of the composition. Accordingly, to establish copyright infringement, the claimant must show either that . The analysis is therefore as the court looks beyond how many elements (chord-by-chord) of the original composition were replicated. The court accordingly ruled that “Lose Yourself” and “Eminem Esque” are “” and the latter “” in a way that makes the tracks “”. Such an alteration of original musical work constitutes infringement when “”.

The court ruled that the National Party used (including copying and reproduction) the song “Lose Yourself” without any authorization in its advertising campaigns. These actions constitute infringement under the . The court assessed the damages according to the user principle i.e., “”. In assessing damages, the court examined a number of factors such as, for example, the conditions under which the licenses for “Lose Yourself” have been previously granted by the Eight Mile Style and the territorial coverage of the broadcasting for Eminem Esque. After examining these factors, the court concluded that the license fee award against the National Party constitutes NZ $ 600 000. The court also noted that the National Party included Eminem Esque in its political campaign after obtaining professional advice from the third parties. The second hearing will determine whether the third parties will carry on the ultimate liability. Now we can only speculate whether the third parties will pay damages and at what amount. Yet it is clear that in assessing the third parties’ liability for professional advice, the court has to analyse the nature of relationship between the third parties and the National Party, to what extent the National Party relied on the given professional advice.

Ksenia Polonskaya is an IPilogue Editor and a PhD Candidate at Queen's University, Faculty of Law.

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In order for the turnover of styles and inventory to be profitable for fast-fashion retailers, costs must be cut somewhere. As such, intellectual property (IP) law and labour law issues have become increasingly ubiquitous for fast fashion brands and have drawn condemnation in the court of public opinion. For example, fast-fashion retailers, such as H&M, are increasingly facing scrutiny with respect to their .

Furthermore, international fast fashion retailer, , is no stranger to IP law disputes.

This time, Zara has set its sights on the innovative and contemporary clothing brand ACRONYM and has debatably copied its famous “functional strap” outerwear. Is it fair for Zara to copy a design that costs ACRONYM a significant amount of time and to produce?

As noted by the Toronto-based style law blog , which was co-founded by myself and IPilogue colleague Alessia Monastero, Zara’s repeat offences do not go unnoticed. In fact, two of Zara’s most notable IP disputes involve ACRONYM and .

In this case, ACRONYM founder, , has been selling its impeccably made coats for over 10 years. In fact, it has become known for its high-quality garments that are made to last. These designs feature a “functional strap” on the insides of the coats and contain a label that reads: “Interior crossbody strap allows wearer to carry over their shoulder.”

: ACRONYM, : Zara's Imitation Label

Aside from its creative designs, ACRONYM also uses a unique advertising plan, which markets the brand almost exclusively to fashion enthusiasts. For example, unlike mainstream brands, such as Chanel and Louis Vuitton, ACRONYM does not advertise on television, does not heavily seek out celebrities as ambassadors, nor aggressively use social media for promotion and marketing. Nevertheless, many have slowly started to become aware of the label due to Hugh’s partnerships with Stone Island and Nike.

The aim of copyright law, generally, is the protection of copyright owners to disallow others to copy one’s work without permission. The promise of this protection promotes creativity and the orderly exchange of ideas. However, it seems as though Zara does not entirely care about such protective mechanisms, since it is to copyright infringement. Perhaps, the revenues from selling copied designs en-mass offsets their litigation costs, though this is just speculation.

ACRONYM is protected by its , which was filed and published in 2003. Under this , ACRONYM “has the right to prevent third parties from making, selling or importing articles bearing or embodying a design which is a copy, or substantially a copy, of the protected design, when such acts are undertaken for commercial purposes.” Zara’s functional strap certainly meets all of these criteria.

The United States Court of Appeals in , stated, “[I]f, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other.”

Since the primary difference between the ACRONYM and Zara products is the quality of the material, an “ordinary observer” can very easily mistake the two labels since a reasonable shopper normally does not spend a lot of time examining the nuances of product quality. In essence, the products appear “substantially the same”.

Zara’s defence relies on a “sufficient distinction” between the two products. However, as seen in , the threshold for this is quite high. What constitutes as “sufficiently distinct” is often an additional part to the product or a substantial difference in the overall look. Given that Zara’s imitation does not, in fact, make a significant change to the original ACRONYM design, it is unlikely that a court will view it as being “sufficiency distinct”. Even if the court does find a distinction, it may decide to look at the prior art to ensure that no confusion will take place with respect to the product.

It nevertheless seems unfair that Zara is able to provide its consumers with a product that looks very similar to one that is being sold for almost 6 times its price point. However, since the onus remains on the party alleging the infringement to bring the issue forward, some labels may think that the cost of litigation –both time and effort– does not present a valuable trade-off.

Take ACRONYM, for example, with designs that are incredibly well made. While ACRONYM takes a detail-oriented approach to the quality, style, and longevity of their products, Zara’s research mostly consists of the latest trends and looking at the designs of other labels. As such, Hugh is not bothered by the copycats that have set their sights on the label, especially the fast fashion retailers that focus solely on style and very little, if at all, on quality. This is because Hugh does not feel as though he is losing the customers who prefer to purchase Zara’s cheaper imitation for the look as opposed to the quality. In fact, when asked his opinion on Zara’s imitation of the signature jacket, Hugh reportedlyÌę with a simple: “LOL.”

Well played.

Saba Samanian is an IPilogue Editor and a JD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School.

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Bandopadhyay argues that “while originality is widely accepted as one of the fundamental ingredients of a copyrightable work, the determination of originality with respect to photography is even more tenuous than with other copyrightable works, in ways that judicial decisions ignore and legal scholarship has left unexplored.” Photographs are protected under the Protection of Original Design in the , codified in the US under Title 17, Chapter 13. Canada extends protection to photographs as “artistic works” under the section 2 of the .

Connecting the Dots

The connection Bandopadhyay draws between intellectual property and disaster begins with his interest in how law produces meaning in society. He believes that law produces meaning by controlling the means of knowledge production, and therefore, the production of photographic documentation of disasters and catastrophes. He begins by recalling his work on a disaster management project for the past five years that exposed him to how states created and maintained power by using information-management strategies. Dating back to the mid-late 18th centuries, modern states emerged by devising rules, regulations, conditions and institutions that allowed for something called a “disaster” to occur. From this, these states could offer some explanation or interpretation over the disaster, creating the narrative behind each catastrophe. Through this act of control, Bandopadhyay believes, modern states could maintain power even when the state was unable to have actual control over that disaster. This study produced two findings; first, that disaster exists as a real “thing” and second, that disaster exists as an interpretive context over which various groups battle for power. For the purposes of his current project and to further his argument, he focuses on the second finding, supporting a more subjective and contextualized consideration of disaster photography.

It seems that the connection between visualization and disaster then comes down to the human factor of interpretation. Bandopadhyay highlights that if disasters are interpretive creatures, then visualization is very important because, for most of the world, visualization is how we relate to the world. We understand the environment, each other and therefore, ourselves, ultimately shaping what we see and whether we believe what we see. Intellectual property, or copyright specifically, is, therefore, the legal regime that controls the means of which visualization is produced, who gets to own, transfer, manage and monitor the property, and determine who can assign meaning to intellectual property. Bandopadhyay studies disaster photography in terms of copyright law because it helps us understand how a legal regime typically disassociated with catastrophic events can nevertheless have a role in how we perceive ourselves in relation to those catastrophic events.

Familiarly Unfamiliar

As everyday consumers, we deal with disaster photography more than we think. Bandopadhyay goes on to explain a more meaningful way that we associate disaster with imagery in what I would simply describe as a compare/contrast system with multiple photographs. For example, the Hurricane Katrina Memory Bank is a digital storage space, a concept of contrasting the past with the present using photograph that started to become more prevalent after September 11th. This storage space asks people from all over the world to submit photos of disasters that are first archived and then geographically pinpointed using Google Maps. The meaning in this process comes from the contextualization of the disaster photograph, allowing the user to tell and share their stories. This way, disasters become less anonymous and irrelevant, evolving into more of a personal connection between the online world and those originally affected by the disaster.

Originality Underexposed

Bandopadhyay believes that at the heart of all disaster photography is originality. The legal restrictions on using disaster photography begin to tighten because there is a risk of the after-disaster photograph being an original, copyrighted work. In the US, to be copyrightable, the work must pass what Bandopadhyay calls a “mythical bar” of originality that comprises of two components. First, the work must be an independent creation, and second, that the work requires “something more.” For such an important cornerstone of intellectual property protection, one would think the courts would have adopted a more defined understanding of what original means. Nonetheless, originality is a value for which we determine whether something is worthy of being copyrightable, therefore making originality one of the most important values to consider in photography.

Part of is his critique is that there is no consideration of a narrative when formulating that value. In comparison with the copyright laws of the most developed countries, most agree on the determinative factor of originality for copyright protection. In the US, the standard for writing, for example, is very low as any expression of creativity passes this bar. Bandopadhyay’s problem with this is that while there is agreement that originality is in the value of work, there is no direction as to how we determine originality, and for what reasons. In turn, this creates a need for comprehensive criteria to guide our determination of originality in photography.

The answer to his call may exist in some form within criteria first developed in the UK, adopted by the European Court of Justice, and then by Canadian courts. Although the US has not explicitly adopted this set of criteria, US courts use a very similar consideration set comprising of the (i) subject matter of the creation, (ii) originality and rendition, and (iii) originality and timing.

Subject Matter of the Creation

To help explain what “subject matter” means to US courts, Bandopadhyay points to case law, specifically to ., one of the most famous decisions that dealt with copyright and photography. In this 1884 case, Napoleon Sarony visited New 91ŃÇÉ« and took a series of photographs, one of which Burrow-Giles printed and sold 85,000 contrasted. Burrow-Giles Lithographic argued that although the Copyright Act extended to authors and writers, the provisions did not extend to protecting photographs. In this time, photographs were generally not regarded as artistic work, but instead, simple mechanical representations of reality. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with Burrow-Giles’ assessment of photography as non-art, for two reasons. First, the Court said the photographs are original works of art by drawing analogies, not to writing but to paintings. Second, the Court said the photographs represented an original scene because it did not exist before Sarony created the scene and it would not exist but-for Sarony’s creative input. For these reasons, Sarony was found to own the subject matter of the photograph, and found Burrow-Giles’ reproductions to be in violation of Sarony’s copyright.

Notwithstanding this decision, Bandopadhyay notes the problems associated with analogizing photographs to paintings. First, photography is not an art of arrangement in the same way painting is because, in a painting, the forms only need to relate to each other. Bandopadhyay claims that if he knew nothing of the world, he could see a painting and it could still exist and therefore function as a painting. He says he could then close his eyes, draw lines on paper and his creation could still count as a painting. On the other hand, in a photograph, not only do the forms of arrangement relate to each other, but they also relate to things outside of the photograph, in the real world. Bandopadhyay further claims that if he did not know what a tree looked like, then he saw a picture of a tree, the subject matter would not make sense to him. This is because of the reference to forms, in this example, a tree, are out in the real world, therefore creating a need for a precluding reference before the subject matter can be interpreted.

Photographs also possess a transparent element; we look at a photograph and tend to believe what we see. We also interpret photographs in different ways, admitting the image to mean different things to different people. This is where Bandopadhyay believes disaster photography “as a lens” is useful because this type of photography amplifies the typical reaction to the information and emotion we expect to take from a traditional photograph, making disaster photography automatically newsworthy. When we look at disaster photography, we believe the subject matter as truth. Disaster photography is then relied upon to serve as memories to those affected, and as a medium to invoke emotion from those who are not.

Contribution

To help explain contributory originality, Bandopadhyay gives the example of American photographer, , and her famed photograph. At the time, Lange was touring the United States in the mid-late 1930s, taking photographs of unemployed and poverty-stricken families to send to Congress, pressuring the government to send assistance to the displaced and migrant workers of America. She found this family in a small town and without much conversation or any questions, she took five exposures of the mother and her two children. The original photograph was taken at a very close range yet the woman was looking away with her children hovering towards her, as if the mother knew what the photograph was for. The purpose of the photograph was never verbally communicated by either Lange or the mother, but Lange claims the woman was an actual collaborator in the production of the photograph. In later years, the daughter of the mother agreed. Although the mother was not told how to pose, she knew what the photograph was for and knew how she was to look if the photograph was going to send the help she desperately needed. In this collaborative understanding, Bandopadhyay believes the benefits of viewing photography as a web of relationships, instead of a hierarchical structure, has shown to have great benefits for photography.

Originality as Rendition

’s famed explains how originality can be found in rendition. Bandopadhyay establishes that the mountain in the image is not real nature but instead, how Ansel wanted the world to perceive nature. Adam’s pre-visualized idea of a hyper-real nature was executed by his own form of editing, or pre-visualizing images, to see in his mind what he wanted to exist in the real world, then taking steps to make that a reality in his photographs. This photograph became synonymous with the natural wilderness and was a main symbol of the 1970s environmental movement. Bandopadhyay argues that the photograph became so well known because it established a reality that people were convinced by. People felt this was pure nature, contrasted by the grime and grain of the industrialization that was taking place in the United States at the time. Ansel spent months revisiting the same location, studying topography, weather patterns, and even exposure levels. Simply, the photograph was completely manufactured before capturing the image. This way, Bandopadhyay thinks, to say this is a rendition, and therefore something that is not a powerful creation of reality, any different than the creation of subject matter, is absurd because Adams convinced hundreds of thousands of people to put their lives on the line protesting; a reality indeed created by rendition.

Originality and Timing

Of the three factors, Bandopadhyay believes timing is the least strong claim to prove a photograph is original. The US Court explains this factor with a rather barebones justification using ’s Ìęto show that originality in timing creates no rights over the subject matter. The Court held that Mengelsen did not make the bear eat the fish, for if he stood there long enough and took enough photographs, he would have captured that same image. However, this is only one, a rather narrow, understanding of how timing can be determined to be original. Bandopadhyay gives four examples of alternative understandings of original timing. First, , the father of real-time photography, would wait until the moment of life would happen, or the “moment of equilibrium”, when everything would “click”, and then he would take the photo. Second, Cartier-Bresson, also waited for a moment, but more specifically, “a decisive moment when, if memory serves, the organization of forms and significance of events, coincides in the mind of the photographer.” Until these factors all came together, Cartier-Bresson would not take the photograph. Third, critic ’s perspective emphasizes a temporal element, “the choice is not between photography X and Y, but the photograph at X moment and Y moment,” incorporating context and environmental change into his consideration. In a more personalized perspective, explains “through an event has come to mean
something worth photographing, it is still the ideology, that determines what constitutes an event,” or in other words, photographers take on a gate-keeping role in determining what and why something is worthy of being photographed.

These alternate understandings allow for other factors such as culture to determine timing. Based on who you are, where you grew up, and what you think is important, non-numerical timing will shape if and when you decide to take a picture, making culture and personalized factors critical when discussing the concept of originality in timing. Bandopadhyay claims that entire disasters can pass without notice if people are not prompted to photograph it. He believes that although there are other ways to offer narratives on how originality can occur, when we try to find originality purely by looking at the subject matter itself, these important narratives fail to be considered when determining holistic originality. Excluding photography skills, social justice, personal and societal ideology, culture and other normative factors that might lead to a coherent narrative and justification for why something was photographed eventually become lost and irrelevant in US courts. Thus, Bandopadhyay rejects the notion that originality in timing, unless defined as Megelsen’s Catch of the Day, click-it-or-you-miss-it photography, is incapable of meaningfully contributing to originality.

Once we broaden our understanding of timing, it then becomes one of the most important features of a photograph’s originality. Bandopadhyay says that timing is capable of affecting us by evoking absence and a state of change. If we look at a photograph of disaster debris, it has little effect. But when we compare it with a contrasting photograph in a before-after comparison, we can then see the state of change, and both individual photos are given unique feeling and effect.

Bandopadhyay reiterates that timing makes contributions to the photograph and the only way to see that is when you allow originality to have a narrative. We have to understand that someone has put something in the photograph for a reason and we need to study why it was put there, otherwise, we risk fetishizing the photograph and the photographer.

Same Picture, Different Frame

In all, Bandopadhyay reiterates that post-damage disaster photographs do not have narrative when they stand alone. Otherwise, they are simply surveillance photographs with little purpose. We can rescue the unpurposive photographs by adding a narrative of some sort with a comparison that shows a state of change. The issue highlighted here is that many of the post-damage photographs are copyrighted, in effect, legally sheltering these images from adopting a fuller meaning and purpose.Ìę Bandopadhyay is . Ultimately, Bandopadhyay’s findings suggest the US Courts are missing the point of originality when labor, skill, judgment, attention and detail are left out of the conversation when making a determination of originality.

Robel Sahlu is an IPilogue Editor and a JD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School.

The post Bigger Picture, Bigger Frame? Dr. Saptarishi Bandopadhyay's Recast of Narrative in Copyright and Disaster Photography appeared first on IPOsgoode.

TCA v McCollum [1] examines the copyright protection for Abbott and Costello's beloved Ìęroutine. There is no clear picture of who first wrote , but most agree that Abbott and Costello evolved it through public performances and radio appearances. The decision hinged on the tangled ownership history of the routine.

The plaintiffs, who claim to own the copyright in Who’s On First, filed against the producers of , a play in which a possessed hand puppet and puppeteer trade lines from the routine. In the initial , the trial court found that repurposing the routine in a darkly comedic play was transformative fair use. The Second Circuit spent about two dozen pages of the judgment rejecting that finding, and only then determined that there was no copyright interest to be infringed.

Under the , works were initially protected for 28 years from publication, renewable for a second term. Since was the first publication of the routine, its protection ran alongside that of the film. However, Abbott and Costello—not the film producers—were considered the authors of the basic routine because it pre-dated their contracts with the producers. Because they licensed rather than assigned their copyright, they were personally responsible for renewing it in 1968. They did not, so the basic routine was in the public domain when written into Hand of God.

The jokes in Kaseberg v CONACO [2]Ìę. They are also much shorter—one-liners that Alex Kaseberg published on or on .ÌęHe filed a complaint in US District Court alleging Conan O’Brien and his staff stole five jokes for . Team Coco’s answer is brief but claims that Kaseberg’s jokes are not protectable subject matter, that they did not copy him, that the jokes were not original, and that any copying was fair use. Arguments are likely to focus on whether Kaseberg’s jokes are protected by copyright.

Under the merger doctrine, if there are only a small number of ways to express an idea, the idea and the expression merge, and the expression cannot be protected. If the idea behind Joke #1 is “even on an otherwise empty airliner, the only two passengers will compete for resources” there might be a number of punchlines: fighting over the arm rest, putting the seat back, waiting in line for the bathroom. However, if the idea is “even on an otherwise empty airplane, the only two passengers will fight over the armrest”, options are much more limited.

As well, since the jokes fit a common comedy rhythm and employ common comedy tropes related to current events, they may be scĂšnes Ă  faire, not original enough for protection.

Although since superseded, the US Copyright Office’s , clarified that “short quips and slang expressions consisting of not more than short phrases are not registrable.” The jokes in question are each two sentences long and follow a familiar comedy rhythm: one set-up line, one punch-line. They may not include enough expression to warrant protection.

Joke theft is a in the comedy world. Copyright protection might seem like an obvious solution . Together, these two cases illustrate why comedy writing does not generally mesh well with copyright: comedy routines evolve over time and are developed amidst standard tropes and structures.

A , from vaudeville when jokes were widely copied to modern stand-up when jokes are viewed as personal property. The paper details a self-policing, norms-based system of joke protection among comedians, and suggests that lawsuits are not necessary since informal sanctions are cheaper and more effective.

The Conan lawsuit likely results from one of the particular problems the paper identifies with norms-based enforcement. Where the alleged joke thief is substantially more famous than the writer, informal mechanisms for enforcement break down. Even if the legal arguments are on shaky ground, a lawsuit--especially one that brings bad publicity to the defendant--may help balance the scales.

Jacquilynne Schlesier is an IPilogue Editor and a JD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School.Ìę Jacquilynne is currently enrolled in Osgoode's Intellectual Property Law Intensive Program. As part of the program requirements, students were asked to write a blog on a topic of their choice.

[1] TCA Television v. Kevin McCollum, No 16-134-cv (11 October 2016, 2d Cir).

[2] Kaseberg v. CONACO, No 15-CV-016370-JLS-DHB (Filed: 22 July 2015, SD Cal).

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Fulk was allegedly by MS MR, a group signed to Columbia/Sony Records and therefore under the same label as BeyoncĂ©, to direct one of their new videos. According to the filmmaker, Palinoia was then sent to multiple individuals working for the label, including Bryan Younce, senior vice-president for video production at Columbia Records. Younce, who had previously made videos for BeyoncĂ©, asked for Fulk’s email five months before work on the Lemonade trailer began. He later asked the plaintiff for story boards and a development plan for the record label. The filmmaker claims that the access to his work explains “.”

How strong is Fulk’s case?

Like many copyright infringement cases, the outcome of this lawsuit will mainly depend on where the line between influence and copying is drawn. According to , the following must be proven in order to establish infringement: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original. Proof of copying consists in two elements: (1) evidence of access to the plaintiff’s work and (2) probative similarities between the works.ÌęMore importantly, the law only protects and not ideas themselves.

While some might be more about Fulk’s chances of winning this lawsuit, the filmmaker seems to have, at first sight, a strong case. In his complaint, the plaintiff mentions nine different instances where substantial similarities between the two works can be seen. These elements make up . The mentioned resemblances, with the proof of access to Fulk’s work, allow the burden of proof to be shifted to the defendant who will then have “.”

However, when taking a closer look at both parties’ work, one could easily argue that some of the similarities Fulk mentions in his complaint lie within the scope of non-copyrightable elements.ÌęThis lawsuit could therefore end up like one of the most recent and similar cases to Fulk’s: .

After being by the agency 72andSunny for a potential Starbucks campaign and eventually declining a deal, Maya Hayuk, a muralist known for her use of colorful geometric patterns, sued the chain, claiming that their new packaging shared too many similarities with her own work. A month later, her complaint was tossed out by the District Court in Manhattan. The judge that “what the Plaintiff [had] described as the 'core' of her work in theÌęaggregate, namely the use of overlapping colored rays, and colors and shapes, is tantamount to a set of unprotectable concepts or methods over which there can be no copyright monopoly conferred.”ÌęUltimately, Hayuk’s work and creativity both rely on the use of “raw material” such as colors and geometric forms, which are part of the public domain. He later added that “the total concept and feel of the protectable expression of those ideas in the Hayuk Works and the expression of those ideas in the Frappuccino Works are not substantially similar.”

Unfortunately for Fulk, some of his claims do rely on the similarities between elements that might be deemed original. For instance, one of the nine scenes he mentioned include a shot of a person with their head down, next to graffiti. As mentioned previously, ideas cannot be protected under copyright law and showcasing a distressed character lying against a wall with their head down is most likely not original enough.

Fulk also mentions the similarity between the black-and-white title screens in both works. However, these screens have been used in multiple movies before (for instance, and , just to name a few). Moreover, as colors and fonts are considered "", Fulk’s title screens cannot be protected under copyright law.

As for more abstract similarities, the plaintiff's complaint mentionsÌęthat both videos have a “heavy, dark and angst-laden” mood and that both works’ paces are “a rapid succession of short scenes or montage, interspersed with notable intermittent pauses through exaggeratedly slow scenes.” But just like for black-and-white title screens, “Palinoia” does not create a new genre. As have previously pointed out, even some perfume commercials are filmed and put together in the same manner. Proving that the substantially similar elements between Fulk’s “Palinoia” and Beyoncé’s “Lemonade” trailer are protected under copyright law might therefore be harder than it seems.

A potential court decision could be very enlightening in regards to the current state of copyright law. Realistically, the chances of this lawsuit ever making it to court are fairly low - most cases like this are settled out of court -Ìęas they are with involving visual arts.

Aicha Tohry is an IPilogueÌęEditor and anÌęUniversitĂ© de MontrĂ©al LLB holder.

The post When Life Gives You Lemons, Make (Your Own) Lemonade: Beyoncé Sued for Her Latest Album Trailer appeared first on IPOsgoode.